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‘Religion is a political force.’
– Michel Foucault, Religion and Culture, 107 –
‘I am sure I am not able to provide people with what they expect. I never behave like a 
prophet – my books don’t tell people what to do. 
And people often reproach me for not doing so (and maybe they are right), and at the same 
time they reproach me for behaving like a prophet.’
– Michel Foucault, Remarks on Marx, 11
‘I have learned to keep silent sometimes, and also that one has to learn to talk, to be quiet in 
the proper way: that a person with backgrounds has to have foregrounds, be it for others, be 
it for oneself. For the foregrounds are necessary to recover from oneself, and to make it 
possible for others to live with us.’
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In September 1978, French philosopher Michel Foucault (1926–
1984), possibly the most famous philosopher in Europe at the time, 
went to Iran as an inexperienced political journalist, controversially 
reporting on the unfolding revolution, undeniably compromising 
and wounding his reputation in the European intellectual 
community in the process. Given the revolution’s bloody 
aftermath  and its violent theocratic development, is Foucault’s 
Iranian expedition, with a second visit to that turbulent country in 
November 1978, simply to be understood as a critical error in 
judgement, with disastrous consequences for his legacy? 
What exactly did Foucault hope to achieve in Iran in 1978 (and in 
the first months of 1979), explicitly supporting the cause of the 
revolting masses and effectively isolating himself from the 
European intellectual community and the Western liberal tradition?
This treatise investigates what can be described as an open 
nerve in Foucault scholarship by interpreting Foucault’s primary 
texts from this period, commenting on various positions in the 
scholarship over the past three decades and eventually proposing 
that Foucault’s ‘mistake’, resulting from his ‘self-consciousness’ 
and ‘uncertainty’, was indeed a highly philosophical endeavour, yet 
misinterpreted by the majority of his contemporaries, to some 
extent by his most noteworthy biographers from the 1990s, and by 
some eminent scholars from the more recent scholarship over the 
past two decades. The issue of Foucault’s involvement in Iran in 
1978–1979 is still a relatively unexplored theme in Foucault research 
and one that is often still bypassed, as the general view seems to 
be that it was a breathtaking mistake, comparable to Heidegger’s 
notorious flirtation with National Socialism in the early 1930s.
The research background of this work comprises two elaborate 
articles that I published in 2009 regarding Foucault’s involvement 




in the Iranian revolution (Beukes 2009a, 2009b). I found it 
compulsory to change my position on a number of issues 
addressed in those articles, in the light of the recent (and crucial) 
developments in the scholarship (especially with regard to 
Behrooz Ghamari-Tabrizi’s [2016] and Marnia Lazreg’s [2017] 
outstanding works, as well as Iran Namag 3[2], Special Issue on 
Foucault in Iran, under editorship of Mohamad Tavakoli-Targhi 
and Ghamari-Tabrizi [2018]). I was in the light of my reading of 
these recent works able to maintain certain fundamental aspects 
of my reception of more than a decade ago but felt that I had to 
rework the bulk of that reception, leading to a more outspoken 
defence of Foucault’s position, a more nuanced contextualisation 
of the influence of Neoliberalism on Foucault’s thought at the 
time and a subtle polemic engagement with some of Foucault’s 
critics both at the time in France and in later interpretations of his 
Iran writings.
This is how this book came about. Its objective is to provide a 
study of a brief historical event in awareness and understanding 
of its context, with its wider consequences and repercussions, 
namely Foucault’s two short visits to Iran in September and 
November 1978, intended as a ‘journalistic’ expedition – yet 
resulting in a highly idiosyncratic, modern-critical and, at first 
blush, contra-Enlightened, archaic interpretation of the revolution. 
The seemingly arbitrary quality of Foucault’s visits to Iran does 
however not only provide a particular focus, but also a dense 
perspective on a wide arrangement of proximate philosophical 
considerations and political events, which are addressed here.
The work is not excessively polemic in its style, orientation and 
approach, neither is it overly critical of Foucault nor of his critics, 
but rather seeks for a constructive engagement of Foucault’s 
involvement in the Iranian revolution in fairness and balance. 
I nevertheless offer sympathetic Motifforschung as far as Foucault 
is concerned, taking a wide spectrum of relevant factors into 
consideration, and attempt to present a constructive alternative 
to the condescending critique of Foucault by the majority of his 
Preface
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opponents (and many former friends and allies) at the time and 
in the decades thereafter. The book in this sense consistently 
attempts to move beyond the limitations of an ordinary polarising 
approach. The same approach is hence applied to Foucault’s 
critics, which results in an open-ended engagement, instead of 
attempting a ‘final word’ or ‘last verdict’, thereby not partaking in 
the dismissive attitudes often visible in contemporary 
philosophical discourse. In the same vein, I do not turn a blind eye 
to the limitations in Foucault’s evaluation of the situation at the 
time of the revolution, notably Foucault’s ‘lack of knowledge’ of 
both Sunni and Shia Islam, but these are presented as explicable 
shortcomings, and not as fatal flaws in philosophical and personal 
integrity.
Finally, this work attempts to provide value to the Foucault 
scholarship on only a few of many possible levels. Disseminating 
three concepts that are key to understand Foucault’s involvement 
in the Iranian revolution (Otherness, Present history and Political 
spirituality), the work progresses by providing a thorough 
overview of what really did happen in Iran after Foucault arrived 
in Tehran in September 1978 (and what really did happen was not 
conforming to the West’s idea of progression, but an Iranian idea 
of progression, on its own terms); analysing Foucault’s reports 
back to France, in a detailed fashion, offering an extensive 
overview of the interpretations on this issue (however often 
reluctant and reserved) from the Foucault scholarship over the 
past three decades; presenting Foucault’s involvement in the 
Iranian revolution not as a ‘mistake’ nor as a ‘critical error in 
judgement’, but as a deeply philosophical position that 
corresponds to Foucault’s theoretical positions on power, death, 
madness, uncertainty, spirituality, Orientalism and Otherness, all 
preceding the revolution in Iran; and finally, by affording a 
historical overview of Foucault’s involvement in the Iranian 
revolution, a responsible and non-polemical synopsis of the 
scholarship’s attempts to deal with the issue and an original 
interpretation and presentation of the legitimacy of Foucault’s 
‘presence’ (even in his eventual absence) in Iran from September 
Preface
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1978 to April 1979. In an age where it has become urgent to 
reinterpret both Shia and Sunni legacies within the context of 
radicalised Islam, the book argues for a Foucaultian recognition 
of the ‘Orient Other’ as nothing more, yet nothing less, than 
‘An-Other Self’.
The final manuscript of this book was edited during the silent 
and grey months from March to June 2020, in a world hesitating 
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Yet again, ‘what is an author?’
Whatever else he may have become and if he indeed became 
‘what one is’, Michel Foucault (15 October 1926–25 June 1984) was 
first and foremost a philosopher and an activist historian of 
ideas.  Since he started publishing his provocative philosophical 
works in the late 1950s, he always maintained a unique interest in 
the role of the intellectual as both an analyst and an activist. 
Foucault moved ideas and his ideas moved the world.
Yet in 1978, events broke out in Iran that stirred up both the 
world and ideas about the world: these events have proved to be 
highly consequential for international politics up to this very day. 
It all began in January 1978, when the first public protests against 
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)-plotted and United States 
Introduction
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(US)-supported regime of the ‘Shah’, Mohammad Pahlavi, started 
to manifest itself. The protesters were quite clear about their 
intention, namely the establishment of an Islamic Republic, 
created by the Shia Islamic movement under the leadership of 
the exiled Ayatollah Khomeini. The protests continued throughout 
and grew in intensity during the first half of 1978, forcing the Shah 
to appeal to President Jimmy Carter for US intervention and aid.
This political opposition was against what it perceived as the 
repressive and oppressive nature of the Shah’s regime and the 
self-indulgence of the regime’s cadres. The protests were also 
targeting the intense Western economic interests in Iran. The 
frustration of the protesters exploded in Tehran on ‘Black Friday’, 
08 September 1978, when police opened fire on large crowds, 
killing a large number of demonstrators. Foucault, having been 
commissioned by the Italian newspaper, Corriere Della Sera 
(with reprints in the French newspaper Le Nouvel Observateur), 
to visit Iran as some kind of ‘political journalist’ and write a series 
of articles on what was now clearly an unfolding revolution, 
arrived in the country a week after Black Friday.
Foucault was enthusiastic about the developing revolution 
from the outset. He was particularly interested in the religious 
quality of the resistance movement and was deeply moved by 
the sheer will of ordinary Iranians for a fundamental change in 
politics and political leadership. What Foucault witnessed in the 
streets of Tehran was for him the affirmation of one of his deepest 
intellectual convictions, namely that religion is a political force 
with an inherent potential to challenge established sets of 
subject–object relations, which is what ‘political power’ really is – 
a dynamic he would progressively refer to as ‘political spirituality’.
Khomeini was expelled from Iran in October 1978 because of 
his seemingly dangerous political tactics and took up residence 
in France. As the protest movement grew in numbers, yet also in 
a unique Dionysian frenzy, the Shah fled Iran. Khomeini returned 




Within weeks the true nature of this new leadership became 
morbidly evident: bitter reprisals and executions of loyalists to 
the Shah started to take place, most often in public. Foucault 
was bewildered by this development, yet he refused to 
substantially amend any of his published analyses of the moral 
qualities of the Iranian revolution. This refusal reflected an 
‘essential dichotomy’ in his thinking, an ‘issue that occupied him 
for most of his life’ (Oliver 2010:16), as an attempt to answer the 
critical question posed by the post-war generation who had 
experienced the German occupation of France and the 
deprivations of the Second World War: what determines the 
kind of life we lead? (cf. Oliver 2010:15–16). This question also 
provided impetus to Foucault’s involvement in Iran from 
September 1978 to April 1979.
According to Beukes (2009a), when Foucault went to Tehran 
in September 1978, he:
[W ]as France’s dominant and most celebrated public intellectual, 
renowned for his idiosyncratic critique of modernity, carried out 
through radical dissections of modern institutions that reversed the 
conventional wisdom about, amongst others, government, prisons, 
madness and sexuality. (p. 5)
He was at the time quite possibly the most famous philosopher in 
Europe, having produced stunning and provocative works over 
and beyond the conventional index of philosophy. This neo-index 
included madness, unreason, anarchy, language and the order of 
things, discipline and punishment, delinquency, sexuality as ‘an 
invention’, ars erotica as opposed to scientia sexualis, and 
‘spirituality’ as a ‘political’ notion. Although he would have been 
embarrassed to be framed into any sort of statistic, it does serve 
the enduring legacy of his unique critique of modernity by 
pointing out that  Foucault was, according to the authoritative 
Times Higher Education Bulletin (28 April 2009), the most cited 
scholar in the humanities in 2007 – and again in 2014 – followed 




Foucault thus was an influential thinker, precisely because of 
his fearless originality: in Discipline and Punish, Foucault (1975) 
had argued, for instance, that liberal democracy was, in fact, ‘a 
disciplinary society with a ferocious governmentality that 
punished with less physical severity in order to punish with 
greater efficiency’ (Beukes 2009a:5). Foucault’s critical resistance 
to modernity (Beukes 2009a) suggested that:
[T ]he modern institutions we trust to liberate humanity (the state, the 
clinic, the penal system, the asylum, the self-reforming church and so 
on) were in fact enslaving us in always reconfigured and deceptive 
ways, cunningly shifting the focus of discipline from the external to 
the internal, from our bodies to our souls. His whole oeuvre could 
be read as a revolt against this governmentality – and he found the 
perfect context for illustrating that revolt in this actual revolution, one 
that seemed to despise Western-modern governmentality as much 
as he did. (p. 5)
Foucault’s critical perspectives on modernity, based on his 
analyses of modern discourses of power, were thoroughly original 
in many other aspects: he famously postulated that modern 
power is not only repressive and negative or restrictive but also 
productive, positive or ‘discursive’, as he liked to call it 
(e.g. Foucault 1975:27). ‘Power is everywhere; it is pervasive. It 
crawls through the web of all social, political and economic 
relations’ (Beukes 2009a:5). Power is not merely being exercised 
‘from above’ – being everywhere, it is being exercised (from) 
everywhere: ‘[i]n the modern sense, knowledge is power, yet in 
the Foucaultian sense, power is knowledge’ (Beukes 2009a:5).
Foucault’s historical studies on the asylum, hospital, school, 
prison, military and many other modern institutions focused on 
what he called ‘modern technologies of power’, which create 
‘docile bodies’. These technologies of power operate according 
to a straightforward principle, which in an acronym (Beukes 
2009a:5) could be called a principle of ‘observe, control, 
normalise and examine’ (OCNE) (Foucault 1975:173). Modernity, 
therefore, firstly aspires to the panoptical position, the ‘single 
gaze which sees everything constantly’ (Foucault 1975:183), by 
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employing a hierarchical method of observation, as manifested in 
prisons, army barracks, hospitals, asylums, schools and so forth. 
What follows is a ‘normalising judgement’, the postulation of a 
set of rules that requires continuous observance. Soldiers, mental 
patients, students and prisoners, for example, internalise these 
rules. They all are now subject to a ‘small penal mechanism’ 
(Beukes 2009a:5). This mechanism ‘compares, differentiates, 
hierarchises, homogenises, excludes; in short, it normalises’ 
(Foucault 1975:183).
Eventually, the ‘examination’ follows, by which Foucault 
indicated an internalised-ritualised process that rewards confor 
mists and penalises non-conformists. In other words, modern 
power works by gathering knowledge about individuals (such as 
prisoners or patients), a knowledge through which they are 
constantly being ‘watched’ (Foucault [1975] 1995:217). Foucault’s 
crucial point (Beukes 2009a) was that:
[T ]he system only really becomes successful once this disciplinary 
power is enforced not only by the doctor, warden, psychologist, 
army officer, factory supervisor or teacher but also by the individual 
subject itself. (p. 5)
This subject has now internalised it as a necessity, as a ‘ritual’, of 
modern life (Foucault [1975] 1995:217). Modern power aspires in 
this way to maximum intensity with as little resistance as possible 
to increase ‘the docility of the elements in the system’, to keep 
them quiet and at their place (Foucault [1975] 1995:217).
Initially, Foucault was convinced that there could be no effective 
challenge to this unitary and disciplinary nature of modern power. 
Yet, later on in his career, towards the end of the 1970s and the 
early 1980s, nearing the completion of the second and third 
volumes of his trilogy, The History of Sexuality, Foucault began to 
allow for ‘local resistances’: because ‘power is everywhere, even at 
the most micro levels of society, points of resistance might be 
present everywhere in the same power network’ (Beukes 2009a:5). 
Foucault, as will be argued from his Iran writings, would engage 
the revolution in Iran exactly from this angle of ‘local resistance’.
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Foucault put his considerable influence behind the Iranian 
revolution that eventually did establish the totalitarian and 
violent Islamicist regime of Khomeini. This is an indisputable 
fact. Foucault’s public support of the revolution quite 
predictably raised the anger of the majority of French 
intellectuals at the time, especially protagonists of women’s 
liberation and gay rights, especially when it became clear that 
Khomeini’s victory, or final ‘triumph’, would manifest itself in 
the public execution of ‘homosexuals’ and the brutal 
suppression of human rights in general: much like the young 
Hegel’s enthusiasm for the French revolution, and Martin 
Heidegger’s reckless support for National Socialism, however 
brief it was, Foucault’s support of the Iranian revolution, if not 
for the Ayatollah himself, seemed to be a gigantic mistake for 
all who knew and did not know him (Tran 2011:160). At the end 
of April 1979, Foucault was in deep trouble.
However, and these are still the key questions: should the 
notions of a ‘gigantic mistake’, a ‘critical error in political and 
ethical judgement’, a ‘philosophical folly’, an ‘intellectual vanity’ 
(Beukes 2009a:2) have the last word on Foucault’s clearly 
controversial ‘journalistic’ expedition to Iran more than 40 years 
ago? This was and still is the case for some Foucault scholars, 
and yet for others, the minority, it simply was and is not that 
straightforward. Some of his critics argued that Foucault in Iran 
in 1978 was ‘a self-displaced French philosopher, in the wrong 
place at the wrong time, saying what should not have been said’ 
(Beukes 2009a:1); others, again the minority, argued that he was 
right where he should have been during the last quarter of 1978, 
‘reading and writing against the grain, saying against mandarin 
conventions what Western philosophers since Plato have always 
been saying: Things are not what they seem’ (Beukes 2009a:1). 
This book contextualises itself within the speculative frames of 
the last conviction.
Two considerations should be noted at the outset: firstly, 
the expedition to Iran was the closest that Foucault ever 
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came  to doing empirical work, ‘in the field’, as done by 
journalists. Although he participated in demonstrations in 
France and Tunisia in the 1960s and 1970s, his commitment to 
demon strations was always one of understatement. Foucault 
could sometimes leave the impression of being opinionated, 
but he certainly never was a blunt activist. He was a scholar of 
archives and always most at home in his study and libraries. 
However, the chance of ‘being a journalist’ marked for him a 
new ‘search for the world of the empirical, of the concrete 
event, which opens up in real-time, in all its confusion, 
complexity and immediacy’ (Lazreg 2017:125). For the first 
time in a long time, in 1978, the famous philosopher had an 
opportunity to leave his study, students and libraries, and 
engage the (for him) ‘other world’, the ‘East’ – twice actually, 
first Japan in the first months of 1978, and then Iran in 
September and November of the same year.
Secondly, a decade before going to Japan and Iran, Foucault 
had lived for two years in Tunisia in a different type of Muslim 
society: ‘[d]uring May 1968, just like the time of the Algerian War, 
I was not in France; always a bit lagging, on the margin’.1 The 
Tunisian students’ fearlessness and their resistance to a 
dictatorship made a deep impression on him. However, what 
Foucault experienced in Iran was different; something was quite 
unique about the demonstrations in Tehran, in particular: wholly 
different from Tunisia, an interplay between Islam and politics 
took place in Tehran, followed by an urgent call for change, made 
‘without an apparent ideological blueprint’ (Lazreg 2017:125). 
What is more, the radically public nature of demonstrations in 
Iran contradicted Foucault’s established preference for ‘silence 
as the best form of protest, (as a) a total abstention’.2 These two 
considerations indicate that Foucault was a novice and profoundly 
inexperienced ‘journalist’: the mere experience of being an 
1. Dits et écrits II, Foucault (1994:897; cf. Lazreg 2017:125, 152: endnote 15).
2. Dits et écrits II, Foucault (1994:670; via Lazreg 2017:126; 152: endnote 16).
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empirical commentator on a ‘revolution without ideology’ was 
completely new to him.
Yet an even more crucial consideration, going back to a famous 
Foucaultian rhetorical question, always lingers: what is an author? 
(Foucault 1977a:124–126). Foucault (1977a:126–127) in his career 
consistently problematised the possible hermeneutic significance 
of authorship, especially with regards to authorial intention. For 
Foucault, the notion of authorship refers to a function that for 
him resolved but especially hid many contradictions: we must, 
according to Foucault, get rid of our habit of exploring an author’s 
authority and intentions, and rather focus on how the power of 
discourse restricts both an author and that author’s statements. 
That is why Foucault never wrote memoirs or an autobiography, 
and certainly never would have authorised a biography: the 
author’s subjectivity is just too capricious, changeable and 
disconcerted, to ever be able to supply any hermeneutical key or 
basis for such a venture. Famously, he noted: ‘[d]o not ask me 
who I am and do not ask me to remain the same’ (Foucault in 
Miller 1993:32), which forms part of Foucault’s ’Art of Not Being 
Oneself’ (Robinson 2003:121–139).
So, again, ‘what is an author?’ Just how unsettling authorship 
really is, is shown in the author’s own transformation in the light 
of crucial developments in scholarship over the past decade. In 
2009, I published two rather elaborate articles on Foucault’s 
involvement in Iran, which I do not recognise myself as the 
‘author’ of.3 This author has changed, the scholarship has changed, 
Iran is changing and, even in death, the subject Michel Foucault 
keeps on shedding his discursive skin. Not even a nuanced 
designator such as hamartia would suffice for what this book 
now has in mind about Foucault’s involvement in Iran in 1978 and 
1979.
In 2009, I employed this classic Aristotelian notion, hamartia, 
signifying a ‘tragic error in judgement with disastrous conse 
3. Beukes (2009a, 2009b); see Lazreg (2017:152: endnotes 5 and 7).
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quences’, to argue that the scholarship in this sector of Foucault 
reception in the first decade of the 21st century had arrived at the 
crossroads: again, was Foucault’s involvement in Iran a mistake, or 
not; and if so, what was (and is) the price to be paid for the so-
called ‘mistake’ he had made? This complex Greek concept, 
hamartia, was used tactically, in a ‘Persian’ context, at the time: 
most famously used in Aristotle’s Poetics, it is often translated as 
a  ‘grave mistake’ or a ‘serious error in judgement’. In Greek, the 
word is rooted in the notion of ‘missing the mark’ [hamartanein] 
and covers a broad semantic spectrum that includes accidents 
and mistakes with severe consequences – in some of the theologies 
in the second Testament of the Christian Bible, even sin. In Greek 
tragedy, the concept as an error in judgement or an unwitting 
mistake is applied to the actions of the protagonist and is central 
to the plot of the tragedy. In particular, the protagonist may try to 
achieve a specific goal by making an error in judgement; however, 
the protagonist instead achieves the opposite, with disastrous 
consequences. Aristotle (Poetics 1453a; see Poetics 6.24) 
famously  cited the example of Sophocles’ Oedipus, who acted 
with consistent discipline to prevent the fulfilment of Oracle’s 
prediction that he would kill his father and have sex with his 
mother, but by his actions he instead caused those very things to 
happen’ (cf. Beukes 2009a:1).
Already then, a decade ago, the simplified rendering of hamartia 
as a tragic flaw in moral composition, or ‘sinful’ in character, was in 
terms of a perspective on Foucault’s ‘mistake’, considered as 
imprecise and misleading (Struck 2004):
The complex nature of Oedipus’ hamartia is important […] The Greek 
term hamartia, typically translated as ‘a tragic flaw’, actually is closer 
in meaning to a ‘mistake’ or an ’error’, ‘failing’, rather than an ‘innate 
flaw’. In Aristotle’s understanding, all tragic heroes have hamartia, but 
this is not inherent in their characters, for then the audience would 
lose respect for them and be unable to pity them; likewise, if the 
hero’s failing were entirely accidental and involuntary, the audience 
would not fear for the hero. Instead, the character’s flaw must result 
from something that is also a central part of their virtue, which goes 
somewhat awry, usually due to a lack of knowledge. By defining 
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the notion this way, Aristotle showed that a genuinely tragic hero 
must have a failing that is neither idiosyncratic nor arbitrary but is 
somehow more deeply embedded – a kind of human deficiency and 
human weakness. Oedipus fits this precisely, for his fundamental flaw 
is his lack of knowledge about his own identity. (p. 10)
Lack of knowledge and issues concerning identity: this is the 
frame in which Foucault’s involvement in Iran was situated in the 
author’s reception a decade ago. Up to 2010, some interpretations 
of Foucault’s involvement in Iran considered his lack of knowledge, 
but pertinently about ‘being a journalist’ or simply ‘being in Iran’, 
as the main factors contributing to what was often described in 
publications as his ‘critical error in judgement’ (Miller 1993:305), 
as the consequence of his ‘peculiar Orientalism’ (Almond 2004, 
2007), as the most ‘indecipherable event’ in his otherwise 
illustrious career (Paras 2006:57), and as the main reason for the 
many problems surrounding this issue in Foucault scholarship – 
that, as a ‘West-essentialising Greek’, he did not belong in his 
other-Oriental posed ‘Persia’.
There is, of course, a long tradition of bohemian French 
intellectuals, chasing ‘distant roars of battles’ (Lilla 2003:137–158; 
Miller 1993:306) to sing the praises of revolutionaries in exotic 
contexts and finding in them the realisation of their intellectual 
hopes (Yang 2005:D4).
More questions then: was Foucault’s involvement in Iran in 
1978 and 1979 an embarrassing affirmation of this suspicious 
tradition? Was Foucault’s involvement in Iran therefore a ‘folly’ 
and a ‘farcical and tragic error’ that fit into a distinctively French 
tradition of intellectual ‘sycophants’ (Broyelle & Broyelle 
1979:249), leeching on distant revolutions, as his most eloquent 
and profoundly compassionate biographer, Miller (1993:309, 315), 
in the closing chapters of an outstanding monograph felt 
compelled to affirm? Or did the Iranian revolution rather appeal 
to some of Foucault’s integral philosophical preoccupations – of the 
spontaneous eruption of resistance to established power, of the 
exploration of the contemporary disclosed limits of rationality 
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(Nigro 2005:652–661), of the philosophical appeal of death (Allen 
2000:121–130), of (Beukes 2009a):
[T ]he dubious nature of discipline, of the enigmatic voices of Otherness, 
of the violent confrontation with identity, of puzzling labyrinths and 
dark esoteric corners, of the entropy of madness and hence the mad 
creativity unleashed by people willing to risk death? (p. 2)
If Foucault was, according to these preoccupations, practising 
philosophy on his unique terms in Iran, what kind of philosophy 
was it? Could it be that Foucault’s involvement in Iran should be 
understood as an investigation into an alternative that was 
absolutely other to liberal democracy and the nature of ‘political 
spirituality’ that underlies this alternative? Or, again from the 
other side of the coin, was Foucault’s search for this kind of 
alternative indeed gullible and even reckless in the light of Shia 
Islam’s subsequent, post-1978 developments in Iran and 
elsewhere, brutal and violent as it unfolded theocratically (and is 
still unfolding)? (Beukes 2009a):
Did Foucault simply put on record some of the political aspirations of 
the protesters, or did he really attempt to overturn the unimaginative 
and antagonistic notions that filled the minds of Western observers 
who stayed well clear of the events, considering the revolution to be 
a mere regression to the pre-modern? (p. 2)
Was Foucault with his presence and reports in Iran furthering the 
established, yet often misunderstood, theme of (not modernised 
and not Westernised) Otherness in his work? Or was he basically 
misinformed, becoming nothing less than a misinforming agent 
himself, simply duped into trying to become a ‘streetwise 
journalist’, forsaking his intellectual nomenclature and deserving 
of the taunts of his critics in France, amongst them even veteran 
leftists and former friends such as Claudie and Jacques Broyelle, 
who urged him to ‘confess’ his ‘mistake’ by getting involved in 
the conflict in the first place?4 Was this a breathtaking mistake, 




again, on the same scale and not less damaging as Heidegger’s 
short-lived but always disgraceful involvement with National 
Socialism (Lilla 2003:1–46, 137–158)? Did Foucault really deserve 
the eulogy at his funeral5 in 1984 that still lamented ‘the mistake 
we made together?’6 So many questions, which could perhaps 
be condensed in a single one: did Foucault have a flash of insight 
in Iran – or did he miss the point entirely?
My 2009 employment of the essentially Western concept 
hamartia to introduce the problems concerning Foucault’s 
involvement in Iran, which at first blush seems to be a wayward, 
‘Oriental’ issue – ‘Persian, not Greek’ – was an attempt to address 
these problems as precisely Western in nature, in an attempt 
firstly to orientate Foucault’s two Iran excursions as a problem 
of Enlightenment, of modernity, of the Occident, with all its 
palimpsestic, Orientalist consequences; and secondly, to keep 
alive the crucial tension between Self and Other, Greek and 
Persia, and West and East. Throughout those two articles, I, 
therefore, accentuated Foucault’s involvement in Iran as 
essentially modern-critical in orientation, characterised by a 
crucial impetus of the Self’s resolute, yet problematic, ‘crossing 
over to the Other’. This is the strained and tense impression that 
Foucault’s Iran writings are still leaving on this book: Foucault, 
along the lines of that reading and reception a decade ago, was 
a ‘self-conscious Greek in Persia’ (Beukes 2009b:4).
This book thus maintains the notion of Foucault being a ‘self-
conscious Greek in Persia’,7 but now with a significant shift in 
5. Foucault’s friend Jean Daniel, in Eribon (1992:289); cf. Lilla (2003:150), Macey (2004:128) 
and Mills (2003:19).
6. Even relatively recent works on Foucault’s political philosophy choose to bypass the Iran-
issue altogether, as in Kelly’s (2009) extensive introduction to Foucault’s political thought. 
Foucault’s Iranian expedition is not mentioned even once in Kelly’s text. This type of omission 
could be considered a tactical move in many political-theoretical works, with Foucault at 
its centre, that one could realistically anticipate would have addressed the issue, had the 
consequences for Foucault’s reputation been different, of course.
7. The section ‘Yet again, “what is an author?”’ represents a substantial reworking of Beukes 
(2009a:1–3). This article was published under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 
International (CC BY 4.0) licence, according to which permission was granted for reworking.
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accentuation: Foucault’s philosophical dispositions are in this 
book handled far more sympathetically than they were in 2009, 
and this book would be much more outspoken against those 
reductionist analyses that diminish Foucault’s involvement in Iran 
as a ‘mistake’. Of course, and this would be acknowledged 
throughout, Foucault could have been more definite and more 
decisive on specific points, but his presence in and his writings 
from Iran were in line with many of his established theoretical 
positions about ‘political spirituality’ and ‘Otherness’. Foucault 
was a philosopher, not a prophet: there was no way he could have 
foreseen what eventuated from 01 February 1979 onwards in Iran. 
But what exactly was Foucault trying to achieve in Iran in 1978–
1979 as some kind of ‘political journalist’, explicitly supporting 
the cause of revolting masses and effectively isolating himself 
from the European intellectual community and Western liberal 
tradition? In other words, and this could be an ultimate and very 
last question: why did Foucault go down this road that in the end 
left him virtually alone?
This book places itself amongst a number of remarkable 
contextualisations and analyses of Foucault’s involvement in Iran, 
arguing that the answer is to be found somewhere in the middle 
of the flash and the void, somewhere in the middle of Foucault’s 
peculiar mixture of naïveté and perceptiveness about the events 
in Iran in late 1978 and early 1979. However, and in this sense, this 
book is a staunch defence of the philosophical quest of a ‘self-
conscious Greek in Persia’, and pointing towards that middle 
ground does not imply a ‘mistake’. The book attempts to answer 
the many questions raised above by argumentatively providing 
an overview of the most crucial contributions that have been 
made on this issue in Foucault research, issues which largely had 
been neglected in the scholarship for four decades. Furthermore, 
this work endeavours to contribute to and stimulate the debate 
surrounding the Iran issue by introducing the tense notion of 
Foucault’s ‘ethics of Self-discomfort’ into this context as a 
plausible way of broadening our understanding of his involvement 
in Iran from 1978 to 1979 – as indeed profoundly philosophical. At 
a time when religion seems more than ever to be inseparable from 
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politics and Western liberals are (yet again) divided between 
interventionists and anti-imperialists, Foucault’s outlooks on 
power, revolt, ‘Otherness’, ‘political spirituality’ and an ‘ethics of 
Self-discomfort’ may prove to be as significant now as they had 
been in 1978, still holding fundamental consequences for an 
understanding of Western liberal tradition and its edgy relation 
to the ‘Western Other’.
The biographical details8 of Foucault’s trips to Iran are 
reasonably well documented.9 During 1977, Foucault was invited 
to write a regular column as a special correspondent for the 
Italian daily Corriere Della Sera. Although it was and still is not 
unusual for European newspapers to solicit reports from 
prominent intellectuals, Foucault never made clear why he 
accepted the offer and, especially important, he never indicated 
clear objectives for the philosophical nature of such an 
undertaking (Eribon 1992:281; Miller 1993:308). He was indeed 
rather vague about it (Foucault, cited in Eribon 1992):
The contemporary world is teeming with ideas that spring up, stir 
around, disappear or reappear, and shake up people and things. 
This is not something that happens only in intellectual circles or 
in the universities of Western Europe; it also happens on a world 
scale, and it happens particularly among minorities that, because 
of history, have not up to now been in the habit of speaking up or 
making themselves heard […] There are more ideas on earth than 
intellectuals imagine. And these ideas are more active, stronger, 
more resistant and more passionate than ‘politicians’ think. We 
have to be there at the birth of ideas, the bursting outward of their 
force: not in books expressing them, but in events manifesting 
this force, in struggles carried on around ideas, for or against 
them. Ideas do not rule the world. But it is because the world has 
8. See the introductions of Afary and Anderson (2004:2, 2005:69–111), Eribon (1992:281–288), 
Leezenberg (1998, republished 2004:99–101) and Miller (1993:306–309).
9. Éric Aeschimann’s (2018) short but erudite introduction to the whole constellation 
of problems opened up by Foucault’s ‘enthusiasm’ for the Iranian revolution could be 




ideas (and because it constantly produces them) that it is not 
passively ruled by those who are its leaders or those who would 
like to teach  it, once and for all, what we must think. This is the 
direction we want these ‘journalistic reports’ to take. An analysis 
of thought will be linked to an analysis of what is happening. 
Intellectuals will work together with journalists at the point where 
ideas and events intersect. (p. 282)
This explanation still does not make clear what would be the 
philosophical nature of that intersection, to what extent an 
‘intellectual’ would have to be developed into a ‘journalist’. And 
this is the foundation of the problem for by far the majority of 
Foucault scholars, even today, in the sense that they still have no 
clear indication as to what were Foucault’s ‘intellectual objectives’. 
If it is true that lack of knowledge about his own identity is the 
cause of his presumed mistake, it is precisely at this point – 
Foucault, the ‘journalist in the Orient’ or Foucault, the ‘philosopher 
in Paris’ – that the complications for many of the established 
Foucault receptions, in particular, commence. Foucault was 
indeed unclear about his philosophical intentions: yet it is argued 
that ‘uncertainty’ is a philosophical virtue – and not a vice. It is 
philosophically crucial that Foucault had no precise, concrete 
objective, that he had ‘little knowledge’, and that he radiated 
uncertainty, that he had to engage the problems of ‘Otherness’ in 
Iran in an unconventional manner, a style where uncertainty or 
vagueness should not be considered a deficiency, a mode which 
is elaborated in the last chapter of this book as an ‘ethics of Self-
discomfort’.10
10. Foucault’s Iran writings from September 1978 to February 1979 were translated into Persian 
and published in 1998. I am indebted to Karen de Bruin, Janet Afary and Kevin Anderson’s 
preparations and English translations of relevant French texts and their translations, in 
correspondence to the pertinent passages of Dits et écrits as well as the older translations by 
Betsy Wing in Eribon (1992), and Miller’s (1993) and Rée’s (2005) own translations. Wherever 
Foucault is quoted directly in Chapter 6, it is done on the basis of these translations by De 
Bruin, Afary and Anderson, as well as those by Miller, Rée and Wing, as indicated via Harvard 
and as per footnote.
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The event of Histoire de la 
sexualité 4: Les aveux de la 
chair (2018)
Apart from the conflict-ridden issue on Foucault’s involvement 
in Iran from 1978 to 1979, another rather dividing issue in 
Foucault research has come to the fore over the past two years. 
The scholarship is currently at odds with the possibilities 
regarding the reception of a newly published ‘fourth’ volume 
of  The History of Sexuality: (Michel Foucault, Histoire de la 
sexualité 4: Les aveux de la chair [The Confessions of the Flesh], 
ed. Frédéric Gros 2018). The debate on the legitimacy of this 
publication in terms of being accepted as an ‘authentic’ Foucault 
text would take a central stand in the Foucault scholarship in 
the years to come. It is not going to be possible to present any 
Foucault monograph after 2018, on whatever theme in Foucault’s 
work, without some grounding of an author’s disposition 
towards this issue.
Why is this publication, within a year of its release, with two 
articles already available in English for years and with a full Dutch 
translation11 pending, already causing significant disunion amongst 
Foucault scholars? The answer is deceitfully simple: Foucault 
made it amply clear, even in the last months before his passing on 
25 June 1984, that he strictly forbids any posthumous publications 
11. The article ‘The battle for chastity’ has been available in English for years in Foucault 
(1988b), whilst the section ‘Maurice Florence’ is available in (only) the first edition of 
the Cambridge companion to Foucault and in Essential Works II. Foucault Cirkel 
Nederland/België held a symposium on the reception of the work on 12 December 
2019 at the University of Amsterdam, with the second symposium on Dutch translation 
by Jeanne Holierhoek (Debekentenissen van het vlees, Boom Uitgeverij, Amsterdam, 
2020) scheduled for 29 May 2020. For an overview of the Dutch reception of the work 
up to December  2019,  see  Beukes (2020c), with reference to the contributions by 
Dorrestijn (2019), Karskens (2019) and Leezenberg (2019); compare Lambrecht’s (2019) 




of his unfinished works.12 Foucault was notoriously tiresome in 
terms of his insistence to edit his works before publication. 
However, there is another reason why Foucault forbade posthumous 
publications: the reaction to his work was for him more exciting 
and spellbinding than the work itself, precisely because he as an 
‘author’ is, as far as he was concerned, hermeneutically dissolved, 
once the text is published. The fact that neither the debate 
following the publication of a book nor the opportunity to defend 
himself against his critics (and the list was always long and often 
distinguished) would be possible, and was unthinkable for 
Foucault. There are many reports of Foucault taunting those who 
thought they were writing for the sake of ‘some future interest’. As 
a ‘philosopher of the present’, undoubtedly he would have been 
astounded by the continuing attentiveness to his work, and the 
many and often perplexing functionalities of his ideas and 
theoretical positions (Elden  2018:293–298). However, would he 
ever have given consideration prolonging that attentiveness 
beyond his ability to react to it? No, he probably would not.
Foucault left no testament, but a few months before his death 
he did leave a note in which he explicitly spelt out his last wishes. 
His apartment in Paris, as well as the rest of his estate, was left to 
his partner, Daniel Defert. He wished not to be kept alive 
artificially – and he objected passionately to publications of any 
of his unedited or unfinished works after his death. That wish – or 
rather insistence – was honoured for close to four decades, both 
by Defert and Foucault’s brother and sister. Defert actually went 
so far as to remove Foucault’s most important documents from 
the apartment and had it placed in a bank vault for more than 
12. Apart from the Dutch reception (cf. Beukes 2020c), section titled’ ‘The event of Histoire 
de la sexualité 4: Les aveux de la chair (2018)’ of Chapter 1 is indebted to and largely based 
on Elden’s review (2018:293–311) of Histoire de la sexualité 4: Les aveux de la chair, used 
here with permission, in which he provided an in-depth exposition of the background to the 
editorial process and eventual publication of this text (cf. Elden 2016:101–102). This article is 




three decades. When Dits et écrits13 was published a decade after 
his death, it included very specifically only the works that Foucault 
unequivocally granted permission for (amounting to four volumes 
making up more than 3000 pages in published format; Elden 
2018:293–298).
In 2013, though, Defert sold all of Foucault’s manuscripts to 
the Bibliothèque Nationale de France, which made the material 
available to bona fide researchers within a year after that. The 
collection at the Bibliothèque Nationale comprised more than 
100 boxes of material, amounting to 37 000 pages of unpublished 
text, including notes, course material, lectures and incomplete 
manuscripts – including the relevant material for Les aveux de la 
chair. One should be cautious of accusations of a financial motive 
for the release of the material, firstly to the Bibliothèque Nationale 
and from there to the scholarship: simply because the quality of 
the content itself justifies Defert’s decision to eventually have it 
published under the editorial guidance of probably the most 
competent contemporary Foucault-scholar in France, Frédéric 
Gros, at the prestigious publisher, Éditions Gallimard, which was 
responsible for the publication of the three preceding volumes of 
the series, The History of Sexuality, Volume 1: The Will to 
Knowledge, The History of Sexuality, Volume 2: The Use of 
Pleasure, and The History of Sexuality, Volume 3: The Care of the 
Self, in Éditions Gallimard’s Bibliothèque des Histoires series. 
The question is: should now a ‘fourth volume’ be added in the 
13. Almost all of Foucault’s shorter writings and published interviews have been published by 
Gallimard (in French) in a collection called Dits et écrits, originally published in four volumes 
in 1994, later published as the Quarto edition in only two volumes. In English, there are a 
number of overlapping anthologies, which often use conflicting translations of overlapping 
pieces, frequently with different titles (Richard Lynch’s bibliography of Foucault’s shorter 
works has become invaluable for scholars in keeping track of these multiple versions in 
English and synchronising page numbers of texts in French and English). Dits et écrits, 
therefore, came out in two versions: the first four-volume set and a later two-volume set. 
The first version is no longer in print. Page numbers of these two editions do not match. The 
official multilingual website by Centre Michel Foucault (https://centremichelfoucault.com/
en/) currently is in the process of producing a page concordance for converting the sets and 
a formula for connecting the page numbers of one edition with the other.
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form of The History of Sexuality, Volume 4: Confessions of the 
Flesh? Can we read this book in unproblematic continuousness 
with the three ‘authentic’ volumes? There is some discomfort in 
the Foucault scholarship about a direct and simple answer to 
these questions.
It is true that Defert sold the material and did not offer it to the 
Bibliothèque Nationale free of charge. Yet he did not put it up for 
auction – if commercial interests were Defert’s objective, he 
might as well have gone for the highest bidder; yet he did not. 
Defert had considerable expenses storing the material and 
making the material coherently available so that the library could 
use, disseminate and release it effectively. It is of course just as 
true that Defert went back on a specific agreement, namely that 
he would honour his partner’s last wishes and take care of his 
estate, including the unfinished manuscripts, and not present 
these unfinished texts for publication. Defert held that agreement 
for more than three decades but had to have a very good reason 
for eventually breaking that agreement. If money was not the 
decisive factor, what was? It was the texts, which is breathtaking, 
to say the least, especially for scholars working with a Foucaultian 
positioning in Medieval Philosophy.14
Foucault published Volume 1 of The History of Sexuality: The 
Will to Knowledge in December 1976, in which he made a number 
of highly innovative claims and discoursed conceptions of the 
‘constituent subjects of sexuality’, namely ‘the perverse man’, 
‘the hysterical woman’, ‘the masturbating child’ and ‘the married 
couple’. There are many suggestions that Foucault’s attention 
in  1976 was changing from the later Middle Ages to much 
earlier  and antique material of the time. According to Elden 
(2018:298–300), Defert remembers that in August 1977 Foucault 
14. For examples of the author’s most recent ‘Foucaultian’ appraisals of Medieval themes and 
thinkers, see Beukes (2019, 2020a).
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was reading patristic literature.15 In January 1979, Defert again 
underscored Foucault’s reading of the patristics from the 2nd 
century to the 5th century, including Cassian, Augustine and 
Tertullian. The most comprehensive treatise of this material 
available before the time was in On the Government of the Living, 
Foucault’s Collège de France course from 1979 to 1980.16
The manuscript of Les aveux de la chair was very close to 
completion in June 1984 and Foucault was actually still working 
on it during his last stay in hospital. By now the working 
manuscript  had been bestowed with the title Les aveux de la 
chair. In October 1982, Foucault offered the script to Éditions 
Gallimard but told them not to publish it straight away. He later 
recalled that the text’s introduction offered remarks about pagan 
antiquity, but that it was a derivative and he wanted to survey the 
primary texts himself. His 1980 to 1981 Paris course Subjectivity 
and Truth explored these themes in detail. Foucault’s initial plan 
was for one book on that earlier period, L’usage des Plaisirs [The 
Use of Pleasure]. The ‘patristics’ volume would then be the 
planned third volume. Yet in late 1983, he split the material of the 
immense manuscript on Greece and Rome in two and named the 
second part as Le souci de soi [The care of the self]. In early 1984, 
Foucault took back the manuscript of Les aveux de la chair from 
Éditions Gallimard and started the final editing of his manuscript. 
According to Elden (2018:301), ‘French publishing timetables, at 
least for Foucault, were rapid, and he said to friends that the 
15. Some examples of this material could be seen in Foucault’s Collège de France lecture 
courses, especially the 1977–1978 course Security, Territory, Population, with its analysis of 
the Christian pastorate. Some of this was used in his Tanner lectures Omneset Singulatim in 
Stanford in October 1979. A lecture given in 1978 in Japan, ‘Sexuality and power’, is important 
as an insight into Foucault’s thoughts of that time. Here, much more than in the concurrent 
Paris lectures, Foucault explicitly relates his themes to sexuality inquiry, linking his work on 
governmentality and the pastorate, to issues of morality and power (Elden 2018:300).
16. This course, essential as it is, rarely recounts the material overtly to the project on sexuality. 
Foucault also examined early Christianity in other lectures in October and November 1980, 
namely the lectures delivered in Dartmouth and Berkeley, which are published as About the 
Beginning of the Hermeneutics of the Self, and in seminars in New York, of which only the 
‘Sexuality and solitude’ lecture has been published thus far (Elden 2018:301).
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‘fourth volume’ would appear in October’. The second and third 
volumes of The History of Sexuality were published in May and 
June 1984 respectively. Foucault received an author’s copy of 
The Care of the Self whilst he was hospitalised, just days before 
his death. He did not complete the final work on what now indeed 
had become the ‘fourth’ volume of The History of Sexuality. The 
script, with his modifications, the author’s copy of the text, and 
some other preliminary material were thus entrusted to Defert.
Les aveux de la chair is readily available on several commercial 
online platforms. The book has three main sections, comprising 
just over 240 pages. Foucault punctiliously traces the shift in 
attitudes from pagan antiquity to Christianity and investigates 
this transition in the first part, followed by a consideration of two 
critical subjects for early Medieval philosophers and the patristics, 
namely the ‘monk’ and the ‘married man’. Foucault’s array is 
pervasive, covering a comprehensive series of thinkers, from 
Justin in the 2nd century to Augustine and John Cassian in the 
5th century, containing deliberations on church fathers such as 
Clement of Alexandria, Tertullian, Basil of Ancyra, Gregory of 
Nazianzus, Gregory of Nyssa, Ambrose, John Chrysostom and 
Jerome. In the flysheet inserted in the early copies of the second 
and third volumes, Les aveux de la chair is described as a book 
that ‘will treat the experience of the flesh in the first centuries of 
Christianity, the role played by hermeneutics and the purifying 
decipherment of desire’. The now published Les aveux de la chair 
certainly lives up to that promise.
Gros edited the final four Collège de France courses by 
Foucault and thus knew the above period and its concerns well. 
Whilst Gros did the bulk of editorial work, Defert and Foucault’s 
cousin Henri-Paul Fruchaud are thanked for their ‘patient and 
helpful re-reading of the text’ (Elden 2018:308). Gros also 
consulted Michel Senellart and Philippe Chevalier, two highly 
rated Foucault scholars from France. He worked with both the 
typed copy and Foucault’s manuscript to set up the text. His 
model for the editing of this text comprised the second and third 
volumes, and stylistically these appear the same. Gros has 
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correctly, unlike the notes to the lecture courses, not filled in 
extra features beyond what was signified in Foucault’s manuscript 
(Elden 2018:308).
Not having Foucault to discuss or debate Les aveux de la chair 
is, of course, a gigantic loss. Foucault, to a degree exceptional at 
the time and rarely equalled since, made interviews an integral 
part of his philosophical practice and these became a central part 
of his oeuvre.17 Even if the metamorphoses in genre of book, article, 
lecture and interview are not appreciated as much as they should 
be in the ways Foucault is interpreted, the interviews always 
provide valuable insight into his thinking. As Elden (2018:310) 
correctly noted, those looking for an immediate connection 
between Les aveux de la chair and contemporary philosophical 
interests may be frustrated, but that is perhaps more to do with 
the absence of its author in the reception than with the text itself.
Every person involved in the event of the publication of Les 
aveux de la chair has long struggled with the core issue of 
17. For instance, the brilliant edition by Lotringer (ed. 1996), Foucault Live, Collected Interviews, 
1961–1984. Some of these and many other published interviews were extensive and probed 
significant questions about Foucault’s work. Lazreg’s (2017:4) broader methodological 
consideration in this regard could be affirmed: Foucault’s interviews indeed provide ‘an 
opportunity to understand in concrete terms what his philosophical–theoretical approach 
often kept abstract’; they can ‘hardly be dismissed as irrelevant to understanding his thought’. 
Foucault’s views of events, such as in Iran, were undoubtedly never ‘ad hominem, but were 
informed by his philosophical orientation’. For example, his ‘pronouncements on Japan 
were part of lectures as well as recorded interviews with significant scholars’. They ‘cannot 
be ignored because they were not part of his written corpus’. Concerned about distortions 
in meaning, especially in the translation of interviews whose recordings are not available, as 
was the case in some instances in Japan, we are often cautioned in the scholarship against 
the use of interviews in re-articulating Foucault’s ideas. This is a legitimate concern, in the 
sense that ‘the interviews were generally oral’, to some extent, ‘unrehearsed and thus lacked 
the reflection and nuances that writing affords’. The ‘multiple translations to which some 
of the published interviews were subjected to should also not diminish their documentary 
value, although (hermeneutic) allowance must be made for translations’ distorting effects’ in 
disseminating them; but this, of course, can be said of the translations of Foucault’s books as 
well, after all. In general, the published interviews, such as the two particularly important ones 
on the Iranian revolution (Foucault 1979d, 1988a) help us to interpret Foucault’s ideas and 




Foucault’s stated wish against posthumous publications. If this 
wish were broken, then the texts would better make up for it, 
apart from being edited to the highest scholarly standards. Gros 
has unquestionably carried out the latter. Les aveux de la chair is 
indeed not a finished book by Foucault, but it was extremely 
close to a finished text. For those readers who appreciate the 
text as a continuation of the second and third volumes, there is 
much to consider here. One can only guess how this book might 
have been received if, as planned by Foucault, it had been 
published during or before October 1984, with its author present 
to take part in the conversation about its merits, possibilities and 
limitations.
This all brings us back to the first question: why is this 
publication causing tension amongst Foucault scholars? It 
possibly has to do with a sense of philosophical integrity: those 
against the publication of this work are against it because of their 
respect for Foucault as indeed a ‘subject’, a ‘normal’ human 
being, with indeed ‘normalised’ legal, if not moral, rights. Those in 
favour of the publication probably weigh Foucault’s last wishes 
against the longevity of his philosophical legacy: they want to 
see Foucault live on, as much as he embraced death. Foucault 
scholarship is thus yet again at the crossroads, as it still is about 
his involvement in Iran from 1978 to 1979. And as is the case with 
‘Iran’, no single answer is going to be the correct one. However, as 
in the case of ‘Iran’, eventually one has to make a choice.
One could suggest that two private (for Foucault, that is) 
considerations be weighed up against each other, namely the 
judicial and the philosophical. If the judicial (and indeed moral) 
factor weighs heavier, then it must be correct and valid that this 
addendum to The History of Sexuality should be regarded as 
inauthentic and at most profitable as an external reference to the 
Foucault corpus, in general, and to the three published volumes, 
in particular. Yet again, ‘what is an author?’ If the philosophical 
consideration weighs heavier, then Foucault’s endless insistence 
on the ‘death of the author’ and the hermeneutic ‘dissolvement 
of authorship’ and thus ‘author-ity’, must be adhered to. 
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This means that with equal respect to the judicial position, the 
philosophical position would allow for an exegesis of Les aveux 
de la chair as an ‘authentic’ primary Foucault text, without being 
untrue to Foucault, both as a ‘person’ and yet always as a 
‘philosopher of the first kind’.
It would take years of specialised, niche-interested scholarship 
to disseminate the published text, and time, for once, would 
prove to be valuable in this regard. In the meantime, this book 
will, out of respect for both Foucault and Gros, refer to this text 
under Gros’ competent editorship and however not as a text by 
Foucault himself. The scholarship is trusted not to have this issue 
hang in the balance but to supply authoritative advice on exegesis 
and references on its own time to the published text.
Foucault in Iran: Ten direct questions
Ten forthright questions that are used in the background as 
leitmotifs for the reading of Foucault’s Iran writings, as well as 
the scholarship’s reaction to those writings, are hereby presented. 
In the closing chapter, these questions will be readdressed in an 
attempt to answer them tentatively, yet as truthfully as possible:
 1.  Did Foucault explicitly support the cause of the revolting 
masses in Iran in 1978 on modern-critical grounds? 
 2.  Did Foucault foresee Khomeini’s understanding and imple 
mentation of what an ‘Islamic Republic’ would be, and did he, 
at any point of what was left of his career, endorse that 
understanding and application, even implicitly?
 3.  Was Foucault justifiably being held accountable by his critics 
in France for a naive perspective on the vicious potential 
embedded in any religious fundamentalism?
 4.  Did Foucault have clear objectives for his journalistic 
expedition to Iran, and if he did not, then why should that be 
a problem philosophically?
 5.  Did Foucault appreciate the unfolding of the revolution in 
Iran on strictly philosophical grounds?
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 6.  Was Foucault primarily fascinated by the violent confrontation 
with identity he had witnessed in Iran?
 7.  Was Foucault intrigued by the possibility of a political 
alternative posed by the Iranian revolution?
 8.  Did Foucault compromise his philosophical position and 
reputation by not engaging the legitimate critique of subjects 
who were systematically crushed as the revolution unfolded?
 9.  Did Foucault underestimate the hostility with which his 
reports would be received?
10.  Did Foucault’s decision to go to Iran and report on the 
revolution, in the end, harm his reputation as being the leading 
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Political spirituality
Until the tragic events of 11 September 2001, the rise of radical 
Islam had received little consideration from the Western liberal 
tradition. The left-wing appeared to have been uncertain about 
what to make of the extreme kind of anti-imperialism in radical 
Islamic circles (far more radical anti-imperialist than the Marxist 
left ever was) in the last decades of the 20th century, hesitant 
what to make of its rejection of Western culture, whilst the 
technological advantages of this culture were being retained by 
these circles (as Foucault’s thoughts on the Iranian army in 
September 1978 and the ‘cassette tape culture’ signify; see 
sections ‘The army – When the earth quakes’ and ‘What are the 
Iranians dreaming about?’ of ch. 6). Above all, the left appeared 
to have been quite unsure about what to make of the unmatched 
kind of ‘archaic fascism’ (Rodinson 2005:268) in those ranks, its 
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particular kind of fascism – Islamofascism – which was for a long 
time half a world away from leftist discourse. Then, on 9/11, it got 
very close.
Some anti-imperialists were promoting highly questionable 
culture-critical assertions in their interpretations of the events of 
9/11. The author has argued sturdily against what could be 
considered to be the exaltation of pure and simple terrorism, found 
in the later works of Jean Baudrillard, as well as in the works of 
other anti-imperialists such as Paul Virilio and Slavoj Žižek, who, in 
their endeavour to pinpoint an anti-globalist hypothesis and an 
‘aesthetic-sacrificial basis’ for the attacks, expressed what has 
been described as a ‘morbid, appalling and deeply unphilosophical 
admiration’ of the terrorists (Beukes 2005:1101–1114, 2019:1–3).
From the open-sphered considerations of modern-critical 
philosophy, there must be another way, vague as it may well be – 
yet a way pertinently different from, on the one hand, the 
interventionist policies of the US government in the post–9/11 
years, with all the quasi-intellectual estimations provided by its 
champions of ‘neo-conservative liberalism’ and, on the other 
hand, the Baudrillardian kind of anti-imperialism which shatters 
the appeal of intellectual liability and philosophical ardour, the 
author finds characteristic of Western philosophy, from Aristotle 
to Boethius to Gadamer. Indeed, in a time when religion seems 
more than ever to be tangled with politics, Foucault’s perspectives 
on power, revolt, Otherness, political spirituality and an ‘ethics of 
Self-discomfort’ may provide us with some bursts of inspiration 
in our search for that elusive ‘other way’.
If anti-imperialism clearly amounted to nervousness and possibly 
an embarrassment for Foucault scholarship in just more than two 
decades from 1978 to 2001, it had after 9/11 become an established 
and distinctly painful theme in this arena: an open nerve, precisely 
because the incidents in New York, Washington and the US airspace 
on 11 September 2001 were horrible ‘in an unmediated sense’ 
(Beukes 2005:1103). It was a grotesque event: around 3000 civilians 
were killed in those two central domains of government at the 
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centre of the world’s only remaining megalith, the United States of 
America (USA). The events of 9/11 designated a new phase reached 
by Islamic terrorism, which until 2001 had succeeded in attacking 
mainly outposts of the USA, except with a relatively low-impact 
bombing of the World Trade Centre in 1993. The second Bush 
administration exploited this horrendous encounter, posed by a 
discreet and very much non-connected offshoot in fundamentalist 
Islam, Al Qaeda, to apply its own orthodox agenda, with what it 
called ‘a global war on terrorism’. An unmatched martial and 
‘homeland security’ stockpile was introduced, resulting in a significant 
amount of arrests of Muslims in the USA (and elsewhere), followed 
by a second, aggressively unilateralist war on the emphatically non-
Islamic administration of Saddam Hussein in Iraq after swiftly 
demolishing the Taliban in Afghanistan. In the process, a broad 
contra Al Qaeda alliance was undermined and associates in western 
and northern Europe, Japan, Russia, China, India and especially its 
more unenthusiastic partners, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and several 
other Middle Eastern governments, were alienated. This second war 
on, and for several years afterwards in Iraq, incensed the  Muslim 
world, revitalising the ranks of radical Islam – fundamentalist Islam, 
both Sunni and Shia, has thrived in Iraq since 2003.
In 1998, Amsterdam philosopher Michiel Leezenberg’s 
grou ndbreaking article, ‘Power and political spirituality: Michel 
Foucault on the Islamic revolution in Iran’, was published.19 It was 
the first article to thoroughly address the philosophical basis of 
Foucault’s involvement in Iran, based on Leezenberg’s exegesis 
of the notion of ‘political spirituality’ in Foucault’s Iran writings. 
Yet, it was only after 9/11 that the importance of Leezenberg’s 
(cf.  1998, republished 2004:99–115) article manifested itself 
(precisely the reason that the article was republished in 2004 in 
a prestigious editorial work by two eminent Foucault scholars, 
James Bernauer and Jeremy Carrette).
Before Leezenberg’s 1998 publication, the scholarship in the 
English language, only had relevant sections in three main 
19. Leezenberg (1998; listed in its republished format, 2004:99–115).
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biographies of the 1990s, Eribon (1992), Macey (1993) and Miller 
(1993), and two temperate articles of Keating (1997) and Stauth 
(1991) at its disposal. However, monographs on Foucault or 
broader Foucault studies in English published after 2001 started 
to refer to, although still carefully, or in the minority of cases, 
dedicate a separate section on the issue of Foucault and Iran. 
Leezenberg’s analysis of Foucault’s involvement in Iran was, 
within years of its publication, thus determined as correct by the 
scholarship itself. It has been given systematic, yet relatively 
understated attention ever since.20
After 9/11, other Foucault scholars also began to investigate 
the promise in Foucault’s turn towards a ‘political spirituality’ 
(henceforth without quotation marks) in the first years of the 
new century. Bernauer, a Jesuit priest who teaches philosophy at 
Boston College and has written several books on Foucault and 
theology, regarded Foucault’s embrace of spirituality as a 
resource for thinking about how to integrate politics and religion 
(Yang 2005; cf. Bernauer 2004:77–97):
Religious discourse has an enormous power to move people to take 
action, to see beyond their immediate self-interest: and Foucault had 
an ability to see this, to see past the pervasive secularism of French 
intellectual life, that was quite remarkable. For better or worse, 
political spirituality is with us, and Foucault was one who helped us 
to focus our sights on it. (n.p.)
During the same time, Carrette (2000) contributed to the 
21st-century understanding of political spirituality, namely as a 
Foucaultian analysis of the factors that lead or could lead to 
radically new sets of reconfigurations of subject–object relations.
A prerequisite for understanding Foucault’s notion of political 
spirituality is his clarification of political freedom as universal. 
Although his interest in the ethics of ‘care of the Self’ and an 
‘aesthetics of existence’ (Huijer 1999:63–83), as presented in 
20. Ghamari-Tabrizi (2016:63–67) provides the most recent dissemination of the discursive 
importance of political spirituality in Foucault’s Iran writings, again confirming the correctness 
of Leezenberg’s initial analysis.
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the  second and third volumes of The History of Sexuality 
(Foucault 1984a, 1984b), could lead to the impression that 
freedom for him is compromised by a ‘valorisation of private 
creativity’ (Prozorov 2007:9), the Foucaultian notion of freedom 
consists in the confrontation with precisely the distinction 
between the public and the private, whereby one could supposedly 
liberate oneself from both prescriptions of an individual lifestyle 
and conventions of social practice (Fox 1998:421).
This ontology of freedom must logically lead to the abandoning 
of that valorisation of the public–private distinction altogether. 
What was at stake for Foucault was the confirmation of the 
irreducibility of the subject to any social order and thus an 
improbable confrontation between humanity and authority 
(McGushin 2005:629–641). Insofar as they are a confrontation with 
public authority, practices of freedom are necessarily public but at 
the same time fundamentally motivated by individual fears and 
private aspirations. For Foucault, the public and the private 
necessarily interpenetrate each other, as they are nothing but 
provisional means of organising human existence: they may well be 
the object of exercises of freedom, but never the establishment of 
freedom. In this sense, no collective project could be deduced from 
the Foucaultian ontological assertion of freedom, because Foucault 
both resists the lessening of existence to a normative project and he 
wants to convincingly take leave from any such project as the very 
constituent of freedom (Prozorov 2007:11). At the same time, 
Foucault’s (2006:I) position recollects Camus’ understanding of 
revolt as an individual affirmation of everyday existence: ‘I revolt, 
therefore we are’. For Camus, the ‘act of revolt actualises the 
universal solidarity between human beings by demonstrating, 
beyond the limits that it transgresses, the endless prospects of 
freedom’ that do not depend on any subject’s particular ‘identities, 
attributes or circumstances’ (Prozorov 2007:11).
In his interpretation of the more general significance of the 
Iranian revolution, Foucault echoed Camus in asserting that 
revolt, although always arising out of particular circumstances of 
oppression, confirms ‘nothing particular’ but rather a possibility 
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available to us all: ‘[i]t is through revolt that subjectivity introduces 
itself into history and gives it the breath of life’ (Foucault, in 
Bernauer 1990:180; Prozorov 2007):
As a potentiality, freedom is not only available to us all without 
any possibility for discrimination, but it is also available to us all 
equally: in asserting one’s freedom one is always already wholly free, 
irrespectively of the positive degree of autonomy that one thereby 
achieves. In such a sense, a practice of freedom functions as an 
affirmation of human universality and is, therefore, unthinkable in 
terms of a narcissistic individualism. (p. 11)
Close to his understanding of political freedom as universal or at 
least ‘cross-cultural’ (Vintges 2011:107–108), Foucault’s more 
general concept of ‘spirituality’ boils down to an ethical self-
transformation, which is political in that it critically corresponds 
to the ‘normal’ Western subject construction of self-governing 
subjects, which themselves are products of the power–knowledge 
administration of Western modernity. This is the reason why 
Foucault (cf. 1991a:82) raised the concept of political spirituality 
in the context of his reflections on ‘the will to discover a different 
way of governing oneself, through a different way of dividing up 
true and false – this is what I would call political spirituality’. In 
other words, for Foucault political spirituality comes down to a 
reconfiguration of existing subject–object relations.
Foucault was therefore articulating the necessity to separate 
subjectivity from Western modernity’s sense of political rationality. 
He empathised with any resistance against this true–false 
management of subjectivity, a confrontation he also identified in 
the Iranian revolution, which, as far he was concerned, started as a 
revolt against the effort to modernise Islamic countries according 
to a European standard. In Iran, he wanted to address the ‘possibility 
we have forgotten since the Renaissance and the great crisis of 
Christianity, namely a political spirituality’ (Foucault 1978d:209). 
That is why the Shia tradition, as a particular presentation of 
Islam according to Foucault’s sympathetic reading, differentiates 
between ‘mere external obedience to the code’ and ‘the profound 
spiritual life’ (Foucault 1988a:211).
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When introducing his concept of political spirituality, Foucault 
thus had in mind the aspect of independent practices opposing 
truth administrations, which involve the entirety of peoples’ lives. 
He pinpointed this dimension within religious contexts as well: in 
the second and third volumes (and obviously the ‘fourth’ volume 
as well) of The History of Sexuality, Foucault addressed practices 
of uninhibited spiritual self-transformation, pertinently in religious 
contexts. That is why he referred not only to individual strands in 
Christianity and Islam but also in Asian religions.21 Foucault 
nevertheless obscured this element, because he wanted to avoid 
his work being slurred as ‘religious’ or ‘metaphysical’, and because 
he did not want to offer any ‘anthropological’ standard or any 
absolute truth concerning the human condition. That is why the 
‘non-Western’ counter-discourse in Foucault’s earlier works could 
be found in his style, rather than in an overt opposition to Western 
‘normalised’ life (Liebmann Schaub 1989:311–314).
In Foucault’s later works, however, in which both Eastern 
and Western philosophies are approached from their practical 
or ethical side, we find that Foucault does offer an effective 
alternative to the normalised Western way(s) of life through his 
presentation of spirituality as ‘ethical self-transformation 
through philosophical ascesis’ (McGushin 2005:630–638, 
2007:5–42). For example, during his visit to Japan in the first 
half of 1978, Foucault showed a remarkable and focused inter-
est in precisely the practice of Zen Buddhism. After his initial 
training, he said to his teacher: ‘I’d like to ask you just one ques-
tion. It’s about the universality of Zen. Is it possible to separate 
the practice of Zen from the totality of the religion and the 
practice of Buddhism?’ (Foucault 1999:113). He also comment-
ed that whereas Zen and Christian mysticism, in terms of con-
tent, cannot be matched, the practice of Christian spirituality 
and that of Zen are similar. This question and comment show 
21. Liebman Schaub (1989:306–311) therefore speculates whether there is a counterpart to 
Foucault’s trapped ‘Western man’, in the form of a subversive discourse in Foucault’s work, 
which could be designated as an ‘Oriental subtext’.
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Foucault’s interest in ethical–spiritual techniques as a universal 
or at least as a cross-cultural phenomenon.
Foucault did not only explore Zen in Japan in 1978 but also 
Islam in Iran in the second half of that year, in terms of a spirituality 
which can oppose truth regimes and possess the inherent 
(or  ‘immanent’, as far as Foucault was concerned) potential to 
inspire new political forms. What one would find in Foucault’s 
Iran writings is therefore not a simplistic ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ verdict 
on the revolution itself but a search for a new concept of freedom, 
which is ‘universal’ in that it could take into account a diversity of 
moral frameworks, including religious ones. Whilst it would be 
wrong to suppose that Foucault’s interest in Iran arose only from 
a fascination with this spiritual transformation of subjectivity 
through political spirituality,22 the Iran issue brought the question 
of political spirituality to the centre of his work. Although the 
concepts of spirituality and particularly political spirituality in 
Foucault’s philosophical texts up to that point were not central, 
in his Iran writings, the constitution of a ‘spiritual subject’ and the 
study of related practices clearly and progressively became a 
significant concern (cf. Carrette 2000:136–141), as we would see 
in the following chapters.
The Iranian revolution, in its endeavour to overthrow the Shah, 
exposed to Foucault the ‘full force of religious phenomena in 
holding the “collective will,” “spirituality” forming the key factor 
in the people’s challenge to institutional power’ (Carrette 
2000:137). For Foucault, the Shia religion in Iran (Carrette 2000; 
cf. Khatami 2003:121–125):
[B]rought to the Iranian people the ‘promise and guarantee of finding 
something that would radically change their subjectivity’. Foucault 
was particularly intrigued by the new revolutionary phenomenon 
found in religion and the way the ‘spiritual’ (‘a highly prized additional 
level of meaning’) mobilises a ‘political will’. (p. 139)
22. As Stauth (1991:259–280), in one of the first articles on the Iran issue from the English-
speaking scholarship, has pointed out.
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What emerged from Foucault’s Iran writings, whether or not he 
correctly understood Shia Islam and the Iranian situation, was 
therefore an attempt ‘to escape from the opposition between 
materiality and mystic phenomena’ (Carrette 2000:139–140). As 
will be shown, there were – because he was a ‘gazing Westerner’ 
or ‘self-conscious Greek’ dwelling into the ‘distant East’ or 
‘Persia’  – some inaccuracies about Shia Islam in Foucault’s 
‘journalistic’ writings from Iran, but the force of his interest in the 
power of religious subjectivity in the shaping of human life was at 
that point nonetheless well defined. As his descriptions of the 
Iranian revolutionary movement in Corriere Della Sera have 
illustrated (Foucault 1978a, 1978b, 1978c, 1978d, 1978e, 1978f, 
1978g, 1978h, 1978i, 1979a, 1979b), religion for him was very much 
an immanent power (cf. Turner 2018:34–45). In order to show 
how Foucault explored this conviction in Iran, it is essential to 
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January 1978: A busy academic 
month and a visit to Germany
In early January 1978, Foucault started the course ‘Security, 
Territory, Population’ at the Collège de France. After introducing 
the issue of power, he swiftly moved on to the question of 
‘governmentality’, which was as new for Foucault as it was for his 
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students and interested companions.23 He followed these lectures 
with a key address at a public seminar on the crisis of juridical 
thought at the beginning of the 19th century and partook in a 
separate seminar on ‘The Genealogy of Societies of Security’, 
which was led by François Ewald.
Foucault often expressed his desire to run a colloquium 
restricted to a small group of researchers, even though the rules 
at the time required that all instructions and peer-discussions at 
the Collège de France should be unrestricted and accessible to 
the public. During the two years of his working on governmentality 
and liberal political rationality, the small group of researchers 
from this eventualised colloquium regularly met in his office. This 
was where nominalist themes, as developed by Paul Veyne, were 
discussed. From January 1978 onwards, Foucault and Veyne 
began to have regular discussions around Foucault’s new interest 
in Greek and Roman antiquity – which found its way to the still 
far away and posthumous ‘fourth’ volume of The History of 
Sexuality.
He then wrote the preface to the English translation of Georges 
Canguilhem’s The Normal and the Pathological, in which he 
identified both a concept of the ethics of the intellectual and a 
philosophy of that ethics. He also kept working on the second 
volume of The History of Sexuality, in which he planned to focus 
on the Christian idea of ‘the flesh’. It was to be a genealogy of 
concupiscence that addresses the practice of confession in 
Western Christianity and the direction of conscience as it 
developed after the Council of Trent. This manuscript was 
completely destroyed, and this theme was only readdressed in 
the aforementioned (see ‘The event of Histoire de la sexualité ‘4’: 
23. This chapter is largely based on Defert’s (2013:11–83) synopsis as well as relevant remarks in 
Deacon (2003:9–20), Downing (2008:1–21), Elden (2016:1–7), Falzon and O’Leary (2010:1–16), 
Foucault (1999:110–114), Gane and Johnson (1993:1–9), Gutting (2005a:1–9, 2005b:1–28), 
Kelly (2009:1–6), Lemm and Vatter (2014:1–16), Macey (1993:7–26), May (2006:1–23), Miller 
(1993:13–36), Mills (2003:11–32), O’Farrell (2005:33–49), Oksala (2005:1–16), Rabinow 
(1997:xi–xlii), Simons (1995:6–12) and Sheridan (2005:1–9).
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Les aveux de la chair (2018)’ in ch. 1) ‘fourth volume’ of The History 
of Sexuality (ed. Gros 2018).
In this particularly tiring month, Foucault also started working 
towards establishing a quarterly that would republish the best 
economic and political analyses from the international press and 
started searching for financial support for this project.
In the last part of January 1978, Foucault travelled to Berlin 
with André Glucksmann and Catherine von Bülow for the so-called 
‘Tunix’ meetings, at which the revolutionary Left explored new 
strategies in politics. Foucault surprisingly did not speak about 
anti-psychiatry within this context but rather about the political 
role of intellectuals. In Hanover, he took part in a demonstration in 
support of political scientist Peter Brückner, who had been 
prohibited from teaching or speaking at his university.
February and March 1978: 
Governmentality and the upcoming 
elections in France
In early February 1978, Foucault delivered a lecture that could 
be regarded as his first lecture on the history of the relation 
between governance and the governed. This lecture was 
eventually published in Italy in Aut-Aut journal, with a simple title, 
‘Governmentality’. Socialist weekly Politique-Hebdo questioned 
Foucault about his voting intentions in the upcoming legislative 
elections of 12–19 March 1978. Foucault answered that he did not 
have to broadcast his voting considerations publicly: for him 
that indicated a position of authority and not a position of 
critique.
He declared the same in 1981 on the occasion of presidential 
elections. This withdrawal from an open discussion on democratic 
elections laid foundation for the dispute, which later exploded 
between Foucault and socialists over the so-called ‘silence of the 
intellectuals’ (for which he was again charged with, coming back 
from Iran for the second time in November 1978).
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April 1978: Foucault visits Japan
In April 1978, Foucault travelled to and spent the whole month in 
Japan, organised by the French cultural attaché Thierry de 
Beaucé. He gave a well-received lecture on ‘Sexuality and Power’ 
at the Faculty of Liberal Arts at the University of Tokyo.
During his visit to Japan and as mentioned in Chapter 2, 
Foucault engaged in several discussions with specialists in Kyoto 
on Zen Buddhist mysticism as compared with Christian mysticism. 
He had prepared well for this trip for several months, and had 
read Demiéville, Herrigel, Watts and Suzuki in advance. In 
Fukuoka, he visited a psychiatric hospital as well as a prison and 
met with magistrates and psychiatrists.
He then delivered a lecture at the University of Kyushu on 
power, analysed very precisely, concerning practices in psychiatric 
hospitals and prisons in Japan as compared with France. Foucault 
then travelled to Hirado, where the first Jesuits had arrived – 
obviously, he had an interest in that precarious first meeting 
between ‘West’ and ‘East’.
Other outstanding commitments that Foucault met in Japan 
included his presence and active participation in a seminar with 
Moriaki Watanabe on the first volume of The History of Sexuality 
at the University of Tokyo. He then attended a roundtable 
discussion on Marxism with Ryumei Yoshimoto, with whom he 
maintained correspondence on Hegel and Marx. He had talks 
with Ichio Asukata, president of the Japanese Socialist Party, 
who had returned from China, on the experience of municipal 
management in Yokohama, Grenoble and Bologna.
He also met the celebrated Japanese political scientist 
Maruyama Masao. Interestingly, three days before he returned to 
France, in a televised interview about intellectual developments 
in France, Foucault summarised his visit to Japan by stating: 
‘what interests me here is history and the limits of Western 
rationality. This question is inevitable because Japan is not in 
opposition to Western rationality’. That was quite a remarkable 
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statement and the one that discursively echoed a few months 
later in Iran.
During the last week of his stay in Japan, Foucault resided in 
Seionji temple in Uenohara at the foot of Mount Fuji. There he 
practised Zazen postures under the guidance of a monk who had 
represented Japan in martial arts at the Munich Olympics. 
Foucault’s natural connection with this monk left him baffled. He 
returned to Paris on 29 April 1978.
May 1978: Turning down the first 
offer of Corriere Della Sera
Because the ‘Foucault effect’, to use the expression coined by 
the editor of above-mentioned Aut-Aut journal, was immense 
amongst Italian Left, in early May 1978, Italian publisher Rizzoli, a 
shareholder in Corriere Della Sera, offered Foucault an opportunity 
to publish a regular opinion column in the popular newspaper, 
which he turned down. As an alternative, he suggested forming a 
group of intellectuals to report on the history of ideas and its 
development in the 20th century.
Later in May 1978, the Society for the History of French 
Revolution, of which Maurice Agulhon was president, arranged a 
debate between Foucault and a group of historians, based on 
Jacques Léonard’s review of Discipline and Punish, which had 
appeared in Annales Historiques de la Révolution Française. The 
papers presented at this event were published in L’Impossible 
Prison along with two Afterwords by historian Maurice Agulhon 
and Foucault himself.
In the last week of May 1978, Foucault presented his famous 
paper titled ‘What Is Critique?’ at the French Society for 
Philosophy. This was eventually published posthumously in 1990 
in Bulletin de la Société Française de Philosophie. Yet, Foucault 
announced the very same day to Henri Gouhier, who chaired the 
symposium: ‘I hesitated for a long time over the title of this paper, 
but the only one that actually fits is “What is Enlightenment?”’ 
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That would, of course, become the title of the publication itself. 
Foucault’s subsequent reading of Kant’s minor works on history 
henceforth became a constant routine that remained with him 
till  his last days. He also started his lectures on Neoliberalism, 
which he had been preparing for some time at Collège de France. 
These lectures played a significant role in his assessment of the 
developments in Iran later that year (Leezenberg 2018:11).
At the end of May 1978, Gallimard published Herculine Barbin, 
dite Alexina B (by Herculine Barbin), a case of hermaphroditism, 
in the Gallimard series ‘Parallel Lives’. Starting from the 
descriptions in a psychiatric chronicle from Île d’Oléron that 
Foucault had somehow ‘found’ (rather typical of his in-the-library 
forensic method), he explored the archives of this unique narrative 
about the medico-legal determination of ‘true sex’. Foucault 
considered using some similar cases to produce one of the later 
volumes of The History of Sexuality. The young French novelist 
Hervé Guibert, whom Foucault had met the previous year, turned 
the chronicle into a script for a film in which European actress 
Isabelle Adjani agreed to play the title role.
June to August 1978: A horrible 
accident and preparations for Iran
During these three months, from June to August 1978, Foucault 
experienced some severe problems. Early in June 1978, the head of 
Corriere Della Sera’s Paris bureau worked out a programme with 
Foucault regarding some substitute for the previously suggested 
column on the history of ideas that Foucault had turned down as 
a sole author the previous month. Foucault again stepped back 
but suggested presentations by each of the following authors: 
Susan Sontag on Vietnam, Alain Finkielkraut on the USA, Arpad 
Ajtony on Hungary and Jorge Semprun on Spain.
In August 1978, Rizzoli responded positively to Foucault’s 
suggestion that more than one author would take part in this 
column whilst the notorious events in Abadan started attracting 
international attention to Iran. After some persuasion, Foucault 
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eventually agreed to inaugurate the particular series. He then set 
about doing his research on Iran, which was likely to be visited by 
him on the brink of a revolution. Shortly after that, he officially 
accepted Corriere Della Sera’s invitation to report on the events 
in Iran as they unfolded.
In early July 1978, Foucault was run over by a car right in front 
of his apartment in Paris. He was badly injured and deeply 
traumatised by this horrible accident, all because of a reckless 
driver’s foolishness. Foucault was consequently hospitalised for a 
few days at Vaugirard Hospital. As a result of trauma to his skull, 
without loss of consciousness, he suffered from migraines for at 
least the next year. In 1980, at Sartre’s funeral, he told Claude 
Mauriac: ‘since that accident, my life has changed. The impact of 
the car threw me onto the hood, and I had time to think – it’s 
finished. I’m going to die. And I was fine with that’.
September and October 1978: The 
first trip to Iran and back to Paris
Foucault arrived in Tehran on 16 September 1978. He had rushed 
there following the 08 September 1978 Black Friday massacre at 
Jaleh Square, in which the Shah’s troops shot at protesters, brutally 
killing more than a hundred and wounding literally thousands of 
people. Foucault’s trip was arranged through Thierry Voeltzel and 
Iranian exiles, all close to Karim Sanjabi. With Claire Brière and 
Pierre Blanchet, journalists from Libération, Foucault went to the 
most troubled spots of the conflict. On 20 September 1978, in 
Qom, the religious capital of Iran, he met Ayatollah Shariat-Madari, 
one of the most important liberal religious leaders in Iran at that 
time and a follower of the Shia tradition. His appraisal of the 
immediate situation in the country strongly influenced Foucault’s 
view of the events as they were unfolding.
Mehdi Bazargan, president of the Committee for the Defence 
of Human Rights, acted as their interpreter. Foucault also met 
representatives of most of the political groupings of Iran at that 
time. At that time Ayatollah Khomeini, who was in exile in Iraq, 
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was still unknown in the West. Foucault returned to Paris on 
24 September 1978 and wrote his first articles for Corriere Della 
Sera, convinced, contrary to public opinion, that the Shah’s army, 
which was collapsing in the face of Islamist uprising, could no 
longer exercise political control. In Paris, Foucault met Bani Sadr, 
just before the arrival of Khomeini in France in October 1978.
Le Nouvel Observateur published a translation of one of 
Foucault’s articles from Corriere on 16 October 1978, in which he 
for the first time used the phrase ‘political spirituality’ – a concept, 
as we have seen in Chapter 2, closely connected to his reflections 
about political and ethical subjectivation. The translated article 
immediately provoked anger in the French left, except amongst 
young leftists in Paris. A heated and extensive exchange of letters 
followed, both public and private.
November and December 1978: The 
second trip to Iran
Bernard Kouchner, Jacques and Claudie Broyelle, as well as Alain 
Geismar, appealed for a ‘Boat for Vietnam’ initiative to help the 
so-called ‘boat people’ in the stricken country. They were 
supported by Sartre, Aron, Montand, Signoret, Foucault, Rocard, 
Clavel, Barthes and Ionesco. However, support for the boat 
people introduced a new rift within the intellectual left of France.
Whilst undertaking a systematic re-reading of Thomas Mann, 
Foucault returned to Iran on 09 November 1978. He attempted to 
engage the same Iranians, as effected during his first trip, to 
follow the possible development of their views. He remarked that 
he was concerned to know how, outside Marxism, it was possible 
in the late 20th century to establish principles that were crucial 
for a communal existence.
Foucault then undertook a trip to Abadan, where oil refineries 
were on work stoppage. Representatives of People’s Fedayeen 
explained to him their reasons for supporting Khomeini. On 
15 November 1978, Foucault returned to Paris, where he wrote his 
final articles on Iranian revolution.
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On 19 November 1978, the Italian weekly L’Espresso published – 
without permission – a fragment of the above-mentioned text 
written for Aut-Aut, as if it was part of a debate between Foucault 
and the Italian communist philosopher Massimo Cacciari and 
‘other supporters of the Gulag’. This led to an angry skirmish with 
Italian communists, which Foucault ended with a letter to L’Unità. 
Duccio Trombadori, a journalist with L’Unità, suggested a debate 
with Italian Marxist intellectuals and sent Foucault about a dozen 
pages of questions. He agreed to answer some of them and 
through a series of subsequent interviews, this initiative, according 
to his partner Defert (2013:70), became some bizarre ‘intellectual 
biography’ of Foucault. In December 1978, The American 
Philosophical Association organised a session on Foucault’s work 
in Washington. Notable participants included Hayden White, 
Reiner Schurmann, Hugh Silverman and Peter Caws.
January and February 1979: The 
birth of ‘bio-politics’ and Khomeini’s 
return to Iran
On 07 January 1979, Foucault wrote this peculiar note in the 
presence of Defert (2013:n.p.): ‘not to pass universals through the 
shredder of history, but to pass history through a form of 
thought that refuses universals. What history, then?’ The history 
of Christian confession led him to study the early texts of the 
Church fathers – Cassian, Augustine and Tertullian, in particular. A 
new subject matter slowly emerged now for the then-intended 
second volume of The History of Sexuality: Confessions of the 
Flesh. The study of early Christian texts turned his genealogical 
research towards the Greek and Latin texts of late antiquity. 
Obviously, this study never found its way to the second volume 
of The History of Sexuality. It took almost 40 years to concretise 
it in (for now) an editorial work,24 that is, Histoire de la sexualité 
4: Les aveux de la chair (ed. Gros 2018).
24. See the exposition in section ‘The event of Histoire de la sexualité 4: Les aveux de la chair 
(2018)’ of Chapter 1.
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On 10 January 1979, Foucault started lecturing his course 
entitled ‘The Birth of Bio-politics’, which, in fact, focused on 
liberal governmentality. His famous Monday seminar, which was 
announced with the title ‘Method in the History of Ideas’, focused 
on the procedures of risk management in modern societies. In 
these lectures, Foucault stated: ‘[t]he state does not have an 
essence. The state is not a universal nor in itself an autonomous 
source of power. The state is nothing else but [...] a perpetual 
stratification’. On 01 February 1979, Khomeini, who had been in 
exile in Neauphle-le-Château, France since October 1978, 
triumphantly returned to Iran. Bani Sadr suggested Foucault to 
accompany him to Iran, an invitation firmly declined by Foucault.
March and April 1979: Foucault under 
constant attack
On 06 March 1979, Foucault was confronted in the newspaper Le 
Matin, in the context of International Women’s day, for his 
supporting the Iranian revolution. As Sartre had found it difficult 
to find another discreet location, because of fear of attacks, 
Foucault, on 14 and 15 March 1979, hosted in his apartment the 
‘Israeli–Palestinian colloquium’, organised by Les Temps Modernes. 
On 17 February 1979, revolutionary groups began to execute 
opponents of the new Iranian regime – per definition those who 
were considered, even by slander, to be loyal to the earlier regime 
of the Shah. On 23 and 24 March 1979, Foucault showed up in 
Paris for 2-day discussions on ‘Nuclear Energy and Energy’s New 
Order’. Foucault nevertheless did not take part in the talks and 
refused to visit a nuclear plant.
On 24 March 1979, Claire Brière and Pierre Blanchet published 
Iran: La Révolution au nom de Dieu (Éditions du Seuil): the book 
ended with Foucault’s interview as an afterword (see ‘The spirit 
of a world without spirit’ in ch. 10), in which he yet again and 
steadfastly emphasised the extent to which ‘the collective will of 
the Iranian people impressed him, and that will wasn’t articulated 
according to Western schemas of revolution’. The book provoked 
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several responses, which focused their hostility on Foucault; even 
though most of the arguments did not come from the afterword 
but from the book itself. Foucault was left extremely upset by 
these responses. On 26 March 1979, he, nevertheless, presented a 
preface for the French translation of Peter Brückner’s Ennemis de 
l’État.
On 01 April 1979, in the first issue of France’s first ‘homosexual 
newspaper’, Le Gai Pied, Foucault published an article in favour 
of suicide, for which he was vehemently criticised in Le Monde 
and other newspapers. On 14 April 1979, he published an open 
letter to Mehdi Bazargan in Le Nouvel Observateur, in which he 
clearly condemned the actions of the Iranian regime and 
attempted to influence Bazargan, the prime minister of Iran.
Thus, the period of 16 months from January 1978 to April 1979 
presented its own highlights and problems: apart from continuing 
his academic work at Collège de France, Foucault visited Germany 
and Japan for a month, saw the left severely beaten in the March 
1978 elections, was involved in a traumatic accident, visited Iran 
twice, in September and November 1978, witnessed Khomeini’s 
return to Iran on 01 February 1979 and came under constant 
attacks thereafter, in particular. The question is: how did the 
philosopher handle those vicious blows?
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Corriere Della Sera: A strange 
invitation
As discussed in Chapter 3, Foucault in the first half of 1978 was 
invited to write a regular opinion column as a special correspondent 
for the Italian daily Corriere Della Sera. Foucault turned down the 
offer made by the main publisher Rizzoli in early May 1978. 
However, after negotiations, Foucault finally accepted the offer 
but insisted on contributing to the column only in cooperation 
with other columnists. That is how he eventually accepted the 
publisher and newspaper’s invitation to visit Iran and report on-
site, as it was, on the unfolding of the revolution. As mentioned in 
the Introduction, although it is not uncommon for European 
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newspapers to petition reports from prominent academics, 
Foucault never indicated clear objectives for the philosophical 
nature of such an undertaking (Eribon 1992:281; Miller 1993:308).
Foucault never made clear as to what extent ‘the intellectual’ 
could become ‘a journalist’. This precisely is the problem for the 
majority of Foucault scholars, in the sense that even today we 
have no clear indication of Foucault’s primary objectives. If it is 
true that lack of knowledge about his own identity was the 
primary cause of his presumed ‘mistake’, then it is exactly at this 
crossroad (Foucault, the journalist in the Orient or Foucault, the 
Western philosopher) that the difficulties for many of the 
interpretations of Foucault’s involvement in Iran begin. Why 
was Foucault so unclear about the philosophical quality of his 
immersion in the Iranian revolution? At first impression, Foucault’s 
following answer (cited in Miller 1993) does not suffice:
I go to see what is happening, rather than referring to what is taking 
place abroad without being informed in a way that is precise and 
meticulous. (p. 308, fn. 82)
Indeed, it is a curious remark, yet it is typical of the stylistic 
distinctiveness, the elusiveness, the tentative nature of Foucault’s 
Iran writings. In other words, Foucault’s vagueness about what 
he was going to do and what he was possibly going to find in Iran 
is thematically relevant in this context. From the style and content 
of his Iran writings itself, it is clear that Foucault was, 
philosophically, displaced in Iran and that he lacked the comfort 
of what he would otherwise have recognised as ‘discourse’. It is 
clear from their presentation and content that these writings are 
stylistically unique – they certainly are not philosophical essays, 
even by Foucault’s open-ended understanding of ‘discourse’ – 
yet by their well-defined and convincing modern-critical claims, 
they are philosophical contributions to his oeuvre, in particular, 
and his critique of the project of modernity, in general, specifically 
because of their timid and self-interrupting nature. Foucault was 
hesitant in Iran – and those who have even a rudimentary 
knowledge of his essential writings would agree that Foucault ‘in 
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the West’ never strikes one as being unsure or hesitant – rather 
the opposite: he was always an extremely assertive and 
challenging intellectual.
However uncertain about and uncomfortable with the 
unfamiliar philosophical order of things they may lead to, Foucault 
thus took the risk and accepted the offer to present his writings 
to the newspaper. He negotiated strict terms with the editor of 
Corriere Della Sera for their publication, making sure that his 
contributions (eventually covering a total of 15 articles and 
interviews25) would not be conventional philosophical inquiries 
but ‘on-the-scene investigations’ (Eribon 1992:281, 289), or a 
‘journalism of ideas’ (Leezenberg [1998] 2004:99) or one of his 
‘present histories’ (Beukes 2004:884). The articles would appear 
on page one of Corriere Della Sera, titled ‘Michel Foucault 
Investigates’, yet these and other parts of his writings on Iran 
would be republished and freshly reworked in French newspapers 
and journals, such as the daily Le Monde and the widely circulated 
leftist weekly Le Nouvel Observateur (cf. Foucault 1978a, 1978b, 
1978c, 1978d, 1978e, 1978f, 1978g, 1979a, 1979b). Iranian student 
activists translated at least one of his essays into Persian and 
posted it on the walls of Tehran University in the last quarter of 
1978 (Afary & Anderson 2005:3). The said Persian translation and 
publication of his Iran writings, titled Iraniha CheRoya’ISar Darand 
(Foucault 1998) would follow two decades later, still years before 
they would be available in English.
Imprecise as he was about the philosophical significance of his 
venture, Foucault was logistically relatively well prepared for his 
journalistic expedition: working with his project coordinator 
Thierry Voeltzel and seeking out the company of other foreign 
journalists, he interviewed a variety of informants, talking with 
representatives of the Shah’s army, American advisers, opposition 
leaders, such as Mehdi Bazargan and Abol Hassan Bani Sadr, as 
25. Republished in French in Foucault (1994), translated and published in Persian (Foucault 
1998) and for the first time fully translated into English and republished by Afary and 
Anderson (2005:181–277).
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well as Ayatollah Shari’at Madari, widely regarded at that time 
the most influential yet moderate of Iran’s mainstream religious 
leaders (Foucault 1978a:190; cf. Miller 1993:308), who, for example, 
opposed participation of the ‘ulamâ’, the higher Shia clergy, in 
government administration. Foucault also spoke to striking 
workers in Abadan, the principality of the oil region, inner-city 
bourgeois individuals, including striking airline staff in Tehran, 
members of the military identifying with the movement, university 
staff, and wherever time allowed for it, he interviewed Iranians in 
the streets.
Foucault received explanations and answers from the revolting 
people in these streets, as well as the addresses for connecting 
with discreet informants such as Ahmad Salamatian, a Parisian-
based secularised Iranian intellectual, in exile since 1965, who was 
to become deputy minister of Foreign Affairs in the short-lived 
post-revolutionary government. Foucault had studied Paul 
Vieille’s and Louis Massignon’s magisterial sociological studies on 
Iran and Henry Corbin’s authoritative four-volume work on Iranian 
Islamic philosophy and spirituality (Leezenberg [1998] 2004:101). 
From Iran, he called and had long discussions with philosopher 
friends such as André Glucksmann and Alain Finkielkraut (Eribon 
1992:282).
Adequate to state that Foucault went to Iran armed with a 
general knowledge of Iran, knowledge about the Shia tradition as 
mainly interpreted by Corbin as well as perspectives presented 
by middle- to upper-class Iranian expats. There do not appear to 
be key Muslim theologians, either Shia or Sunni, other than 
Shari’at Madari, amongst the people he interviewed in either Paris 
or Iran who might have added value to his understanding of the 
relationship between religion and politics as understood by 
Iranians themselves.
Foucault thus went to Tehran in mid-September 1978 on the 
first of the two trips (the second one in the second half of 
November 1978, when the reaction against the Shah was reaching 
its brutal climax), in the company of Voeltzel, to spend 10 days 
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with demonstrators in the streets of Iran. Those were the days 
after ‘Black Friday’, 08 September 1978, when the Shah’s army 
had shot on a crowd at Djaleh Square in Tehran, leaving as many 
as hundred Iranians dead and thousands wounded (although the 
number of actual casualties on that day has always been 
disputed). After Black Friday, the popular uniting call was for 
the  Shah’s departure, rather than reconciliation or reforms 
(Leezenberg [1998] 2004:100; Miller 1993:308).
Foucault (1988a) had entered into this incinerator – a strange 
one, where no one seemed to be afraid of burning to death:
When I arrived in Iran, immediately after the September massacres, 
I said to myself that I was going to find a terrorised city, because there 
had been 4000 dead.26 Now I can’t say that I found happy people, 
but there was an absence of fear and intensity of courage, or rather, 
the intensity that people were capable of when danger, though still 
not removed, had already been transcended. (p. 220)
Although Corriere Della Sera datelined the articles ‘Tehran’, 
Foucault wrote them in France, after returning from Iran (the first 
visit was from 16 to 24 September 1978, and the second one was 
from 09 to 15 November 1978). As Corriere Della Sera translated 
those articles into Italian, they were not at once available in 
French. As highlighted, Foucault did publish extracts and 
summaries of those articles in French publications as well, notably 
the widely circulated Le Nouvel Observateur and Le Monde.27
26. Foucault seems to have adhered to this exaggerated death count at Djaleh Square, 
propagated by the revolting masses themselves. Thousands were wounded, but the death 
toll unlikely accounted to more than hundred casualties. As formal statistics and official 
reports were never released, the true extent of deaths has remained uncertain. 
27. See Afary and Anderson (2005:181). The full register of 15 writings (Foucault 1978a, 1978b, 
1978c, 1978d, 1978e, 1978f, 1978g, 1978h, 1979a, 1979b) is not discussed, but only seven main 
articles, cross-referencing them to the other eight articles. Those seven articles are the most 
representative of the content and tone of Foucault’s Iran writings, and the most consequential 
in terms of his broader philosophical project, namely his critique of modernity, which is the 
basis of the reception of Foucault’s work in this book in more general terms. 
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Into the Incinerator, 16 September 
1978
Every 40 days, the masses reappeared to mourn, as Shia Muslims 
do, the thousands that had died, and the police and army would 
again assault the mourners, producing more martyrs – a country 
with one of the most lethal armies in the world was in the third 
quarter of 1978 sinking into chaos, faced with a population 
seemingly keen to die.28
The protesters typically wore white shrouds, as a sign of their 
readiness to face death. The world was watching one of the 
28. Miller (1993:306–307), in an unforgettable overview of the aftermath of Black Friday.
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greatest populist explosions in human history (Miller 1993:306–
307; 451, fn. 79) which was becoming an embodiment of Marx’s 
notorious yet justifiable comment that ‘religion is the heart of a 
heartless world’. From September 1978 to April 1979, in the course 
of this epic revolution with its millions of participants, the Iranian 
people overthrew the regime of Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi 
(1941–1979), who had pursued a dictatorial programme of 
economic and cultural modernisation for more than 25 years 
(Cottam 1990:3). The Shah’s regime had never gained a broader 
base in Iranian society but had acquired a measure of legitimacy 
in the two decades following a coup, backed by the CIA, which 
had brought him to power in 1953.29 By the mid-1970s, protests 
against the repressive nature of the regime and widespread 
corruption in Iran started to increase dramatically.
The Shah reacted by intensifying political repression on the 
one hand, and introducing lacklustre reforms on the other, which 
only proved to nourish the potential for organised resistance. 
Initially, the demonstrations calling for substantial reforms were 
led by secularised left-wing, urban-based intellectuals, but from 
08 January 1978 onwards the Shia Iranian clergy was fully 
mobilised into internal warfare after a demonstration by Shia 
seminary students in Qom led to a confrontation with security 
forces, leaving 20 students dead. After this event, resistance 
against the Shah was centred on religious institutions and 
organised by urban as well as non-urban mullahs, intensely 
influenced by the high-ranking Shia scholars (the ulamâ).30
By late 1978, the Islamist faction led by these Shia mullahs, 
loyal to Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who was still in exile in the 
Shia holy city of Najaf in Iraq, had come to dominate the anti-
Shah uprising, including secular nationalists, democrats and 
liberal Iranian intellectuals (Cottam 1990:5; Miller 1993:309). 
29.        Bakhash (1986:48–63); Gasiorowski (1987:263); Kinzer (2008:1–29); Leezenberg 
([1998] 2004:99).
30. Bakhash (1986:48–63); Leezenberg ([1998] 2004:100); Rodinson (1978:233).
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The Shia Islamists fully controlled the organisation of the protests, 
which for example meant that many secular women protesters 
who joined the protests were pressured into donning the veil, as 
an expression of solidarity with Shia Iranian Muslims (Afary & 
Anderson 2005:1–2, cf. 72–74). By 16 January 1979, the Shah had 
left the country. Khomeini returned from exile on 01 February 
1979 – the last few months of his 15-year exile, from October 1978, 
were spent in Paris – to take power. A provisional government led 
by Shahpour Bakhtiar tried to introduce quick reforms, but it was 
perceived to be too closely associated with the Shah for it to 
have any public support, hence was ousted in a three-day uprising 
from 10 to 12 February 1979 (Afary & Anderson 2005:106; 
Leezenberg [1998] 2004:100). A fierce competition for supremacy 
was now developing amongst the groups that led the revolution. 
In the anarchy that followed the Bakhtiar provisional government, 
a powerful but uncontrolled, volatile and explosive new force was 
formed all over Iran: The so-called revolutionary committees or 
komitehs, which were responsible for much of the carnage that 
was to follow (Bakhash 1986:48–63).
After Khomeini’s return to Iran, he at once began to assume 
absolute power, even to a large extent over the komitehs, providing 
them with ‘revolutionary courts’, a new and draconian code of 
justice, which essentially implied a free hand to impose capital 
punishment and carry out swift public executions. Thousands of 
Iranians associated with the old regime – even by slander and 
rumour – were rounded up and tortured, or summarily executed, 
or both. ‘Homosexuals’ were dispatched to firing squads. Any 
‘adulterer’, which simply meant anyone talking with an unrelated 
person of the opposite sex – or often anyone merely accused of 
‘adultery’ – could be stoned to death on a whim. Iran in the first 
months of 1979 became a ruthless theocracy, inspired by Khomeini’s 
understanding of an ‘Islamic government’ (cf. Afary & Anderson 
2005:109). On 30 and 31 March 1979, a national referendum was 
held, and the outcome was confirmed on 01 April 1979, declaring 
Iran an ‘Islamic republic’ by an overwhelming majority.
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From September 1978 to April 1979, everything changed in 
Iran. It was a revolution in the most inflexible sense of the word. 
But the religious fervour providing the revolution with all its force 
was not going to depart once victory was obtained – ‘the mullahs 
were not going to return sensibly to their mosques’ (Leezenberg 
[1998] 2004:100). They had drawn blood, had a glimpse of what 
absolute power could do, and had become the judges and 
executioners of this bloody new dispensation. The bloodshed of 
the last quarter of 1978 suddenly seemed ignorable, given the 
utter carnage that followed Khomeini and the komitehs’ vicious 
execution of power in the first and second quarters of 1979. 
Around 10 to 12 thousand Iranians had died in the uprising of late 
1978 – but thousands more during the bloody aftermath in the 
first quarter of 1979 alone (cf. Miller 1993:313).31
Initially, progressive and leftist intellectuals around the world 
were much divided in their evaluations to the Iranian revolution. 
The repression that turned demonstrations and processions into 
bloodbaths in 1978 had aroused disgust against the Shah’s regime 
and sympathy for the Iranian people. Everyone, it seems, eventually 
hoped that the Shah would leave Iran; but no one bothered about 
what would happen afterwards. Whilst some Western liberals 
supported the overthrow of the Shah on the grounds of violation 
of human rights, they were far less enthusiastic about the notion of 
an Islamic republic. And most, if not all Western liberals, considered 
31. Beukes (2009a:4, fn. 8) – In-depth reading on the broader socio-political and socio-
historical contexts of Iranian revolution, and ultimately the bloodshed in the first quarter of 
1979, should consider the following sections in or otherwise complete works of Abrahamian 
(1982:496–530,1993:60–87); Afshari (2001:14–32); Arjomand (1989:91–176); Bakhash (1986 – 
an outstanding introduction); Cottam (1990:3–15); Dabashi (2005 – a post–9/11 updated 
version of a celebrated introduction, first published in 1993); Esposito (2003:26–70), 
Halm (1997 – a sober introduction to Sunni–Shia oppositions by a philosophically erudite 
historian from Tubingen); Hiro (2000:103–135); Kinzer (2008:ix–xxv, 119–133); Kurzman 
(2004 – a balanced overview of the revolution from organisational, religious, cultural and 
military perspectives); Martin (2003:100–165); Milani (1994:59–104); Momen (1987:246–299); 
Mortimer (1982:296–376); Mottahedeh (2000 – the complete book is crucial for orientation; 
this is the revised and updated version; in terms of depth, scope and eloquence, this book 
has no rival); Parsa (1989:91–222) and Vahdat (2002 – an introduction to the intellectual basis 
of the modernisation of Iran).
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any possibility of restoring Islamic tradition for guiding the 
government and the life-world system in Iran as regressive, if not 
barbaric (cf. Miller 1993:309–310). Yet, Foucault resisted the 
de  rigueur quality of these reserves. Rather interested in the 
contra-modern nature of the uprising itself, he was intrigued by 
the quality of the mass spirituality the world was confronted with 
in the last quarter of 1978. The resistance to modernity and 
modernisation must have been, for him, just too obvious.
In his expedition to Iran, Foucault (cited in Oliver 2010) was, 
from the outset, disapproving the Shah’s regime:
He saw it as autocratic, particularly in terms of its use of secret 
police  as a means to establish a climate of fear among the 
population. He was excited about the opposition of Ayatollah 
Khomeini, viewing it as potentially ushering a new form of religious 
democracy. (p. 113)
Foucault seems at first glance to ‘have overlooked or not accepted 
alternative analyses that saw the potential both for totalitarianism 
and the oppression of women within the proposed religious state’ 
(Oliver 2010:113). But that was only on the surface: what Foucault 
recognised, was a potential for the manifestation of a political 
spirituality, an alternative to both liberalist discourse in the ‘West’ 
and Islamism in the ‘East’.
Foucault indeed accepted several arguments put forward by 
Khomeini devotees ‘that men and women would be treated 
differently but equally in a new religious state’. He (in Oliver 2010) 
also accepted the principle that it was:
[P]ossible to treat men and women by different standards, and yet to 
retain a principle of equality between the sexes. It may be that, when he 
heard people predicting an oppressive regime that would drastically 
reduce the liberty of women in particular, he felt that people were 
being needlessly critical of Islamic society. (p. 114)
Foucault’s (cited in Oliver 2010) only ‘prediction’ at the time was 
that, in a country now to be governed by the ayatollahs:
[T ]here would not be any form of hierarchy, and thus the country 
would naturally tend towards democracy. In this, he seems to have 
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underestimated not only the influence of the ayatollahs, but their 
hunger to use this influence to control the religious nature of the new 
society. (p. 114)
Foucault seems to have thought that the imams would not use 
their influence to regulate the behaviour of citizens in the new 
Iran. It appears that he believed that the society would return to 
a form of a non-threatening ideal, characteristic of society 
during the inception of Islam. There were serious concerns 
amongst several observers, both within and outside Iran, during 
late 1978 and early 1979, that ‘the lives of minority groups such 
as the Baha’is would be in danger from an Islamic society. 
Foucault did not think this was at all likely; but unfortunately, 
events would prove him wrong’ (Oliver 2010:114).
Female protagonists, outside Iran as well, objected the 
projected new system, anticipating some form of ‘Islamic 
government’. They were troubled by the possibility of a 
fundamentalist ideology, and also that a new religious 
administration would in effect preserve the ‘worst extremes of 
the earlier regime, albeit reinforced by different validations. 
Those who spoke out were also frightful of the methods of Islamic 
judicial punishment that they saw in other Islamic countries’ 
(Oliver 2010:114).
Foucault had suggested in his writings on the Iranian revolution 
that combining religion and politics could actually construct an 
efficient kind of administration. This idea was severely criticised 
by several political writers in France. Moreover, it soon became 
apparent that other subgroups in Iran were in a state of grave 
vulnerability, and reports regarding the executions of 
‘homosexuals’ started surfacing in Paris (cf. Oliver 2010:114). For 
Foucault, such reports cut very close to the bone. Yet, he did not 
back down on his pro-revolution stance as published in his 
reports.
It is rather inexplicable: did Foucault not unswervingly argue 
against the idea of universalist perspectives on history, society 
and the link between the two? Indeed, in a personal sense, 
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Foucault wanted to maintain his personal freedom to interpret 
society as he wished, but also to retain that freedom of thought 
for others. He did not wish to be constrained into a single 
paradigm or theoretical perspective and did not prescribe it upon 
anyone else. However, in his Iran writings, he clearly did not 
anticipate that there was any danger of tyranny within the 
spiritual guidance of the new leaders, notwithstanding many 
concerned opinions in Europe and France, in particular. 
The  evidence was overwhelming, especially regarding the 
treatment of women and ‘homosexuals’, yet Foucault did not 
withdraw any of his assertions about the validity of the Iran 
uprising. This rightly caused disbelief amongst those who 
supported Foucault as a philosopher up to that point.
Foucault nevertheless was at the time seriously involved in 
human rights problems. One of Foucault’s most important 
contributions during this period was to accrue backing for the 
aforementioned ‘boat people’, who had left Vietnam in the mid-
1970s onwards. The fall of Saigon in April 1975 to the North 
Vietnamese army witnessed the start of a series of efforts by 
many people to leave former South Vietnam to seek sanctuary in 
adjacent countries or to be granted asylum in countries such as 
the USA and Australia. People wanted to leave former South 
Vietnam because either they had been working for the US 
administration and hence would be subjected to retaliation or 
were likely to be imprisoned because they were perceived to be 
ideologically opposed to North Vietnam. The years following the 
victory of the North Vietnamese and the reconsolidation of the 
country were harsh and ambiguous until the country as a whole 
was stabilised after many years of war and conflict. The majority 
of these people struggled to leave Vietnam, forcing many of 
them to buy a place in a boat that could reach other countries or 
to be picked up by neutral ships in international waters. Hence, 
such people were called ‘boat people’, who endeavoured this 
hazardous way of fleeing from Vietnam and suffered extensively. 
Many boats were ill-equipped and overturned, whilst others were 
seized by bandits, often killing the escapees. Only a small number 
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in the end found asylum in Western countries. The misery and 
difficulties of such people had attracted considerable media 
attention in France because Vietnam being its former colony. 
Foucault, in his defence, made constant and resolute efforts to 
highlight the dilemma of Vietnamese refugees (cf. Oliver 2010:116).
The obvious question in everyone’s mind was: why was 
Foucault not as clear and ‘helpful’ in his observations of the 
developments in Iran as he was with Vietnam? The answers are to 
be found in his Iran writings, which radiated uncertainty and 
self-discomfort, yet were unfaltering in Foucault’s convictions 
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Foucault’s most consequential Iran 
writings
Before we proceed to the seven most consequential of Foucault’s 
Iran writings, this apparent intra-philosophical difficulty must 
have bothered critical readers from the outset: how did a 
philosopher who specialised his whole academic life in themes of 
particularity manage to become a journalist, generalising 
experience, as journalists typically have to do? (cf.  Beukes 
2009a:6).
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Foucault, engaging in this project, was not completely new to 
journalism: in France, he had been intimately involved in launching 
Libération, and he had been a regular contributor to Le Nouvel 
Observateur (Eribon 1992:281). Yet, he was completely new to 
being a journalist in the proper sense of the word, speaking on 
behalf of others, or ‘saying what others are saying about others, 
as journalists typically have to do’ (Beukes 2009a:6). A close 
associate of Foucault, Jonathan Rée, has pointed out that unlike 
some other contemporary figures of French intellectual life, 
Foucault was always ‘reluctant to air his opinions about big 
political issues’. It was not that Foucault was uninterested in 
politics or indifferent to human suffering, certainly not, but rather 
that he was suspicious of the species of intellectuals – ‘universal 
intellectuals’ as he often referred to them – who considered it 
their privilege and duty to set the world right, ‘as if history had 
appointed them to speak on its behalf, or morality had summoned 
them to be the conscience of the human race’ (Rée 2005:46).
However, even more relevant to our treatise, Foucault was a 
philosopher of particularity – and journalists need to generalise 
their stories for it to have effect and street credibility. Journalists 
tell the human story of the event – whilst ‘Foucault typically tells us 
stories of marginalised subjects outside events’ (Beukes 2009a:6). 
Indeed, anyone who has read Foucault’s famous analyses of 
typical modern institutions – Discipline and Punish, or the 
preceding Madness and Civilization, published in the very early 
1960s, or the thematic parallel Birth of the Clinic, to the three 
volumes32 of The History of Sexuality, for example – would 
understand why Foucault must have found it challenging to be a 
journalist, to speak in the name of others. He had immense 
respect for the other’s otherness.
Foucault was at heart a historian, however unconventional, who 
spent the best part of his life studying ancient documents in the 
32. Again, it is too early in terms of the reception and dissemination of Histoire de la 
sexualité 4: Les aveux de la chair (ed. Gros 2018), to speak of a four-volume work, or a series 
now consisting of four volumes.
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Bibliothèque Nationale and the Bibliothèque du Saulchoir in Paris. 
However, he was also a social philosopher with a specialised 
interest in those small-scale processes in the webs of social 
interests, or ‘particularities’, or ‘micro-power’, as he called it, that 
travel through the labyrinths and dark corners of the institutions in 
and by which we live. Foucault was always on the lookout for 
themes that refused to conform to the ‘normal’ ways of established 
notions and conventions – he was interested in particularities, 
idiosyncrasies, uniquenesses and discrepancies. He was a poet of 
uncommon place: to a great extent, in a striking description, ‘a 
philosopher of the unphilosophical, a historian of the unhistorical 
and a politician of the unpolitical’ (Rée 2005:46). Given this already 
complicated philosophical position, the mere fact that Foucault 
accepted the invitation to go on the road to Tehran as a journalist 
could seem like opting for a treacherous road, full of traps.
Yet, consciously self-displaced as he was in Iran, Foucault did 
not want to be read as a lost or trapped philosopher. ‘Throughout 
his life, Foucault’s concept of authenticity meant looking at 
situations where people lived dangerously’, that unsafe realm of 
‘limit experiences’ where Nietzschean ‘creativity originated’ 
(cf. Afary & Anderson 2005:2). In the tradition of the famous yet 
notorious Western contra-modern prophets of extremity, 
Nietzsche, Heidegger and Bataille, Foucault embraced the 
intellectuality that pushed the limits of rationality – and ‘he wrote 
with great passion in defence of irrationalities that broke new 
boundaries’ (Afary & Anderson 2005:2).
In 1978, Foucault found precisely that kind of morbid 
transgressive powers in the revolutionary figure of Khomeini and 
the millions who risked death as they followed him in the course 
of the revolution. He knew that such ‘limit experiences’ could lead 
to new forms of creativity and he, as his Iran writings would clearly 
specify, passionately threw in his support for their cause (cf. Afary 
& Anderson 2005:2). This was Foucault’s only first-hand experience 
of revolution if the protests in Tunisia in the late 1960s and the 
student uprising in 1968 in France are not considered to 
be ‘revolutions’ in the strict sense of the word. The Iranian revolution 
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also led to his most extensive set of writings on a non-Western 
society. What then, did Foucault physically encounter in that 
incinerator, in and on the streets of Tehran in September 1978? 
Moreover, what did he make of those encounters?
However, before answering that crucial question, let us 
deliberate for a moment on Foucault’s broader interest 
in  spirituality and religion, which was already well established 
in 1978 (Bernauer 2009):
Some would claim that Foucault’s interest in spirituality and religion 
was a consequence of the Iranian encounter, but that would be to 
ignore many earlier signs of such concern in his writings. Certainly, 
Foucault’s openness to the religious dynamics of the Islamic 
world was not only due to his erudition but also to other personal 
experiences. (pp. 150–151)
For example, Foucault spent a year (1958 – 1959) in Poland, where 
(Bernauer 2009):
[H]e witnessed the Catholic Church’s strong opposition to the 
Communist government. John Paul II, who became pope a month 
before Foucault’s first trip to Iran, brought that encounter to an 
astonishing efficiency, as was shown in the enormous expression of 
support for him during his trip to Poland in the second half of 1979. 
(p. 150)
That visit was the ‘incentive for the Solidarity movement, of which 
Foucault became a strong public campaigner, and which possibly 
was one of the events that announced the coming collapse of 
communism’ (Bernauer 2009:150; cf. May 2006:129).
Possibly even more significant for understanding Foucault’s 
sense of religious dynamics were his visits to Brazil in the early 
1970s whilst the military tyranny was in control of the state 
(Bernauer 2009):
He was attentive to the theologies of liberation that had come 
to prominence in South America at that time, whilst obviously 
distrustful of the many Marxist dimensions to them. Here too, he saw 
the Catholic Church’s confrontational activism of human rights and 
the type of power it was capable of exercising. (p. 150)
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For example, in 1975, a prominent Jewish journalist, Vladimir 
Herzog was killed whilst in police custody, another event in a 
series that had intimidated the Jewish community in Brazil. 
The  archbishop of São Paulo decided to organise an inter 
denominational memorial service for the slain journalist (Bernauer 
2009:150). As quoted in Bernauer (2009), Foucault noted the 
following:
[T ]his service drew thousands and thousands of people into the church, 
on to the square and so on, and the cardinal in red robes presided over 
the ceremony, and he came forward at the end of the ceremony, in front 
of the faithful, and he greeted them shouting: ‘Shalom, Shalom’. Also, 
there was all around the square armed police, as well as plainclothes 
policemen in the church. The police pulled back; there was nothing 
the police could do against that. I have to say, that had a grandeur of 
strength, there was a gigantic historical weight. (p. 150)
‘It was the spiritual–political power of that historical weight that 
prepared him for Iran and generated some of his hope for its 
revolution’ (Bernauer 2009:150). To that sense of spiritual–
political power, Foucault’s overall solidarity with those against 
authority must be taken into consideration.
The question at once arises: can philosophy develop spiritual 
practices of resistance against authority, without falling in the 
traps of totalitarianism itself? Foucault undeniably thought that 
philosophy could make possible a new spiritualisation of politics 
and political discourse. Politics and political discourse could take 
the form of ‘messianic programs for the spiritual salvation of 
populations’ (McGushin 2007:240). This also means that resistance 
could take the form of counter-practices of political spirituality. 
This explains Foucault’s admiration for the spiritual roots of Iranian 
revolution – yet as well the dangerous ways this spirituality could 
be captured by totalitarian projects, as indeed happened in Iran in 
1979. Was Foucault careful enough about this potential danger?33
33. Note that aside his responses to the Iranian revolution, the political relation between 
sovereignty and power is not an issue that Foucault pursued in his later writings (Houen 
2008:71). This is another element of the uniqueness of his Iran writings.
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If he was not, then it was not because he underestimated the 
potential of the ‘collective will’ of Iranian people. Foucault 
deliberated that until his visit to Iran he had only read about that 
‘collective will’: in Iran, he however encountered it on the streets, 
focused in determined opposition to the Shah. He wondered 
what to make of ‘the vocabulary, the ceremonial, the timeless 
drama into which one could fit the historical drama of a people 
that pitted its very existence against that of the sovereign’ 
(Foucault, cited in Rabinow 1997:xxii). Foucault was fascinated, 
perhaps above all, by what he saw as a call for a new subjectivity. 
He discerned an imperative that went beyond overthrowing yet 
another corrupt, Western-supported authoritarian regime, a 
command he had formulated thus: ‘[…] above all we have to 
change ourselves – our way of being, our relationships with 
others, with things, with eternity, with God’ (Foucault, cited in 
Rabinow 1997:xxiii). He struggled with this impression, repeating 
a comparable suggestion on several occasions (Foucault, cited in 
Rabinow 1997):
What is the meaning for these people, to seek out, at the price of their 
lives, that thing whose very possibility we Europeans have forgotten 
at least since the Renaissance and the period of the great crises of 
Christianity – spirituality. I can hear the French laughing at these 
words, but they are making a mistake. (p. xxiii; [emphasis in original])
Foucault was not only deeply captivated by this ‘collective will’ 
but it was driven by a definite ethical conviction, namely his 
understanding of an ‘ethics of freedom’ (Bernauer & Mahon 
2005:151–153). Foucault’s urgent calls for freedom in his last 
works were not new to his work, but it was now presented with 
a new assertion and resolute urgency. In the second and third 
volumes of his series on The History of Sexuality, Foucault 
explored a new angle of intellectual liability, and in addition to 
the spheres of power–knowledge interactions, he documented 
a precise angle of the relationship to oneself and the ways 
people fashion their subjectivity, that is, practices for an even 
deeper diffusion of normalisation and tangible opportunities for 
the transgression of the standardised parameters of subjectivity. 
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‘This angle of subjectivity refers to the set of practices we 
perform on ourselves: for Foucault, ethics is essentially a mode 
of self-formation, “the ways we fashion our subjectivity”’ 
(Bernauer & Mahon 2005:151). According to Foucault (cited in 
Bernauer & Mahon 2005), ethics is the:
[P]rocess in which the individual delimits that part of himself that will 
form the object of his moral practice, defines his position relative to 
the precept he will follow, and decides on a certain mode of being 
that will serve as his moral goal. Also, this requires him to act upon 
himself, to monitor, test, improve, and transform himself. (pp. 151–152)
Within this compact expression is Foucault’s idea of ethical 
practice and its dissimilarity to any ethics that would express 
itself as an abstract normative code. This view led Foucault to ask 
new questions about himself and about the cultures he had 
studied: in other words, ‘How have individuals been invited or 
incited to apply techniques to themselves that enabled them to 
recognise themselves as ethical subjects?’ (Bernauer & Mahon 
2005:152). In other words (Bernauer & Mahon 2005):
What aspect of oneself or one’s behaviour applies to ethical attention 
and judgement? Under what rule of conduct do people subject 
themselves, and how do they establish their relationship with this 
rule? In what type of activities do people engage in order to form 
themselves, to moderate their behaviour, to decipher what they are, 
to exterminate their desires? (p. 152)
The specific focus of Foucault’s ethical concern is graspable only 
in the context of his project of The History of Sexuality, but he 
was also motivated by two political events, namely the Iranian 
revolution and his already mentioned support for the Solidarity 
movement in Poland (Bernauer & Mahon 2005:152). When he was 
criticised for his initial compassionate analysis of the Iranian 
revolution, Foucault refused to dismiss the moral achievement of 
those who participated in the revolution, precisely when it 
resulted in a new political repression. He spoke of this ethics as 
‘anti-strategic’ and as ‘irreducible to the question of political 
success’ (Foucault, in Bernauer & Mahon 2005:153). This 
orientation to an explicitly ethical perspective was decisively 
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determined by his study of the Christian experience of sexuality, 
which he took up in the later sections of The History of Sexuality. 
He considered his involvement in Iran to be directly aligned with 
this philosophical discourse, as manifested during the second 
half of the 1970s.
It is precisely this ethical concern that brought Foucault under 
the impression that the revolution in Iran was at heart a human 
rights issue. Already in 1976 (Gane & Johnson 1993):
Foucault took action over human rights in Iran in association with 
Iranian activist Ahmed Salamatian. Foucault visited Iran just more than 
a year later, as the Shah’s repression was intensifying. After talking 
to people from all shades of the political spectrum, he concluded 
that for Iran, secularisation and modernisation were already archaic. 
Opposing what he called the ‘illusions’ of Western analysts, he argued 
that modernity was experienced by Iranians not as progressive but as 
timeworn and corrupt. (p. 5)
Of course, liberal humanists were opposed to the Shah’s brutal 
regime and Foucault, who never considered himself to be 
outside of that tradition, responded as soon as the revolution 
began to take a dangerous turn by condemning abuses of 
human rights in an open letter to Iranian prime minister (Simons 
1995:11). He certainly was not blasé about the ignoration of 
human rights after Khomeini’s komiteh’s took over in February 
1979. His wide-ranging ethical concern for human rights at the 
time is demonstrated in his numerous and well-documented 
protests against racism, the war in Vietnam, the treatment of 
Soviet dissidents, and as mentioned, his involvement in the 
Solidarity movement in Poland, in Brazil and, in its early stages, 
the Iranian revolution. Later in the 1970s and early 1980s, 
‘Foucault was also modestly active in the gay rights movement 
and contributed several interviews to this political cause’ 
(Markula & Pringle 2006:17). During this period, Foucault’s 
political activism and writings undoubtedly ‘helped to promote 
the perspective that one could aspire to so-called left values, 
whilst also being determinedly anti-Communist and anti-
revolutionary (in precisely the Communist sense of the word)’ 
(Markula & Pringle 2006:17).
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In spite of these political actions, Foucault has been critiqued 
often for being apolitical, with the prime criticism being that his 
‘present histories’ graphically point out a range of social problems, 
yet they do not supply coherent guidelines to help challenge 
these problems (Markula & Pringle 2006:17). Habermas 
(cf. Habermas & Levine 1982:21), for example, branded Foucault 
as a ‘neo-conservative’ because he failed to provide a strategy 
for political intervention. Foucault (1997), in response, stated:
I am sure I am not able to provide these people with what they expect. I 
never behave like a prophet – my books don’t tell people what to do. And 
they often reproach me for not doing so (and maybe they are right), and 
at the same time they reproach me for behaving like a prophet. (p. 131)
Foucault did not believe that it was his role to tell others what to do. 
Indeed, he was highly critical of all the ‘prophecies, promises, 
injunctions, and programs that intellectuals have managed to 
formulate in the course of the last two centuries’ (Foucault 1991b:11). 
In contrast, he thought it more suitable to (Markula & Pringle 2006):
[P]erform critical analyses that reveal the strengths and weaknesses 
in the workings of power associated with specific social practices, 
such as punishment or sexuality, so that individuals who were directly 
involved in political action could be better informed in their own 
design of possible strategies and actions. (p. 17)
So, how did Foucault make sense of the Iranian revolution? Was 
he really ‘too intent to ascribe “otherness” to the Iranian 
revolution’, by attempting (Ghamari-Tabrizi 2016):
[V]ery consciously not to see the revolution through the prism of a 
Western conceptual toolkit, thereby Orientaliz(ing) it in a worn-out 
discursive universe? And by doing so, did he neglect ‘to recognise 
“the extent to which the revolution belonged to a historical situation 
different from, but related to the Western context?”’ (p. 74)
Or was he indeed too ‘enthusiastic about any revolt that demands 
the ultimate sacrifice’?34 By presenting and disseminating Foucault’s 
Iran writings themselves, an attempt is made to answer in negative.
34. Simons (1995:85): ‘His admiration for the spiritual, revolutionary experience as a way of 
life suggests a mode of living that transcends the limits of normal life. Yet he is simultaneously 
aware that such existence is sustained by a momentary light that will soon die out’.
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‘The army – When the earth quakes’35
In his very first article for Corriere Della Sera, published on 
28 September 1978, Foucault set the stage for all the articles that 
were to follow, by hinting with subtlety at first, eventually 
becoming very direct, at the intervention of the Shah’s army in 
Iranian people’s everyday lives, as a modern, panoptic event. 
Through his army, the Shah was there, he saw everything, he was, 
in this panoptic sense, the ultimate politician (Foucault, cited in 
Eribon 1992):
When you arrive at the airport after curfew, a taxi takes you at 
breakneck speed through the streets of the city. They are empty. The 
only things slowing the car down are the roadblocks set up by men 
with machine guns. Woe betides if the driver does not see them. 
They shoot. All up and down the Avenue Reza Shah, silent now, as 
far as the eye can see, red lights and green lights flash off and on 
in vain, like the watch ticking on the wrist of a dead man. This is the 
undivided rule of the Shah. (p. 283)
Against the backdrop of the ‘first painful experience’ of a modern 
state, namely the way the early modern vision of a transparent 
and lucid society in France, England and Germany eventually 
paved way for industrial capitalism to emerge as the ‘harshest 
and most savage society one could possibly imagine’, Foucault 
(1979d:184–185) described the brutality and ‘methodical coldness’ 
of the Iranian army as a visible by-product of Iran’s own industrial 
capitalism. Iran’s industrialism, the hallmark of its modernisation, 
brought about a first-class army, which very soon became a tool 
of oppression in the modern sense, namely an instrument to 
observe and control.
Iranians had to be observed and controlled by the fifth largest 
army in the world at the time, a US-trained force which was 
organised precisely according to the same weaponry divisions 
and disciplinary structures as any modern Western army. Actually, 
Foucault noted that there were four armies: the first one for the 
35.Foucault (1978a:189–194; cf. Beukes 2009a:7).
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‘surveillance and the administration of the whole territory’, the 
second for the ‘Shah’s protection’ (the so-called immortals, ‘his 
own Praetorian guard … his Janissaries’), the third was the combat 
army to seek and destroy, and the fourth – 40 000 American 
advisors to the Shah at the time, who naturally controlled the 
Iranian cultural landscape with their ‘advice’. The Shah is the 
panoptic centre of this all-encompassing modern intervention, 
this observing and intervening army (Foucault 1978a:191). There 
was no veritable general staff in this army. Each unit was directly 
linked to the Shah himself, with internal police conducting tight 
control and surveillance amongst soldiers themselves; an army, in 
the last instance, was not a tool for defence against others but for 
‘controlling the Self’, a ‘tool of identity’ (Foucault 1978a:191).
On Black Friday, 08 September 1978, the magnitude of this 
Pahlavian panopticon was demonstrated. Foucault found it 
significant that the unthinkable, in the modern military sense, 
happened on Black Friday: at least on one officially reported 
occasion, an Iranian officer was shot by his own men when he 
gave his men an order to shoot at the crowd. In the context of the 
Western military, disobeying an order is unthinkable. Killing an 
officer who is himself executing an order, is desperately taboo. 
Yet it happened. Some soldiers who could bring themselves to 
execute the order to shoot at the crowd committed suicide the 
next day (Foucault 1978a:193). Because the Shah was guilty of 
the ultimate transgression in Shia Islam – Shia soldiers shooting 
Shia civilians – it was to be expected that the wheel would turn, 
that this version of modernity would turn in against itself: ‘[s]
oldier, my brother, why shoot your brother?’ (Foucault 1978c:200).
A close reading of Foucault’s first article on the position of 
Iranian army in September 1978 brings one to the following 
fundamental conclusion: Foucault was convinced that the Iranian 
army, as a concretisation of hyper-modernity in a country that 
was eager to leave modernity behind, would turn against itself; 
that modernity in Iran would eventually destroy itself in Iran, with 
tools made possible by modernity itself. Foucault thus turned the 
transformative moment he experienced during the Iranian 
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revolution into contemplation and an annotation on history. It is 
not implausible to think that he considered himself as one of 
those transformed people that the revolution generated on the 
streets of Tehran. He also turned the courage and the lack of 
distress he encountered in Tehran, as Ghamari-Tabrizi (2016:57–59) 
argued, into an incentive for and an opportunity of considering 
the social world outside the dominant progressive narratives of 
modern teleology.
In the Iranian revolution, Foucault was thus provided with an 
illustration of his anti-teleological understanding of history. He 
understood the marching masses on the streets of Tehran as the 
embodiment of a political spirituality, the production of history 
through the transformation of the self. That is why he ‘prioritised 
the act and experience of rebellion over the concerns about the 
outcome of the revolutionary movement’ (Ghamari-Tabrizi 
2016:58). Foucault famously scorned all forms of developmentalist 
discourse, Marxist or otherwise. These views attributed to the 
rise of the revolutionary movement in Iran as conflicts stemming 
from the Shah’s modernising administrations. Rather than posing 
a predictable antagonism between a ‘particular past-orientation 
and a prescriptive future project, Foucault defined history as a 
way of reinventing the present moment. This, he believed, was 
the distinct strength of the revolution’ (Ghamari-Tabrizi 2016:58).
‘The Shah is a hundred years behind 
the times’36
How self-conscious this ‘Greek in Persia’ really was, becomes 
clear from Foucault’s second article for Corriere Della Sera, 
published on 01 October 1978. This second article was even more 
upfront in its modern-critical orientation than the first. The initial 
Western interpretation of the events that were heightening the 
sense of crisis in 1978 in Iran was, particularly in Europe, 
an  established one: in the liberal mind, the Shah embodied 
36. Foucault (1978b:194–198; cf. Beukes 2009a:7–8).
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the  positive and productive forces of Enlightenment: of 
‘modernisation’ and ‘secularisation’. The Shah, according to the 
up-curved dynamics of modern telos, had the future on his side, 
whilst those who opposed the Shah were considered a loose 
assembly of antiquated peasants and religious fanatics who had 
yet to adjust to the reality of the modern world.
However, Foucault made it clear in this second article that his 
informants in Iran saw things very differently. As far as they were 
concerned, their struggle was as much against corruption as 
against modernisation – actually, these two were perceived to be 
linked from the outset. The ‘honest people of the West’ turned a 
blind eye to the ‘speculation, corrupt practices, embezzlement 
and swindling that constitute the veritable daily bread of their 
trade, their industry and their finances’ (Rée 2005:46) – but for 
the protesters, a blind eye was no longer possible.
Corruption in Iran was the ‘dynastys way of exercising power 
and a fundamental mechanism of the economy’ (Rée 2005:46), 
the ultimate power of ‘that dreadful ensemble of modernism, 
despotism and corruption’ (Eribon 1992:283). Foucault immediately 
took this ensemble, this contra-modern notion, against the 
backdrop of his agitation for insight into the failures of the modern 
project on the one hand, and the acknowledgement of socio-
religious particularity on the other, seriously. He consciously went 
against the grain of the conventional European perspective on the 
revolution – that ‘unimaginative perspective’ (Foucault 1978b; cf. 
Eribon 1992:283–284) which considered the revolution to be 
simply regressive and a free-fall back into the premodern – by 
accentuating the modern-critical undertones of this revolt:
There was a detail that struck me when I visited the bazaar, which had 
just reopened after more than a week of strikes. There were dozens 
and dozens of incredible sewing machines lined up in the stalls, big 
and elaborate the way 19th-century newspaper advertisements show 
them. They were decorated with drawings of ivy, climbing plants and 
flower buds, in crude imitation of old Persian miniatures. All these 
out-of-service Westernisms wearing the signs of an out-of-date 
East also bore the inscription: ‘Made in South Korea’. I felt then that 
I understood that recent events did not represent a withdrawal of the 
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most outdated groups before a modernisation that is too brutal. It 
was, rather, the rejection by an entire culture, an entire people, of a 
modernisation that is an archaism in itself. It is the Shah’s misfortune 
to be of one piece with this archaism. His crime is that he maintains 
through corruption and despotism this fragment of the past in a 
present that wants nothing to do with it anymore. (pp. 195, 196)
Foucault (1978b; cf. Eribon 1992:284) continued:
Modernisation as a political project and as a principle of social change 
is a thing of the past in Iran […] With the current Iranian regime in 
its death throes, we are present at the final moments of an episode 
that began almost 60 years ago: The attempt to modernise Islamic 
countries in a European mode […] Consequently, I beg of you, let’s 
hear no more talk in Europe about the fortunes and misfortunes of 
a ruler who is too modern for a country that is too old. The Shah is 
what is old here in Iran. He is 50, even 100 years behind. He is as old 
as predatory sovereigns. His is the antiquated dream of opening up 
his country by means of secularisation and industrialisation. However, 
his project of modernisation, his despotic weapons, his system of 
corruption are what is archaic today. (p. 198)
Foucault (1978b:194; [author’s added emphasis]) was in these 
sections of his second writing aspiring towards another political 
imagination, which would escape the stronghold of modernism. 
He did not view modernity in Iran as an ad hoc problem, a case of 
modernity being temporarily derailed by corruption, or a localised 
crisis of modernity, or a minor social problem, but as a problem 
of the crisis of modernity itself. It is modernisation itself that is an 
archaism (Foucault 1978b:194).
Foucault therefore considered the failure of modernisation in 
Iran as a following chapter in a series of stinging failures, which 
had started in the 1920s proper, namely the modernising of Islamic 
countries in a European fashion. If modernity was failing in Europe, 
as Foucault was convinced it was – should the decay of the 
bulwark of modernity, namely the notion of progress through the 
rationalisation of the life-world system, with all its corrupt and 
oppressive consequences, not be taken seriously? If it was clear 
that not even a ‘reasonable modernisation’, which would be willing 
to ‘take cultural identity into account’ (Foucault 1978b:196) would 
escape from being a ‘dead weight’ (Foucault 1978b:197), why not 
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recognise that it was modernity that was failing humanity, and 
not humanity failing modernity?
If it is clear that modernity, and the industrial capitalism it spawned, 
would always in the end boil down to a ‘gigantic (mis)appropriation 
of goods’ (Foucault 1978b:198), its dividends being ‘distributed like 
spoils’ (Foucault 1978b:198) to the Shah and, one could add, his most 
infamous Western peers – those slick chief executive officers, callous 
hedge fund managers and industrial magnates who crashed world 
markets in late 2008, again in a flash crash in 2010, and again in 
2014 – Is it not time to recognise the failure of modernity in even the 
most brutal of senses, which is economical?
Foucault thus located the revolution not in any arbitrary event 
as another failed project of modernity but rather as confirmation 
that it was achievable to surpass modernity and the ‘spiritless 
world’ it had established. He noted that he was ceaselessly told 
that Iran was going through a ‘crisis of modernisation’, and that 
‘a traditional society cannot and does not want to follow its 
arrogant monarch’ in its attempt to ‘compete with the developed 
nations’ of the West. The activist events in Tehran did not signify 
a ‘shrinking back in the face of modernisation by extremely 
retrograde elements’, or some ‘archaic fascism’: for Foucault, 
what is archaic is ‘modernisation itself, not the religious mode of 
the revolutionary expression’ (Ghamari-Tabrizi 2016:60).
‘Faith against the Shah’37
This is precisely where Foucault took off in his third article for 
Corriere Della Sera, published on 08 October 1978. Juxtaposing 
socio-economic spaces in Tehran, describing it as a ‘divided city’, 
with the Hilton Hotel (and the Shah’s palace) on the one side and 
the ‘empty molds’ created by industrialisation, urbanisation and 
growing poverty amongst Iranian people on the other, Foucault 
(1978c:199; cf. Vahdat 2002:1–30) discusses the ways modernity 
fundamentally ‘displaced Iranians’ under the auspices of the Shah. 
37. Foucault (1978c:198–203; cf. Beukes 2009a:8–9).
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Ironically, the urban poor had only one refuge: the mosques 
(cf. Afary & Anderson 2005:81). Modernity drove the urban poor 
to religious spaces where they and their children would be fed, 
clothed and taken care of. Foucault (1978c:199) described this 
modernised Iran, with its poor at the entrances of mosques, as a 
‘rootless geography’, with nothing to offer the people of Iran and 
yet nothing, it seems, to answer for.
Fascinated by the spontaneous eruption of resistance against 
these divisions that were created by the many economic and 
industrial programmes of modernity, Foucault (1978c:200, 202) 
described this energy of resistance as a ‘matter of belief’, a 
‘simple vocabulary’ and an ‘elemental organization’ against the 
injustices modernity had brought to Iran. It was not merely a sub-
economical reaction from an impoverished context; instead, it 
was a refined and eloquent worldview against the ‘worldview of 
this liberal, modern, Westernised regime’ (Foucault 1978d:204). It 
seems to be ‘Persia’s surprising destiny’ (Foucault 1978c:203), its 
‘peculiar destiny’ (Foucault 1978d:208) to have invented the state 
and government at the dawn of history, yet also derived a religion 
which never ceased to give an ‘irreducible strength to people to 
oppose state power’ (Foucault 1978c:203).
It was in Foucault’s mind that ‘Persia’s destiny’ to become the 
indicator of the bankrupt nature of modernity’s ruthless relation of 
progress and the legitimation of suffering. In this regard that 
religion – Shia Islam – was the keyhole and resistance the key to 
unlocking the door, which would lead to a different and non-
modern world. Opposing modernity had become a matter of faith 
against the forces of modernity. Foucault (1978c:200) described 
how groups of unarmed demonstrators were halting government 
troops with shouts of ‘Islam, Islam!’ and again, ‘Soldier, my brother, 
why shoot your brother? Come with us to save the Quran!’
Foucault was at first surprised to find many – but not all – left-
wing, even entirely secularist students agitating for an ‘Islamic 
government’. However, he then observed that the Shia clergy was 
utterly different from Catholic hierarchy: ‘[t]he Shia clergy is not 
Chapter 6
79
a revolutionary force – they mediate and facilitate a sense of 
being-together for the Iranian people’ (Foucault 1978c:202). The 
clergy had no popes or cardinals nor any centralised system of 
authority, and if the mullahs were stimulating a popular revolt 
against corruption, it was not because they were ‘in command’ 
but because they were giving ordinary Iranians precisely what 
they needed: ‘[a] way of being together, a way of speaking and 
listening, a means of understanding each other and sharing each 
other’s desires’ (Foucault 1978c:202).
These protesters who were calling for Islamic government 
explained themselves to Foucault by speaking about an ‘ideal’ 
fashioned from Islamic values as they understood them: the dignity 
of labour, respect for minorities, equality before the law and a 
government accountable to the people – precisely the things 
promised but never realised by modernity in Iran (Foucault 
1978d:205). That ideal could transform thousands of forms of 
discontent, hatred, misery and despair into a force – it could 
transform them into a dynamism ‘because it is an elemental mode 
of social organisation, of being together, a way of speaking and 
listening, and being listened to’ (Foucault 1978c:202). To listen and 
be listened to – that was what Iranians were dreaming about. They 
imagined an Islamic government carrying that dream forward. In an 
interruption to his streak of articles for Corriere Della Sera, Foucault 
published an extensive article in Le Nouvel Observateur in the 16–22 
October 1978 edition, pondering on the ‘Iranians’ dream’.
‘What are the Iranians dreaming 
about?’38
Foucault (1978d) was initially startled by this ‘dream’:
It is often said that definitions of an ‘Islamic government’ are 
imprecise. To me, however, they seemed to have a clarity that was 
completely familiar and also, it must be said, far from reassuring […] 
(I told them) these are simply the catchphrases of democracy – of 
38. Foucault (1978d:203–209; cf. Beukes 2009a:9–10).
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bourgeois or revolutionary democracy. We in the West have been 
repeating them to ourselves ever since the 18th century, and look 
where they have got us. (p. 206)
However, the protesters immediately replied (Foucault 1978d):
These catchphrases were part of the Quran long before your 
philosophers adopted them; in the industrialised Christian West they 
may have lost their meaning, but Islam is going to restore their value 
and their force. (p. 206)
Foucault (Foucault 1978c, 1979c:186; cf. Eribon 1992:284) was 
initially not persuaded by their reflections on their dream, but as 
Iranian students elaborated on their dreams of an ‘Islamic 
government’, it must have struck him that he was witnessing one 
of his ‘present histories’ in action; that he was witnessing a micro-
process, a particularity, a dynamic reconfiguration of rigid subject 
and object relations, a clear manifestation of what he recently 
began to refer to as political spirituality (cf. ch. 2), similar to what 
swept through Europe centuries earlier:
The mullah’s shouted imprecations […] terrible as Savanarola’s must 
have sounded in Florence, as the Anabaptists in Münster, or the 
Presbyterians in Cromwell’s time […] It might not amount to a political 
program, but still, it was impressive in its own way. It impresses me 
as what you might call a ‘political will’ […] It also impresses me as an 
attempt, in response to current problems, to politicise structures that 
are both social and religious. And it impresses me as an attempt to 
open up a spiritual dimension in politics (p. 201) 
In this fourth article published in 1978, Foucault worked with two 
opposing idea types – that of the saint (Khomeini) and the king 
(the Shah). Foucault was moved by the difference in 
communication with Iranian people between Khomeini (‘who is 
not there, who says nothing, who is not a politician’; Foucault 
1978h:220) and the Shah (who is ‘panoptically’ there, who sees 
everything, who gives orders, who examines – who is a politician 
in the most modern sense of the word). How was it that one who 
‘is not there’, who ‘says nothing’ and who ‘is not a politician’ could 
have such an enormous communicative ability and political 
effect? How did one communicate in silence, in exile?
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Khomeini, Foucault argued, communicated precisely by his 
silence, by his non-presence, by being ‘non-political’ (or not 
political in the modern sense). His silence was the symbol of 
Iranians’ silence, and his exile had become their exile, in their own 
country. That is why merely his name had become a ‘rallying cry’ 
(Foucault 1978d:204). Khomeini’s ‘saintliness’ was to be found in 
the fibre of understatement embedded in the ‘mysterious current 
between Khomeini and the people’, which Foucault (1978d:205) 
admitted he found ‘intriguing’. Western observers might have 
stated that the Iranians said ‘what they did not want, but not 
what they wanted’ (Foucault 1978d:204) – yet for Foucault it was 
clear what they wanted. They wanted to mobilise their silence, 
stepping out of Khomeini’s silence, to break their exile from the 
marginalised position of his exile.
It is essential to state that Foucault, however intrigued he was 
by the uprising events, was not mesmerised by Khomeini’s image 
as ‘the saint of the people’: he was actually very ironic about it, 
precisely because the horizontal organisation of Shia clergy in his 
mind would not have allowed such a sanctification of one single 
‘super mullah’, or a special breed of one of the ‘ulamâ’. No 
adoration for Khomeini as a person could be responsibly isolated 
in Foucault’s Iran writings.
Precisely the opposite: Foucault found the effect of Khomeini’s 
non-presence fascinating; it was Khomeini’s silent, marginalised 
persona within a grand historical scheme of things that mattered 
for him. It was the lack of Khomeini’s presence in the events that 
intrigued Foucault. Yet, Foucault strikingly did refrain from 
criticising Khomeini – not anticipating the harsh, cruel Khomeinism 
that would follow from February 1979 onwards. Even in October 
1978, at this still unstructured, volatile stage of the revolution, one 
would expect Foucault, precisely from the background of his 
own theoretical writings on power, to have been more cautious 
of the potential of repression and the kind of obscurantism that 
Khomeini undoubtedly represented. The fact that Foucault met 
Khomeini shortly after Khomeini arrived in Paris on 06 October 
1978 – even though it was a meeting that could only be described 
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as brief, inconsequential and uninteresting, given Eribon’s 
(1992:286) report – did nothing to sensitise Foucault to what in 
hindsight was danger lurking in the shadows.
However, what Foucault understood to be an Islamic 
government was tightly knitted with his understanding of Shia 
Islam’s non-hierarchical nature and the experience of Khomeini 
as non-visible and non-political in the modern sense, that 
Khomeini would be, as the mullahs already were, echoing the 
voices of and pastorally guiding the flock that was Iran. One 
could possibly refer to Foucault’s perspective on the Iranian 
dream, besides his second take on it being as ‘present–historical’, 
which is a contra-modern notion, as ‘pastoral’ in the sense that he 
thought that the Islamic government would constitute a simple 
vocabulary, as simple as one would ordinarily find in pastoral 
relationships. Foucault (1978d) understood the notion of Islamic 
government in this sense as ‘pastoral’, as a series of elementary, 
horizontal relationships:
One thing must be clear – by ‘Islamic government’ nobody in Iran 
means a political regime in which a cleric or the clerics would have a 
role of supervision or control. To me, ‘Islamic government’ (points) to 
two orders of things: An ideal, something ancient yet very far into the 
future, a notion of coming back to what Islam once was at the time of 
the Prophet […] but also that distant point where it would be possible 
to renew identity rather than maintain obedience […] a faith in the 
creativity of Islam seems to me to be essential. (p. 206)
Foucault gave no indication, at any time, that he suspected that 
the Islamic government that came into being on 01 April 1979 
would be so drastically different from this ‘pastoral’ understanding 
of an Islamic government. It would come back to haunt him.
The dynamics of Foucault’s first trip in the second half of 
September, as reflected in the first four articles of September 
and October 1978 (Foucault 1978a, 1978b, 1978c, 1978d), clearly 
centred around modern-critical notions, notions that were 
already established in many of his earlier works, from the early 
1960s onwards. Foucault perceived the events in Iran to be proof 
of the failure of the project of modernity, even in a context 
Chapter 6
83
isolated geographically and socio-historically from the world of 
Enlightenment.
Foucault was not content merely with meeting politicians and 
leaders from the opposition. He spent 10 days in Iran speaking to 
students, people in the street, representatives of the Shah’s army, 
and not least, the Islamic youth proclaiming that they were 
prepared to die (Foucault 1978a:190). He went around to the 
cemeteries, which were the only authorised places of meeting 
(Foucault 1978g:219). He went to the universities and the doors 
of the mosques: ‘Foucault gathered information, listened, looked, 
always taking notes, walking everywhere – Voeltzel remember 
them as exhausting days’ (Eribon 1992:284). Foucault asked the 
same question to everyone he met in the streets of Tehran: ‘what 
do you want?’ Invariably he got the same answer, an answer he 
considered to be a genuine modern-critical one and the basis of 
what has supra been referred to as his ‘pastoral’ perspective on 
the resistance: ‘an Islamic government’ (Foucault 1978d:205; 
cf. Miller 1993:309).
‘A revolt with bare hands’39
Foucault went back to Paris in the last week of September 1978. In 
France, liberal commentators were struggling to come to grips with 
the expressedly unmodern nature of recent events in Iran and to 
fit that wayward kind of ‘non-political politics’ into the up-curved, 
teleological political narrative of modernity. Iran did not present the 
familiar lines of a struggle between ‘pure-hearted youthful rebels 
and dark-souled reactionaries, and it was difficult to see it as another 
China, Cuba or Vietnam, or a second edition of Paris 1968’ (Rée 
2005:46; cf. Foucault 1978e:211). These commentators nevertheless 
condemned Foucault’s notion of political spirituality, which struck 
them as incredibly anachronistic; to which, again, he stated: ‘I can 
hear the French laughing, but I know that they are wrong’ (Foucault 
1978d:209). He admitted that he knew relatively little about Iran 
39. Foucault (1978e:210–213; cf. Beukes 2009a:10).
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(‘let us admit that we Westerners would be in a poor position to 
give advice to the Iranians on this matter’; Foucault 1978e:213; 
cf. Foucault 1978h:220). Yet, he was convinced that the entire Iranian 
population was acting like a massive ‘political hedgehog’ with a 
single, seemingly contradictory passion: the desire for a process 
that would somehow ‘prevent politics from gaining a foothold’ 
(Foucault 1978e:210–211). Such a movement was not sustainable, 
but this did not make it lamentable in Foucault’s mind. The idea of 
an Islamic government would settle down eventually; it would prove 
to be either ‘a reconciliation, a contradiction, or the threshold of 
something new’ – but in the interim, it was simply impossible to tell.
In his fifth Iran writing and fourth article for Corriere Della 
Sera, published on 05 November 1978, just before he returned to 
Iran for his second visit and at the time when the uprising was 
reaching its climax, Foucault described the energy of the 
resistance he had witnessed in the streets of Tehran based on 
two paradoxes. The first paradox he noted was that the uprising 
against that mighty modern structure, the Iranian army and police 
force, was brought about without weapons. It was carried out 
with ‘bare hands’, never resorting to armed struggle. The courage 
and determination of Iranian people brought about a dynamic 
which ‘froze’ the army and police (Foucault 1978e):
Two months ago, the army killed 400040 in Djaleh Square. Yesterday, 
200 000 people marched in front of soldiers, who did not react […] 
As the final crisis looms, recourse to violent repression seems less 
and less possible. The uprising of a whole society has choked off the 
possibility of civil war. (p. 211)
The second paradox that Foucault described was that the revolt 
spread without splits or internal conflicts. The secularists at the 
universities could have tried to destabilise the uprising by actively 
40. Again, this is an exaggerated number, propagated by the protesters and a number to 
which Foucault subscribed – thousands were indeed wounded, but it is unlikely that more 
than a hundred protesters were killed on Black Friday, which is, of course, already a massive 
loss of human life, indicating a massacre in the most rigid sense of the word and indicative of 
the brutality of Shah’s army.
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engaging their best students in the political arena. For whatever 
reason, it did not happen – possibly because some of them 
actively joined the uprising themselves, whilst others wanted to 
stay out of the affair and carry on with their daily business of 
doing science. The Shah’s tactical release of more than 1000 
political prisoners at the time could have brought the spontaneous 
eruption of the resistance into disarray. This too did not happen – 
the released prisoners simply joined the uprising, without trying 
to gain control over or structure it. Not even the modern 
industrialised sector was able to destabilise the revolt’s cohesion 
by offering pay raises to demonstrators. The demonstrators were 
by all indications ‘one’ and their revolt was not for sale, not even 
by some of the largest petroleum companies in the world. In this 
fifth article, Foucault (1978f:213–215) challenged the government 
forces with these two paradoxes.
However, Foucault chose not to linger with the ‘natural 
dissidents’ of the revolution, those who opted to stay out of the 
uprising – the many secularists at the universities and the business 
people who wanted nothing to do with it, as well as the thousands 
of secular women, amongst them many scientists and academics, 
who suddenly had to don the veil, and, ironically, ‘homosexuals’. 
Yes, millions took part in the uprising, but millions preferred to 
stay out of it too. In Foucault’s Iran writings, there was no 
reference to their situation. Again, this was an oversight that 
would come back to haunt him.
Yet, one has to understand that Foucault was convinced that 
everyone would be accommodated in the new dispensation, 
whatever form that dispensation would take and however absent 
long-term objectives were in the vision of protesters. Foucault 
(1978d) was assured that:
[W ]ith respect to liberties, they will be respected to the extent that 
exercise will not harm others; minorities will be protected and free 
to live as they please on the condition that they do not injure the 
majority; between men and women there will not be inequality with 
respect to rights, but difference, since there is a natural difference. 
(p. 206)
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One might ask, alongside the exiled feminist ‘Atoussa H’41: since 
when, if ever, have minorities, outside clear and present terrorist 
contexts, harmed the majority? Foucault was however never under 
the impression that the secularists, in general, would be crushed in 
the new dispensation. Everyone he spoke to expected Khomeini to 
come back soon, but Foucault (1978h:222) was assured that ‘there 
will not be a Khomeini party; there will not be a Khomeini 
government’. According to Foucault (1978e), what the protesters 
wanted was not even a ‘revolution’, as Westerners understood it:
Everybody is quite aware that they want something completely 
‘different’, something the consequences of which would come as a 
surprise to modern political analysts. The only certainty was that this 
new revolt of Islam was ‘irreducible and unpredictable’. (p. 211)
‘A revolt with cassette tapes’42
Foucault’s sixth article was retrospectively published in Corriere 
Della Sera on 19 November 1978, four days after he returned from 
his second visit to Iran. Once again, he was impressed by the way 
the resistance was perpetuating itself, not through military 
strength but the power of information. The protests were 
sustained by a diffused system of communication that the state 
could neither monitor nor control. Messages from unidentified 
sources were transmitted by telephone, by sermons and, above 
all, by what was at that time the tool par excellence of counter-
information: the audiocassette recorder, which we today would 
consider a very modest apparatus, of course.
‘If the Shah is about to fall, it will be due above all to the cassette 
tape’ (Foucault 1978g:219). Foucault in this article appreciated, on 
a philosophical level, the spontaneous eruption of resistance to 
established power and the way the dissemination of information 
assisted the momentum of the revolution. However, there is more 
41. Atoussa (1978:209; cf. ‘Foucault and “Atoussa H”’ in ch. 7).
42. Foucault (1978g:216–220; cf. Beukes 2009a:10–11).
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to it: again, as was the case with the army with all its modern 
weaponry, which eventually would be the modern tools of (self-)
destruction in this modern state, the cassette tape was a product 
of modern industry, seemingly a modest product, yet used very 
effectively against the modern state.
What happened was that the military in their numerous 
attempts to establish censorship and silence journalists, paved 
the way for an entire network of information, sustained by 
telephones and cassette tapes, a network people perfected over 
‘years of obscurantism’ (Foucault 1978g):
One can find, outside the doors of most provincial mosques, tapes of 
the most renowned orators at a low price. One encounters children 
walking down the most crowded streets with tape recorders in their 
hands. They play these recorded voices from Qom, Mashad and 
Ishafan so loudly that they drown out the sound of cars, passersby 
do not need to stop to be able to hear them […] that is why, from 
town to town, the strikes start, die out and start again. (pp. 219–220)
The mythical leader of the Iranian 
revolt43
Foucault’s last noteworthy contribution for Corriere Della Sera 
was published on 26 November 1978, at the time when the 
country was enveloped in a full-blown revolution, at the time it 
became indisputable that a semi-liberal government has changed 
into a full-fledged military rule over a period of less than 3 months 
(Foucault 1978h):
The whole country is now engulfed in revolt: the cities, the countryside, 
the religious centres, the oil regions, the bazaars, the universities, the 
civil servants, the intellectuals […] an entire century in Iran – one of 
so-called economic development and modernisation – is being put 
into question. It is being totally rejected. (p. 220)
Now slowly appearing from the shadows of understatement was 
Khomeini, who the previous month left the Shia holy city of Najaf in 
43. Foucault (1978h:220–223; cf. Beukes 2009a:11).
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Iraq, arriving in Paris on 06 October 1978, to spend the last months 
of his 15-year exile in Europe, until late January 1979. Foucault 
(1978h:222) described Khomeini without any reserve as the ‘leader’ 
of this otherwise leaderless revolt and therefore an ‘almost mythical’ 
figure. Although Foucault (1978d:204–205; cf. the section in this 
chapter titled ‘What are the Iranians dreaming about?’) in his fourth 
article reflected on Khomeini’s appeal and the way he evoked 
solidarity in the hearts of Iranians, this seventh article focused on 
Khomeini’s progressive visibility and importance, not merely for the 
clergy but for ordinary Iranians as such (Foucault 1978g):
I was impressed to hear a Boeing pilot say: ‘You have now in France 
the most precious thing that Iran has possessed for the last century – 
protect it’. His tone was commanding. I was even more impressed 
to hear strikers of Abadan44 say: ‘We are not particularly religious’. 
I  asked them: ‘Whom do you trust then? A political party?’ ‘No, 
no one’, they answered. ‘Only one, Khomeini, and he alone’. I was 
impressed by it. (p. 218)
Foucault (1978h) went on:
Today, no head of state, no political leader, even one supported by 
the whole media of his country, can boast of being the object of 
such a personal and intense attachment [… which is the] result of 
three things: Khomeini is not there. For the last fifteen years, he has 
been living in exile and does not want to return until the Shah has 
left. Khomeini says nothing, nothing other than no … to the Shah, 
to the regime, to dependency. Finally, Khomeini is not a politician 
[…]. There will not be a Khomeini party; there will not be a Khomeini 
government. (p. 222)
In this particular passage, Foucault is philosophically at his most 
vulnerable over the nine months during which his Iran texts were 
written. Khomeini was sent into exile in June 1963, after he publicly 
compared the Shah to Yazid, the Umayyad caliph who ordered the 
murder of Hussein, grandson of the Prophet, calling the Shah a ‘Jew’. 
His imprisonment, with some 30 other ‘ulamâ’ then had caused 
large-scale demonstrations, the subsequent repression resulting in 
44. Referring to the strikers at oil refineries in Abadan, who put the growing tension in Iran on 
the Western map months before Black Friday on 08 September 1978.
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at least 100 deaths (Rodinson 1978:235). Although Khomeini was 
not present physically in Iran since 1963, that which is now considered 
to be general knowledge for political researchers of Islam must be 
stated, namely that Khomeini was in effect governing Iran from exile 
since at least the early 1970s (cf. Momen 1987:246–299).
Actually, a subversive, underground and self-perpetuating 
network of resistance was put into place at the time Khomeini was 
exiled in 1963, and it was carefully orchestrated from outside by 
Khomeini as well as his many cadres. These cadres included some 
prominent leftist intellectuals in Iran, who supported Khomeini to 
develop his ‘blueprint for an Islamist revolution’. Afary and Anderson 
(2005:59) indicated that Jalal Al-Hamad (1923–1969), author of the 
classic 1963 book, Plagued by the West, was the first leftist to join 
ranks with Khomeini, furthering the cause of the revolution that 
followed 15 years later. Khomeini moved relatively freely between 
the domicile of his exile, Iraq, and the domicile of his power, Iran. The 
reality was that Khomeini was in a far more favourable political 
position staying outside than had he been in Iran. Had he been in 
Iran, he would have simply become the opposition in terms of the 
binary logic and dynamics of modern politics.
However, being in exile allowed Khomeini to oppose without, in 
fact, becoming the opposition. The fact that Foucault did not 
encounter the ‘phenomenon Khomeini’ in the streets of Tehran in 
1978, yet met with the reality that Khomeini was precisely present 
in his absence, and was actually lobbying in his absence, thus 
facing a ‘noumenal Khomeini’, absent yet spookily present in those 
streets. This served as a proof of how really effective was the 
subverted organisation of Khomeini’s political profile, and how 
sophisticated was the network of ‘cassette tapes’ that Foucault 
himself had witnessed and reported on.45 Foucault underestimated 
45. The following commentaries on social and political developments towards the revolution 
confirm the political realities underlying this statement: Abrahamian (1982:496–530, 
1993:60–87), Arjomand (1989:91–176), Esposito (2003:26–70), Hiro (2000:103–135), Kinzer 
(2003:119–133), Martin (2003:100–165), Milani (1994:59–104), Momen (1987:246–299) and 
Mortimer (1982:296–376).
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the complexity of the kind of politics Khomeini was practising, 
indeed from outside. He also underestimated to what extent 
Khomeini himself, however untypical, had become as a modern 
politician whilst still in exile; and to what extent Khomeini himself 
observed, controlled, normalised and examined the events in Iran.46
46. All sections in Chapter 6 represent a substantial reworking of Beukes (2009a:108–115), 
now re-evaluated against the backdrop of and aligned with the basic tenets of Ghamari-
Tabrizi’s (2016:57–74) recent exegesis. Beukes (2009a) was published under the Creative 
Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0) licence, according to which permission 
is granted for reworking.
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Foucault and Khomeini
It is evident from Foucault’s Iran writings, as disseminated in 
Chapter 6, that he was convinced that an ‘Islamic government’ 
could not restrict people’s rights because the government was 
bound by religious duty: the people will accordingly know what 
to do because it is ‘the right thing to do’, in the religious sense. 
He was seriously mistaken.
Why did Foucault compromise on the characteristic cynical 
nature of his views on the cunning ways people are ‘governed’ in 
the modern world and did he fail to view Khomeini’s ‘non-
presence’ as a ‘form of political presence’; how could he maintain 
his views on Khomeini as a ‘non-politician’ and a rather ‘mystical 
figure’, is difficult to understand in the light of his own crucial 
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theoretical position regarding power as anonymous and 
‘everywhere’. Had his theories on ‘governmentality’ not taught 
precisely the opposite of what he said about Khomeini ‘not being 
there’, about Khomeini being ‘disengaged from external 
domination and internal politics?’ (Foucault 1978h:222; cf. Beukes 
2009a:11). If it is true that the prevalence of the political influence 
of the Iranian ‘ulamâ’, who constituted a sort of religious party, 
‘astonished everyone’ (Rodinson 1978:233), why did it not 
astonish Foucault?
Is it possibly because Khomeini had become for him the 
‘personification of Nietzsche’s “will to power”’, a ruthless historical 
figure with ‘saintly self-mastery’, the perfect example of going 
beyond Nietzsche’s ‘ascetic priest’, as Afary and Anderson 
(2005:14, cf. 36–37) rather polemically contested? Although one 
could be apprehensive of this somewhat affected, forced 
Nietzschean interpretation, it must be conceded that Foucault’s 
reluctant, hesitant disposition towards Khomeini was and still is, 
at least for those who attempt to interpret his lifework as 
meaningful, a mystery.
Foucault himself indicated that Khomeini says nothing except 
‘no’: how does a philosopher who is so exceptionally hermeneutical 
otherwise, accept that ‘no’ as unproblematic, as a given premise? 
How can the refusal to say ‘yes’ to anything, in principle, be 
philosophically justifiable within any ‘discursive practice’, to use 
Foucault’s own words? Whilst it is correct on the one hand that 
Foucault found the perfect context for illustrating his own revolt 
against Western ‘governmentality’ in an actual revolution, that of 
the Iranians, one that seemed to despise modern Western 
‘governmentality’ as much as he did, it now, in hindsight, seems 
possible and even likely on the other hand that he underestimated 
the way Western ‘governmentality’ was internalised by Khomeini 
himself. It should come as no surprise then that Lilla (2003:1–17, 
137–158) felt compelled to rather audaciously juxtapose 
Heidegger’s position in 1933 and Foucault’s position in late 1978, 
implicitly asking both Heidegger and Foucault the same question: 
how could you not have foreseen?
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In Foucault’s case, it was impossible to ‘have foreseen’: he 
was a philosopher – and not a prophet. The juxtaposition of 
Foucault and Heidegger, and by implication Khomeini and Hitler, 
is seriously off the mark. Furthermore, whilst Heidegger’s loyalist 
position had no philosophical basis whatsoever, Foucault’s 
critique of modernity, specifically as presented in his Iran 
writings, provided a clear and solid philosophical basis for his 
involvement in the Iranian revolution. It could be argued that 
Foucault possibly overburdened the critical mass of his own 
critique of modernity in the process. But in his Iran writings, 
Foucault set himself up against the same old Europe which gave 
birth to, nourished and embraced Enlightenment: does it not 
speak for itself that this ‘Enlightenment’ was going to fail in any 
context where there was an ‘other-posed’ resistance to the 
project of modernity, as Foucault repeatedly emphasised in his 
writings?47
It seems however, as far as Khomeini’s political position was 
concerned, that Foucault was indeed mistaken. Even if he did 
not support the person ‘Khomeini’ but was only recording the 
resistance against the ‘politics of the present’, which the 
person ‘Khomeini’ was part of; even if is true that he never 
supported any of the developments in early 1979 whatsoever, 
Foucault’s last article (cf. the section on ‘The mythical 
leader  of  the Iranian revolt’) in 1978 for Corriere Della Sera 
paved the path for the intense criticism he was subjected to in 
France and the broader intellectual community in the years 
thereafter.
Yet, it must be stressed that Foucault never supported 
Khomeini, because the Iran writings themselves do not support 
that conclusion: being ‘uncritical’ is something utterly different 
from being ‘supportive’. Foucault could have been more forthright 
in keeping his distance from what Khomeini represented, but he 
did not make a mistake by being in Iran or writing about the 
revolution from a modern-critical perspective.
47. For example, in Foucault (1978a:194, 1978b:196, 1978c:201, 1979c:184–186).
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As indicated earlier, events in Iran got entirely out of hand after 
the initial revolutionary spurs that lasted from September to 
November 1978. Whilst there was outspoken resistance from the 
outset in France against the tone of Foucault’s Iran writings in its 
support for the revolting masses, his experiment in political 
journalism met with immense hostility from the French press by 
April 1979. Maxime Rodinson, a respected Marxist scholar of Islam 
at the time, informed Foucault in an extensive essay, published on 
the front page of Le Monde in the 06 – 08 December 1978 edition, 
that a cruel future awaited Iran and that an Islamic government 
was bound to implement some archaic fascism (Rodinson 1978):
The scope of the meaning of a ‘Muslim government’ is vast […] the 
term can cover different, even diametrically opposed, regimes. 
Governments can make mutual accusations of the betrayal of ‘true’ 
Islam. Nothing is easier or more dangerous than this time-honoured 
custom of dubbing your adversary an ‘enemy of God’ […] it is indeed 
unwise that so many regimes have declared themselves ‘Islamic’ […] 
it is quite possible that the men of this religion will present a somewhat 
more modern, concrete and persuasive form of Islam. (pp. 237–238)
This statement confirms the suggestion made above about 
Khomeini’s political position being awkwardly ‘modern’. Later, 
Rodinson (2005) stated:
Foucault, this very great thinker, part of a line of radically dissident 
thought had enormous gaps in his knowledge of Islamic history 
that enabled him to transfigure the events in Iran, to accept for the 
most part the semitheoretical suggestions of his Iranian friends, 
and to extrapolate from this the imagining of an end of history that 
would make up for disappointments in Europe and elsewhere […] 
at the very least, Foucault wanted to announce the introduction 
of satisfactory political and social measures towards his humanist 
ideal, due to the workings of his notion of ‘political spirituality’ […] 
this notion had at a very early stage shown that it operated by no 
means in the humanist sense that had been attributed to it, very 
naively, by Foucault. (p. 274)48
48. In Chapter 8, an effort was made to highlight a difference of opinion to that of Rodinson’s: 
the question is, did Rodinson himself understand Foucault’s concept ‘political spirituality?’ 
Given this citation, read against the exposition in Chapter 2, it does not seem to be the case.
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Foucault and ‘Atoussa H’
The aforementioned exiled Iranian feminist, sobriqueted as 
‘Atoussa H’, who was to some extent the silent informant of Afary 
and Anderson’s comprehensive study on Foucault’s involvement 
in Iran, claimed that Foucault’s ‘self-centred’ (if not, then his 
implicit ‘Orientalist’, according to her) theoretical perpetuation 
of his notion of political spirituality was ‘blinding’ him, ‘like many 
other Westerners’, to the inherent injustices of Islam, especially 
towards women (‘Atoussa H’ 1978; cf. Rodinson 1978:237):
I am profoundly upset by the untroubled attitude […] of some French 
leftists toward the possibility of an ‘Islamic government’ that might 
replace the bloody tyranny of the Shah […] Michel Foucault seems 
moved by the ‘Muslim spirituality’ that would advantageously replace, 
according to him, the ferocious capitalist dictatorship that is tottering 
today […] Spirituality? A return to deeply rooted wellsprings? Many 
Iranians like me are distressed and desperate about the thought of 
an ‘Islamic government’. We know what it is […]. merely the cover for 
feudal or pseudo-revolutionary oppression […] do not be seduced by 
a cure that is worse than the disease. (p. 209)
The problem is of course that ‘Atoussa H’ herself, being in exile, 
was completely alienated from Iranian society as it presented 
itself through the course of 1978. She gave no impression of an 
understanding of how widespread the support for Khomeini and 
the possibility of an Islamic government actually was. The ‘many 
Iranians’ she refers to, were really not that many: they were in fact 
quite few. Foucault’s reaction was therefore justifiably hostile, 
arguing that ‘Atoussa H’ did ‘not read the article’, or if she did, 
merged ‘all the potentialities of Islam within a single expression 
of contempt’ (Foucault 1978i:210). He had a valid point: either she 
did not read the article, or she misread it quite dramatically.
Unfortunately, the reception history itself would underscore 
those ‘potentialities’: a caricature of Foucault was systematically 
being set up in France. What is more, the tragic and murderous 
events in the first quarter of 1979 seemed to be vindicating 
Foucault’s critics. As mentioned earlier, the Shah fled Iran in the 
early weeks of 1979, Khomeini returned in triumph and the Islamic 
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republic was confirmed in a popular referendum on 01 April 1979. 
Only then it became clear that the events in Iran constituted a 
classic case of reactionary authoritarian populism. Many of the 
possibilities that Foucault had argued for in his writings from 
September 1978 onwards were coming to nothing – no 
transgression of the failure of Enlightenment, no uniqueness, no 
innovative reconfiguration of subject–object relations, no 
particularity, and especially, no surprises. However, there was 
absolutely no way Foucault could have foreseen it.
Indeed, if ‘political debate is not grounded in theoretical 
frameworks, it is fair to ask to what authority it does appeal’ 
(Gutting 2005a:29). Frequently, of course, we can get along 
without fostering enquiries about the decisive validation of 
political principles; those truthful enquiries of how to reach 
particular objectives that are positioned against the framework 
of implied joint commitments. In such cases, the issues are 
normally those involving practical modification rather than 
fundamental revolt. According to Gutting (2005a:29–30), 
Foucault, however, rejected the separability of questions of 
reform working within an established system and the 
revolutionary critique of that system:
Discussing with Didier Eribon the election of François Mitterand’s 
socialist government in 1981, Foucault resisted Eribon’s suggestion 
that his sympathy with the opening initiatives of the new regime 
meant that he thought it would be possible to work with this 
government. (p. 29)
He rejected ‘the dilemma of being either for or against’ and went 
on to argue that even reformist projects (within a system) require 
‘criticism (and indeed radical criticism)’ because any reform 
worthy of the name requires questioning modes of thought that 
say it is impossible (Gutting 2005a:29). Accordingly, we cannot 
choose between ‘an inaccessible radicality’ and ‘the necessary 
concessions to reality’ (Gutting 2005a:29). Instead, ‘the work of 
deep transformation or reform should be done in the open and 
always turbulent atmosphere of a continuous revolutionary 
criticism’ (Foucault 1979b:263–267; cf. Gutting 2005a:29).
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This position further strengthens the question of what grounds 
fundamental criticisms of existing regimes, because for Foucault 
such criticism should be a constant of political life, and not just of 
exceptional moments of revolutionary disruption. We can get a 
sense of Foucault’s response precisely via his position on the Iranian 
revolution. It must be stressed that Foucault’s (Foucault 1979b; cf. 
Gutting 2005a:30) sympathy was with the essential act of revolt:
[T ]he impulse by which a single individual, a group, a minority, or an 
entire people says ‘I will no longer obey’ and throws the risk of their 
life in the face of an authority they consider unjust. (p. 265)
Such an act is for Foucault ‘irreducible’ and even an ‘escape’ from 
‘history, and its long chains of reasons’. The decision ‘to prefer 
the risk of death to the certainty of having to obey’ is the ‘last 
anchor point’ for any assertions of rights, for him, ‘one that is 
more solid and closer to experience than (even) natural rights’ 
(Foucault 1979b:266–267; cf. Gutting 2005a:30).
The consequent and fundamental question is: what is the status 
of this will to revolt? Undoubtedly, there is a kind of genuineness in 
the acceptance of death as the possible price of freedom, but as 
Foucault asked: ‘is one right to revolt, or not?’ Foucault (1979b:263; 
cf. Gutting 2005a:30). At least in this context, Foucault avoided 
answering with a verdict: ‘let us leave the question open. People 
do revolt; that is a fact […] A question of ethics? Perhaps. A question 
of reality, without a doubt’ (Foucault 1979b:268; Gutting 2005a:29–
30). All Foucault was willing to say is that it is only through such 
revolt that ‘subjectivity is brought into history’ making human lives 
not just a matter of biological evolution but authentically historical – 
and that his duty as an intellectual is ‘to be respectful when a 
singularity revolts, intransigent as soon as power violates the 
universal’ (Foucault 1979b:268; Gutting 2005a:30).
Some may argue that it is not a very pleasing reaction, 
‘especially when we recollect that the revolution in question is 
one that led directly to a tyranny of stonings and severed hands’ 
(Gutting 2005a:30). Foucault (1979b:266) did acknowledge that 
the Iranian revolution contained, from the outset, spores of its 
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brutalities: ‘[…] the formidable hope of making Islam into a great 
civilisation once again’, always carried the possibility of a ‘virulent 
xenophobia’. He (Foucault 1979b:268) insisted, however, that ‘the 
spirituality which had meaning for those who went to their deaths 
has no common measure with the bloody government of an 
integrist clergy’ (Gutting 2005a):
But wasn’t the spirit of revolt equally present in those who died and 
those who lived to tyrannise? Moreover, isn’t there every reason to 
think that a reversal of fates would have turned the martyrs into 
clerical tyrants? How can we be ‘respectful’ of revolts that we have 
every reason to think will lead to a new tyranny? (pp. 30, 31)
Foucault (1979b:267) remarked that there is no inconsistency 
‘when today one is against severed hands, having yesterday been 
against the tortures of the SAVAK’:49 ‘But why respect a movement 
opposing the SAVAK when you know that it will lead to equal 
outrages?’ (Gutting 2005a:31).
In other contexts, Foucault uses the category of the ‘intolerable’ 
(Gutting 2005a:30) to portray circumstances that provide 
justifiable reasons for revolt. This category allows us to distinguish 
some examples of revolt as morally proper (in the sense that they 
oppose what is ‘intolerable’) and others as not. Foucault’s respect 
for the initial stages of the Iranian revolution reflected ‘his 
reluctance to judge a case of obviously sincere commitment that 
he knew he could not know from the inside’ (Gutting 2005a:31). 
Apparently, he would act otherwise about developments within 
his own culture, where he would be in a position to evaluate 
whether or not what they opposed was ‘intolerable’. But there is 
no doubt that he would have seen such an evaluation as itself ‘an 
irreducible given’, and not the conclusion of (Gutting 2005a):
[T ]he application of the theoretical categories of a political or 
(another) ethical framework. In the end, there can be ‘no authority 
other than the judgement of those who directly experience a 
situation. (p. 31)
49. Foucault (1979b:267). The SAVAK was the infamous ‘National Organization for Security 
and Intelligence’, effectively a security police force, in operation during the Shah’s regime.
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Foucault and the Broyelles
This is pertinently not what Foucault’s critics in France understood 
at the time. Even the prominent French leftists Claudie and Jacques 
Broyelle, for many years amongst Foucault’s closest allies in a broad 
spectrum of activist endeavours in France, finally called on him in a 
venomous article on the front page of Le Matin, on 24 March 1979, 
to ‘confess his errors’ (Broyelle & Broyelle 1979:249). The Broyelles 
were extremely hostile, their tirade representative of the viciousness 
Foucault had to bear towards the end of May 1979. Their rant is 
important though because it shows just how resentful the attacks 
from a turmoiled Paris was at the time (Broyelle & Broyelle 1979):
Today there are little girls all in black, veiled from head to toe; 
women stabbed precisely because they do not want to wear the 
veil, summary executions for homosexuality […] women merely 
suspected of adultery, flogged […] Michel Foucault’s ‘saint’, 
‘the destitute exile’, ‘the man who rises up with bare hands’, his 
‘Ayatollah Khomeini’, ruined it all. What form was this Islamic 
government supposed to have taken (according to Foucault)? 
‘Absence of hierarchy in the clergy […] the importance of purely 
spiritual authority […] the echoing and guiding role the clergy 
must play […] the Islamic fashion over and against the stupidity of 
Western democracies […] very old yet very far in the future  […]’. 
(What we see in Iran now are) spontaneous armed groups, or 
otherwise ‘benevolent’ Islamic committees that ‘counterattack’ 
and take immediate revenge – this is the people’s justice for which 
Michel Foucault so passionately yearned […]. This philosopher 
contents himself with painting and offering images, holy images: 
the abridged illustrated imam, sequel to the hurried marabout of 
‘people’s justice’. This philosopher is no more responsible than Léon 
Daudet for the Holocaust, or the Western communist intellectuals 
for the gulags […] When one is an intellectual, when one has the 
freedom – without having to fight at the risk of one’s life in order to 
obtain it – not to be a sycophantic writer, then one has also some 
obligations. The first one is to take responsibility for the ideas one 
has defended when they are finally realised. This philosopher should 
say ‘Long live the Islamic government!’ and it would be clear that he 
is going to the final extreme of his radicalism. Or he should say ‘No, 
I did not want that, I was mistaken – here is what was wrong with my 
reasoning, here is where my thinking is in error’. He should reflect. 
After all, that is his job. (pp. 247–249; [emphasis in original])
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No wonder Foucault was injured on a profound level by this and 
similar other public outcries against his ‘championing of the 
people’s justice, of Khomeini’s bloodshed’. He reacted the next 
day swiftly, his philosophical grace still intact (Foucault 1979c):
I will not react to these accusations: I have never in ‘my life’ taken 
part in polemics, and I have no intention of beginning now. There 
is another reason why I will not react based on principles. I am 
summoned to ‘acknowledge my errors’. This expression and the 
practice it designates remind me of something and many things, 
against which I have fought. I will not lend myself to a manoeuvre 
whose form and content I detest: You are going to confess, or you will 
shout ‘Long live the assassins!’. I am anxious to debate the question of 
Iran – yet Blanchot teaches that criticism begins with attention, good 
demeanour and generosity’. (pp. 249–250; [emphasis in original])
The fact that the Broyelles had themselves been ‘zealous, 
pro-Chinese Maoists a few years earlier’ (Almond 2007:34), did 
not bypass Foucault’s ever-present sense for irony.
Foucault and Bazargan
Indeed, Foucault initially still endeavoured to further debate the 
‘question of Iran’. In April 1979, he published an open letter to 
the  new Iranian prime minister, Mehdi Bazargan, published in 
Le Nouvel Observateur on 14 April 1979, expressing dismay at the 
violation of human rights under what was now clearly a ‘government 
of mullahs’. He also wrote two last articles for Corriere Della Sera 
in April and May 1979 (Foucault 1979a, 1979b), attempting to 
provide a coherent and sensible overview of the stark developments 
in Iran. Things indeed turned out for the worse in Iran, but he 
stressed that it did not invalidate his opinions about how they 
might have been different; nor did it show that the events were not 
inherently modern-critical – which was Foucault’s central position – 
with a capacity to ‘surprise the Western world’.
During March, April and May 1979, Foucault was constantly on 
the defence, not yielding an inch to his critics in Paris. Despite their 
accusations, he was resolute that he had not advocated an Islamic 
government, but that he had simply recorded some of the aspirations 
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of the protesters, whilst trying to use the events in Iran as a platform 
for an ongoing critique of modernity, precisely in an attempt to 
dismantle the modernistic notions put forward by Western 
observers, in France, mainly: ‘the problem of Islam as a political 
force is an essential one for our time and for the years to come […] 
and we cannot approach it with a minimum of intelligence if we 
start from a position of hatred’ (Foucault 1978i:210).
During the middle of May 1979, Foucault started to withdraw 
from further public discussions surrounding the Iran issue. He 
was appalled by many other arrogant summonses to confess his 
‘mistake’. He was surprised and wounded by the scorn of his 
critics, and at the end of May 1979, he retired from the conflict 
altogether. Foucault’s adventure as a controversial political 
journalist had now come to an end. In the five years he had left, 
he seldom took further part in extra-academic public discourses 
– and he never spoke publicly about Iran again (Eribon 1992:295).
Is this now the end of the line for any attempt to understand 
‘Foucault in Iran?’ How can we further interpret the factuality of the 
10 direct questions posed in the Introduction (see ‘Foucault in Iran: 
Ten direct questions’) – even if the tentative ‘answers’ provided in 
the final chapter (see ‘Foucault in Iran: Ten tentative answers’ in 
ch. 10) are accepted and stand undisputed, what can we do with 
their status as given? Can we work with those questions as premises 
for deepening our understanding of Foucault’s involvement in Iran? 
Yet of course, what are those questions not stating? What are the 
deeper nuances we should take to heart and come to grips with? 
What is the philosophical potential engraved on both sides of the 
coin – Foucault’s perceptiveness about some of the events in Iran, 
as well as his naïveté about other events?
The next chapters venture to move closer to a nuanced 
interpretation of both sides of that coin, trying to understand 
Foucault’s precarious position during and after the revolution, 
defending his basic modern-critical orientation and notion of 
political spirituality – whilst attempting to shelter Foucault’s 
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‘Seduced?’
It should be clear by now that Foucault developed a series of 
unique political and theoretical positions on the Iranian 
revolution. These positions, until two decades ago, have been 
consistently understated and remain to this day relatively 
subdued in broader  Foucault research. Again, 9/11 changed 
everything – and the 21st-century Foucault scholarship is no 
exception (Kinzer 2008:ix–xxv). Iraq is, for all practical purposes, 
today a destroyed country, not only by the initial attacks of 
American warplanes and artillery – and, of course, the hostile 
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American presence as such – but also by internal Shia and Sunni 
violence. Iraq’s dominantly Shia sister, Iran, is a constant 
international focal point because of its highly dubious nuclear 
programme and its provocative challenges of global peace. 
Washington, particularly today, two years after the election of 
Donald Trump as the US president in 2016, seems more fragile 
than New York, Washington and US airspace on that fateful 
Tuesday ever was. On the other side, Tehran appears in the first 
few months of 2020 to be more viperous and restless than 
ever – the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) was not a mere 
contingency. Yet, Washington is the one which will be on the 
offensive – it is Washington that will be on the attack, as it 
always has been, whether in Korea, Vietnam or in countless 
clandestine operations all over the world in the second half of 
the 20th century. Those covert operations included the 
manipulation and control of the state of Iran from 1953 to 1978.
The previous chapter sketched the extremely negative 
caricature of ‘Michel Foucault, the champion of Khomeini’s 
bloodshed’. This distortion should relentlessly and at all costs be 
countered. Furthermore, a reassessment of the initial, later and 
contemporary receptions, as well as the philosophical significance 
of Foucault’s writings on Iran, in light of the events of 9/11, military 
operations in Iraq and elsewhere in the Middle East, Tehran’s 
ongoing nuclear programme and the many brutal attacks on the 
West by the so-called ‘radicalised Muslims’ over the past decade,50 
has become urgent and consequential. With all its possible 
Orientalist undertones, it has thus become vital to revisit Foucault’s 
Iran-mediated take on ‘Oriental Otherness’ in light of the terrible 
events in New York, Washington and US airspace on that ill-fated 
day in September 2001, the Second War on Iraq, the more recent 
events regarding Iran’s nuclear fixations and the many merciless 
acts of terror from radical enclaves in the Middle East.
50. Madrid 11 March 2004, and in chronological sequence, Stockholm 11 December 2010, 
Boston 15 April 2013, Paris 07 January and 23 November 2015, Brussels 22 March 2016, Berlin 19 
December 2016, Manchester 22 May 2017, London 03 June 2017 and Barcelona 17 August 2017 
– to name just a few of the most prominent attacks on Western cities over the past decade.
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The ‘problem of the East’, it seems, is now more than ever in 
the West. As convinced as Postel (2006:15) was 13 years ago, 
during the most tempestuous period of the second Bush 
administration, that an attack on Iran was possible, an attack on 
or a provoked attack from Iran should today be considered to be 
a genuine probability, precisely because a far more unpredictable 
and reckless politician than any of his predecessors now holds 
the highest office in the most powerful country in the West, and 
indeed, in the world.
In direct reaction to the events of 11 September 2001, prominent 
commentator, French banker and philosopher Alain Minc (2001:1, 
15), in an intriguing contra-Baudrillard and otherwise thought-
provoking article, bitterly and polemically referred to ‘Michel 
Foucault, the advocate for Iranian Khomeinism in 1979, who was 
therefore theoretically in solidarity with its exactions […]. Those 
harsh words appeared in a front-page article in Le Monde. There 
is in general still a great deal of a similar ignorance and malicious 
slander involved, often describing Foucault as the ‘philosopher 
who energetically endorsed the Iranian revolution and the regime 
it produced’ (Minc 2001:15). This statement and these kinds of 
statements simply are not correct. Yes, Foucault did endorse the 
revolution but as was pointed out in the previous chapters, he did 
so on very specific modern-critical grounds. Furthermore, 
according to the presentation of his Iran writings (cf. in ch 6, from 
‘The army – When the earth quakes’ up to and including ‘The 
mythical leader of the Iranian revolt’), Foucault clearly did not 
endorse Khomeini’s understanding of what an ‘Islamic republic’ 
should be; however, his apparently uncritical perspective on 
Khomeini’s ‘non-political political position’ was problematic in 
that it was precisely against the backdrop of his theoretical 
writings on power, as well as his rather unquestioning 
understanding of clergy organisation in Shia Islam, being ‘non-
hierarchical’.
Although an artificial distinction to some extent, these 
two considerations – Foucault’s support for the revolution and 
the uncritical or incautious interpretation of Khomeini’s position – 
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should be kept apart as far as possible. Following this line, the 
upcoming chapters argue, alongside some but also against recent 
receptions in the scholarship, that Foucault’s Iran writings were 
not arbitrary, but in fact closely related to his general theoretical 
writings on the discourses of power and the inherent risks of 
modernity; that these writings were stylistically unique, yet by 
their very nature appealed to philosophical contributions to 
Foucault’s oeuvre in particular and, again, to the philosophical 
critique of the project of modernity in general.
Older receptions of Foucault have consistently depicted his 
Iranian writings as anomalous, as a gross political and ethical 
mistake, even if Foucault did not (could not) foresee the extremely 
adverse reaction to those writings, even if he did have another 
objective, however unclear that objective might have been at the 
time. Foucault’s three pivotal biographers of the 1990s, Didier 
Eribon (1992), James Miller (1993) and David Macey (1993, 2004), 
isolated Foucault’s Iran expeditions as an event that may indeed 
have repercussions for a deepening understanding of the 
Foucault legacy – yet they were all outspokenly sceptical about 
setting the issue straight and very aloof about trying to mend 
Foucault’s ‘wounded reputation’.
Eribon (1992:281–295) wrote extensively on this episode and 
provided for the first time in the Foucault literature a balanced and 
nuanced account of its biographical and intellectual-historical 
relevance. Yet, Eribon gave a clear signal that Foucault had made a 
mistake, already by merely accepting the offer to go to Iran, thereby 
eventually – very soon, within months actually – compromising his 
stature as Europe’s leading intellectual in the 1970s. Throughout his 
deliberations, Eribon articulately elaborated that the incident had 
wounded not only Foucault’s reputation but also Foucault himself 
on a personal and intellectual level: in the five years Michel Foucault 
had left to live, he would never again deal publicly with politics and 
social commentary – he simply distanced himself from it, traumatised 
until his death by the hostile reception of his Iran writings.
Miller (1993:306–318), in a rigorous yet highly cynical account, 
provided the scholarship with the presumed philosophical tenets 
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of Foucault’s visits to Iran and a solid platform for the English-
speaking world, promoting ongoing investigations into the 
intellectual relevance of the event. For example, Miller (1993:307, 
313) was the only one of these three biographers from the 1990s 
to suggest that Foucault’s philosophical fascination with death 
played a part in his enthusiasm for the Iranian Islamists, with their 
emphasis on mass martyrdom. Miller (1993:309, 312) nevertheless 
concluded that the Iran episode reflects a ‘tragic error’ in 
judgement, a ‘folly’ over which Foucault remained ‘unrepentant’. 
Foucault, fascinated by the subjects of dying, pain, madness and 
limits, often linked up with surrealist and avant-garde intellectuals 
such as Antonin Artaud, Georges Bataille and Maurice Blanchot 
(Lilla 2003):
In them, Foucault saw the possibility of exploring personally what 
lay outside the bounds of ordinary bourgeois practice, to seek 
what he called ‘limit experiences’ in eroticism, madness, drugs, 
sadomasochism and even suicide. (p. 141)
Macey’s (1993:406–411) account was possibly the most 
sympathetic of all three accounts from the 1990s, although it was 
still clearly reserved about any possible merit of Foucault’s 
involvement in the conflict. Macey regarded the French attacks 
on Foucault over Iran as exaggerated and often malicious: yet he 
is clear about his conviction that Foucault was so ‘impressed’ by 
what he saw in Iran in 1978, that he sadly ‘misread the probable 
future developments he was witnessing’ (Macey 1993:410). In his 
later, shorter monograph on Foucault, Macey (2004:128) implied 
that the event had only a marginal effect on the reception and 
understanding of Foucault, stating that ‘in fairness, he [Foucault] 
was not the only one to misread the situation’. Macey was thus 
fair and balanced in his summary of the Iran issue regarding its 
impact on Foucault’s oeuvre, but still very sceptical about re-
interpreting the event in a more productive philosophical way. 
Foucault made a mistake. Even for Macey, that is the end of a 
disastrous story. Nothing could change ‘Foucault’s mistake’, and 
it would be unproductive to further consider the issue. One may 
add that a fourth biographer, Jeanette Colombel, a close associate 
and friend of Foucault, in her untranslated French monograph 
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also refers, albeit with considerable understatement, to his ‘error’ 
in Iran and confirmed that the incident ‘wounded’ him (Afary & 
Anderson 2005:7).
Early 21st-century receptions were far more inclined to revisit 
the issue. Yet, it has to be noted that the authoritative biographies 
from the 1990s, however unconvinced about any philosophical 
merit regarding this issue, paved the way for this renewed interest, 
especially so in the light of the terrible events of 9/11, the Second 
Iraqi War and the way the issues of reconfigured power, the 
‘West-East divide’ and Foucault’s notion of political spirituality 
are approached in the first two decades of the 21st century: 
because Tehran’s unique self-esteem is still radiating brighter 
than ever in the desert skies.
Because only three of Foucault’s final 15 articles on the Iranian 
revolution (and none of his interviews with exiles, mullahs and 
demonstrators) have appeared in English before Afary and 
Anderson (2005:181–277) translated and republished all of these 
articles and a significant number of these interviews, they had in 
the previous three decades generated little discussion in the 
English-speaking world. Apart from those biographies by Eribon, 
Miller and Macey, elsewhere in the English-speaking world, where 
Foucault’s writings on Iran have only been scarcely translated 
and the French responses to him at the time not translated at all, 
his Iran excursion and the writings stemming from this excursion 
have been treated with far less hostility.
His last two articles on Iran, for instance (Afary & Anderson 
2005:181–277), where he eventually made a few criticisms of the 
Islamic regime in the face of the attacks on him by prominent 
French intellectuals, have in fact been the most widely circulated 
ones amongst those that have appeared in English up to 2005. 
They were also the only English examples of his Iran writings to 
be found in a three-volume collection entitled The Essential 
Writings of Michel Foucault up to 2005 (cf. Foucault 2000). To 
this day, relatively few scholars outside the French-speaking 
world have realised exactly how hostile, such as the Broyelles’ 
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response, the French reactions towards Foucault were and how 
sensitive and consequential this matter really still is in Foucault 
scholarship. Yet, reactions from the English-speaking world, 
however sporadic, were sometimes very hostile as well: ‘[...] 
[Foucault’s Iran writings are] a symptom of something troubling 
in the kind of left-wing thinking that mixes postmodernism, 
simplistic thirdworldism and illiberal inclination’ (the political 
theorist Mitchell Cohen, cited in Afary & Anderson 2005:7).
The characteristic and shared feature of the commentaries 
that recognised the importance of this issue for Foucault’s legacy 
is that he was somehow ‘seduced’. Whilst that is an implied notion 
in the perspectives of his commentators and biographers from 
the last decade of the 20th century, it is overtly and unambiguously 
so – already in the title – in Janet Afary and Kevin Anderson’s 
(2005) then groundbreaking book on Foucault in Iran, Foucault 
and the Iranian Revolution: Gender and the Seductions of 
Islamism. The author is now far more guarded than in 2009 of the 
risks involved in reading Foucault as having been ‘seduced’ 
by either Islamism or Khomeinism, or both (cf. Beukes 2009b:118, 
fn. 4).
Afary and Anderson radicalised this notion of ‘seduction’ and 
a ‘seduced Foucault’, but not without providing a noteworthy 
initial contribution to Foucault research, on at least four levels: 
firstly, their work provided the scholarship with the most thorough 
account, up to Ghamari-Tabrizi’s work of 2016, of the prologue to 
Foucault’s two expeditions to Iran, the expeditions itself and the 
immediate aftermath of those expeditions.51 Secondly, the Afary 
and Anderson volume (2005:181–277) provided the first 
systematic overview, analysis and annotation of all of Foucault’s 
Iran writings, embedding them into the broader Foucaultian 
corpus, however not without problems. Thirdly, for the first time, 
Foucault’s Iran writings were translated into English and 
annotated in toto by the authors (and Karen de Bruin) and 
51. Afary and Anderson (2005:38–68, 69, 105–137; cf. Amsler’s review, 2006:521).
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presented in one single compilation. Because only three of 
Foucault’s final 15 articles on the Iranian revolution (and again, 
none of his interviews with exiles, mullahs and demonstrators) 
had appeared in English before Afary and Anderson (2005:181–
277) translated and republished all of the articles and many of 
the interviews, they have in the previous two decades generated 
little discussion in the English-speaking world. Apart from the 
biographies of Eribon, Miller and Macey elsewhere in the English-
speaking world, where Foucault’s writings on Iran had only been 
translated in fragments and the French responses to him at the 
time had not been translated at all, his Iran excursion and the 
writings stemming from it had been severely understated (cf. 
Afary & Anderson 2005:7–9). Fourthly, again for the first time, 
Foucault’s Iran writings were challenged by a ‘feminist’ reading – 
yet not without shortcomings.
Afary and Anderson’s book consists of two parts: the first part, 
‘Foucault’s discourse on pinnacles and pitfalls’ (Afary & Anderson 
2005:13–68), provides an introduction to Foucault’s thought, 
precisely those elements in his philosophy that would again 
manifest itself in his Iran writings, whilst the second part, 
‘Foucault’s writings on the Iranian revolution and after’ (Afary & 
Anderson 2005:69–162), provides a thorough investigation into 
Foucault’s preparation for his two Iran visits, the visits themselves 
as well as the immediate aftermath of the visits, employing 
several feminist purposes in their reading of the events (with the 
aforementioned Iranian feminist ‘Atoussa H’ and Marxist scholar 
Maxime Rodinson being their most prominent discursive 
informants; Afary & Anderson 2005:163–177), concluding with 
the translation and annotation of all of Foucault’s Iran writings, as 
well as the translation of several of his critics’ reactions to those 
writings (Afary & Anderson 2005:180–277).
Concurring that Foucault’s philosophical approach to the Iran 
affair was vague, Afary and Anderson (2005:2–7) nevertheless 
noted the clarity of Foucault’s relation to the Islamist movement 
in Iran, with reference to three distinct ‘passions’: an opposition 
to the imperialist and colonialist policies of the West; a rejection 
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of certain cultural and social aspects of modernity that had 
transformed social hierarchies in both the East and the West; and 
the notion of political spirituality – that Foucault documented the 
Iranian public’s fascination with the seemingly archaic rituals of 
Shia Islam and that he was ‘intrigued’, if not ‘infatuated’, by the 
active participation of clerics in the revolt and the ‘use of religious 
processions and rituals for ostensibly political concerns’ (Afary & 
Anderson 2005:39, 84).
Against the backdrop of their note on these ‘passions’, the 
authors would likely concur that Foucault’s support for the 
revolting masses should be understood as modern-critical in 
orientation – and that Foucault was indeed intrigued by the 
nature of their political spirituality, which he was convinced was 
sustaining an alternative absolutely other to liberal democracy. 
However, the two authors went further – indeed too far – arguing 
that Foucault’s view of the revolution is integrally related to ‘a 
one-sided hostility to modernity’, that his Iran writings in its 
‘modern-critical one-sidedness’ actually raise questions about 
‘his overall approach to modernity’ (Afary & Anderson 2005:5).
The question is as follows: are Afary and Anderson (cf. 
2005:163–193, 293, fn. 1) in these remarks about the ‘modern-
critical one-sidedness’ of Foucault’s Iran writings not implicitly 
adhering to Esposito’s (2003:26–70; cf. 2005:350) description of 
four ‘popular myths’ in Western responses to the revolution, 
namely, that the revolution was narrowly, exclusively religious; 
that it was, before and after, confused and disorganised; that it 
followed a predictable, naively religious course; and that there 
was no such thing as ‘Iranian moderates’? It seems to be the case. 
Is this the reason why the authors could throughout their book 
not give Foucault sufficient credit for the originality of his contra-
modern, contra-Western perspectives on the revolution? Foucault 
certainly did not conform to these Western myths and mythmaking 
about the revolution at the time.
In an illuminating article, British philosopher Jonathan Rée 
(2005:46) threw the gauntlet at Afary and Anderson, precisely 
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for ‘going too far’, accusing them of skewing Foucault, stating 
about their book that ‘one could hardly have asked for more – 
one might have asked for less, however’. Rée’s overall hostile 
reception of the book is however not justified. Afary and 
Anderson’s tone was temperate in general and their judgements – 
although questionable in some cases in the sense that they 
indeed took their reception of Foucault to too many debatable 
heights – were on most points non-partisan. Rée’s critique of 
Afary and Anderson’s work was necessary though, because it 
brought balance into the reception, from a loyalist viewpoint in 
particular (Rée 2005):
Afary and Anderson’s summaries of Foucault’s achievements are 
consistently hostile and tendentious. Noting that he was sceptical 
about self-congratulatory Western narratives of progress and 
modernisation, they make the absurd assertion that ‘Foucault 
privileged premodern social relations over modern ones’ […] Having 
constructed an imaginary Foucault intoxicated by ‘authenticity’, 
‘creativity’ and ‘living dangerously’ – notions that have no place in his 
work except as butts of his teasing paradoxes – Afary and Anderson 
offer their readers the astonishing assurance that ‘Foucault’s 
concept of authenticity meant looking at situations where people 
lived dangerously and flirted with death, the site where creativity 
originated’. And having transformed this gentle apostle of radiant 
uncertainty into a philosophical version of Charles Manson, they credit 
him with an ‘uncritical enthusiasm for the Islamist movement of Iran’ 
[…] Foucault’s quizzical mixture of excitement and disappointment 
over Iran, together with his perceptive remarks about corruption 
as a political issue and the recrudescence of political spirituality in 
the Muslim world, are passed over in silence as Afary and Anderson 
condemn him for an ‘uncritical embrace’ of Islamism and try to 
explain it in terms of a kinky fascination with ‘limit experiences’, ‘new 
forms of creativity’ and even (yes, they are serious) the ‘transgressive 
powers’ of Ayatollah Khomeini. Although they have spent ten years 
working on their book, it has not been a labour of love. (p. 46)
It is true that Afary and Anderson went in some respects too far 
(of course, there will always be those who suppose that even 
Afary and Anderson ‘did not go far enough’ [cf. Aysha 2006:377–
379]; point not taken). Yet, in difference with Rée, it may be 
responsibly contended that Foucault’s preoccupation with death, 
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marginality and transgression was indeed characteristic of his 
general philosophical disposition, as Miller (1993:83, 87–88) 
convincingly argued and Afary and Anderson52 simply 
emphasised, in confirmation of the suggestion in the previous 
chapters that Foucault was convinced that he was witnessing in 
the streets of Tehran those kinds of irrationalities that, for him, 
would break new boundaries in the understanding of subjectivity. 
Afary and Anderson’s criticism of Foucault could indeed have 
been more toned down, even before the publication of their book 
(Afary & Anderson 2004):
We suggest that Foucault’s Iran writings reveal, albeit in exaggerated 
form, some problems in his overall perspective, especially its one-
sided critique of modernity. In this sense, the Iran writings contribute 
something important to our understanding of this major social 
philosopher […] We think of Foucault as this very cool, unsentimental 
thinker who would be immune to the revolutionary romanticism 
that has overtaken intellectuals who covered up Stalin’s atrocities 
or Mao’s […] but in this case, he abandoned much of his critical 
perspective in his intoxication with what he saw in Iran. Here was a 
great philosopher of difference who looked around him in Iran and 
everywhere saw unanimity. (p. 3)
Foucault’s notorious suspicion of utopianism, his antagonism 
towards grand narratives and universals and his stress on 
difference, particularity and singularity rather than totality, would 
make him less prone, one could reasonably assume, to romanticise 
any authoritarian politics that promised to refashion ‘from above’ 
the lives and thought of a people, for their own benefit. However, 
Afary and Anderson were convinced that Foucault’s Iran writings 
had indicated that he was not immune to the type of illusions 
that so many Western leftists had held with regard to the Soviet 
Union and China – although he documented its ‘birth’ in Iran, he 
himself, according to these two authors’ reading of Foucault, did 
not anticipate the birth of yet another modern state where old 
(religious) technologies of domination could be refashioned and 
re-institutionalised, and he did not realise how explosive the 
52. For instance, Afary and Anderson (2005:23–24, 34, 39, 50, 201, 259).
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combination of a traditionalist ideology and modern technologies 
of organisation, surveillance, warfare and propaganda would be 
in the end.
Afary and Anderson (2005:36,124) went so far as to speculate 
that Foucault’s ‘peculiar Orientalism’ would have to carry some 
of the blame in this regard, in the sense that Foucault ‘privileged 
an idealised, premodern past – the period of early Islam – over 
modernity’ – his ‘denial of any social or political differentiation 
among the Iranian “people”’ bearing witness to this ‘breathtaking’ 
error. Afary and Anderson (2005) therefore constructed a picture 
of Foucault as not just an anti-modernist, but as a ‘defender of 
traditional societies’: that, in all his major works, in terms of their 
reception, Foucault described the visible improvements of 
modernising reform as less appealing than what they displaced. 
That is incorrect: Foucault’s penetrating critique of modernity 
never and in any way implied that he would uncritically ‘privilege 
premodern societies’ in his historiographical discourse.
Again, Foucault is taken to seduced-bohemian and Orientalist 
extremes where he would never have expected to be. Foucault 
was, of course, willing to reorient premodern notions: in the 
specific context of contra-modernity, Foucault in this reorientation 
indeed argued for the revival of political spirituality. In other 
words, ‘Foucault does not go back, he brings back’ (Beukes 
2009b:120). He was convinced that some resources of past and 
present cultures could be utilised strategically and selectively to 
invigorate the consumed resources of modernity (cf. Foucault 
1991a:82). It must be nevertheless be pointed out that Afary and 
Anderson were correct in their interpretation that Foucault was 
‘fascinated’ by the revolution, not just because it was a challenge 
to repression or American imperialism, but because it was indeed 
an attempt to open a spiritual dimension in politics, with all the 
risks involved therein.
Afary and Anderson’s volume on certain points bears testimony 
to the validity of another suggestion in Chapter 7 (see ‘Foucault 
and “Atoussa H”’ in ch. 7), that Foucault compromised his 
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philosophical position by not engaging the legitimate critique of 
those subjects who were systematically beleaguered as the 
revolution unfolded, especially so, for Afary and Anderson, 
women. Employing ‘Atoussa H’ as their silent and guiding 
informant (Afary & Anderson 2005:91–94, 142, 181, 209–210), the 
authors argued just how far Foucault was, in their minds, removed 
from understanding what the revolt would hold for what they call 
the ‘natural dissidents’ of the revolution, namely, women, 
‘homosexuals’ and secularists in general.
Yet again they go further and too far, postulating that Foucault 
had a ‘highly problematic relationship’ with feminism, which to 
them is a fundamental problem in his philosophy. Foucault, 
according to them, never questioned the ‘separate, but equal’ 
message of the revolutionaries. He explicitly dismissed feminist 
warnings that the revolution was headed in a dangerous direction. 
He seemed to regard such warnings as nothing more than 
Orientalist attacks on Islam, thereby accentuating his own 
‘peculiar Orientalism, compromising a balanced perspective on 
the revolution’ (Afary & Anderson 2005:5, 36). More generally, in 
their view, Foucault remained insensitive towards the many ways 
in which state power affected women, ignoring the fact that 
those most wounded by (premodern) disciplinary practices were 
often women and children, who were oppressed in the name of 
tradition, obligation or ‘honour’. Afary and Anderson seem to 
never take into account that Foucault never aspired to articulate 
finally and precisely the dispositions of Otherness, be it women’s 
rights or gay liberation.
Using the discussed (see ‘Foucault and “Atoussa H”’ in ch. 7) 
letter of ‘Atoussa H’ in her response to Foucault’s support for the 
revolution as their compass, Afary and Anderson (2005:26–27, 
93, 109, 132) argue that although there is very little in Foucault’s 
writings on women or women’s rights,53 his ‘ambiguous and often 
dismissive attitude toward feminism’ notwithstanding, his 
53. But why should there be, since he was a man? Or is this a feminist kind of ‘seduction’?
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theoretical writings on power as ‘everywhere’ had an immense 
influence on a whole generation of feminist academics, inspiring 
them via his technologies of the Self not to view women as 
‘powerless and innocent victims of patriarchal social structures’ 
(Afary & Anderson 2005:27).54
Again, it is true that Foucault himself never addressed feminist 
concerns or gay liberation in general, and yet again he is accused 
here of ‘revealing a clinical detachment’ that for the two authors 
was grounded in a ‘covert androcentricity’ – the predicament of 
women and ‘homosexuals’ is something he glossed over, not only 
in Iran, ‘but in his work in general’ (Afary & Anderson 2005:27–
28).55 This seems to be the reason the two authors focus on what 
they consider to be Foucault’s ‘quick willingness’ to accept 
assurances of the revolutionaries regarding the ‘separate, but 
equal’ status of these subjects in a new dispensation. In all of his 
Iran writings, Foucault indeed only once referred to the dilemma 
of women, and then only after Khomeini’s bloodbath had started 
to manifest itself in March 1979 (Foucault 1979b:265), but in ‘an 
offhand, almost grudging acknowledgement’ (Afary & Anderson 
2005:132),56 even then seemingly offended and even slightly 
amazed that his opinion or lack of one caused women to take 
offence.
The two authors conclude that Foucault’s ‘unwillingness’ to 
engage the plight and legitimate critique of women and 
‘homosexuals’ (as well as secularists) who were subjugated as 
the revolution unfolded, is an ‘inherent problem’ in his work, and 
not restricted to his Iran writings. That is why the two authors 
consider it to be of logical consequence that Foucault had been 
54. Is that not the point precisely? If Foucault’s philosophy had such an impact on feminisim, 
why is he put on the clock to have done more or otherwise for ‘women’s rights’, inside or 
outside of Iran?
55. This is yet another unfortunate example of a careless statement in a work that otherwise 
offered much in terms of the translations of Foucault’s Iran writings in English.




unable or unwilling to penetrate the repressive dynamics of the 
religious fundamentalism underlying the revolutionary movement: 
the consequences on the real, lived lives of the oppressed left 
him cold (cf. Afary & Anderson 2005:39).
However, Afary and Anderson’s analysis, on the less 
confrontational end, confirms the notion that Foucault appreciated 
the masses’ resistance to established power with regard to the 
dissemination of information and the way it assisted the momentum 
of the revolution. They indeed isolated it as one of Foucault’s 
‘astute observations’ about the revolution: that this seemingly 
anti-modern movement was heavily dependent on modern means 
of communication to disseminate its ideas; that, in this regard, a 
blending of tradition and modernity, of modern means of 
communication with centuries-old religious convictions and rituals, 
made it possible to paralyse the modern authoritarian police state 
of the Shah (Afary & Anderson 2005:98). Unfortunately, this sort 
of acknowledgement is far too scarce and scattered in an overly 
polemical work.
The two authors left no doubt that, in their minds, Foucault’s 
Iran expedition and the writings that bore witness to that 
expedition estranged him from the intellectual community in 
which he was a central and leading figure during the 1970s, and 
that the incident harmed his reputation irrevocably.57 Foucault 
was indeed estranged from former theoretical allies, colleagues, 
feminists and co-activists, such as Kate Millet, who wrote a 330-
page memoir on the affair of Foucault, women and Iran, Claudine 
Mollard, Laya Dunayevskaya, Simone de Beauvoir, Claire Brière, 
Pierre Blanchet, Jean Lacouture, Bernard Ullmann, Pierre Manent 
and, of course, the Broyelles.
It is thus on the issue of Foucault’s support for the revolution, 
initially, and the support for Khomeini, eventually – which was 
described elsewhere (Beukes 2009b:124) as ‘ironising’, as 
57. Afary and Anderson (2005:121, 111–127; see Afary & Anderson 2005:247–250, again for 
the Broyelles’ attack). This evaluation is correct, as the reaction from some of these eminent 
figures illustrates.
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Foucault ‘not being mesmerised’, because the horizontal 
organisation of Shia clergy in his mind would not have allowed 
the sanctification of one single ‘super mullah’ (although conceding 
that Foucault was in general uncritical of Khomeini and 
overburdened his critique of modernity in the process) – that 
there is agreement between my reception of Foucault’s 
involvement in Iran and that of Afary and Anderson’s.
But otherwise we differ rather pertinently. Afary and Anderson 
made it abundantly clear that there is no distinction to be made 
between Foucault’s support for the revolting masses and his 
support for Khomeini, however implicit the support for the latter 
might have been. For Afary and Anderson (2005:14, 36–37), 
Khomeini became for Foucault the personification of Nietzsche’s 
will to power, a ruthless historical figure with ‘saintly self-mastery’, 
the perfect example of going beyond Nietzsche’s ‘ascetic priest’. 
This part of their reception is clearly eisegetical, as the primary 
texts themselves do not at all give the impression that Foucault 
held this kind of Nietzschean perspective on Khomeini: as the 
only brief and unfruitful meeting between Foucault and Khomeini 
indicated (Eribon 1991:286), there is nothing ‘Nietzschean’ to be 
read in Foucault’s perspective on Khomeini, neither as a person 
nor as the ‘leader of the revolt’. Again, Foucault’s views on 
Khomeini, however uncritical, and his support for the revolution 
should be kept apart as far as possible.
Afary and Anderson (2005:105) finally concluded that 
Foucault, with his comments and writings on Iran, had isolated ‘a 
unique and very problematic position for himself’ – and it is clear 
that they want to hold Foucault responsible for that position. 
Foucault, in their opinion, has a lot to answer for. Although they 
accepted Foucault’s observations as penetrating and unique 
from a modern-critical perspective and concurred restrainedly 
with his notion of political spirituality – which indicated that the 
movement against the Shah included many diverse elements, not 
only social or political in orientation, but ‘spiritual’ and religious 
as well, even dominantly so – they maintained that Foucault had 
been annexed by the persona of Khomeini to such an extent that 
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it blinded him, that he had found Khomeini’s ability to maintain 
the anti-Shah focus overly intriguing, to the point of uncritical 
adoration.
Afary and Anderson acknowledged Foucault’s insight into the 
dissemination of knowledge in Iran, that he anticipated the 
revolution to have a global reach through its use of modern 
means of communication. They also acknowledged to some 
extent that Foucault’s philosophical position was modern-critical, 
that he rejoiced in the revolution because he interpreted it as a 
rejection of the spirit of Enlightenment, a European form of 
modernity; that he hoped that the ‘madness of the revolt’ would 
break new boundaries for understanding subjectivity, 
transgressing the fixed cultural and political positions of rational 
modernity. Yet, this focus had led him, as far as these two authors 
were concerned, to an apathetic attitude regarding the way 
Islamic radicalism displaced liberal ideas on the state and the 
individual.
Several scholars58 were left uncomfortable by the pedantic 
and accusatory tone of this first extensive introduction to 
Foucault’s involvement in the Iranian revolution. Aspects of it can 
nevertheless be endorsed and the contributions the book made 
at the time should be acknowledged, with specific reference to 
the first translations of Foucault’s Iran writings in English offered 
in the volume. But the point that Foucault was somehow 
‘seduced’ – one which the two authors constantly drove home – 
is just too pejorative to give this work a sense of balance and 
fairness (Leezenberg 2018):
Whilst the Afary and Anderson volume was certainly valuable as a 
compilation of Foucault’s Iranian writings, their interpretive essay 
that introduced the volume contained serious misunderstandings 
of Foucault, Iran, and Foucault’s writings. Initially, many readers and 
58. For recent critical reviews, see Gray and Faisal (2018:100) and McCall (2018:47). Already in 
the first reviews of the book the inadequacies in Afary and Anderson’s introductory chapter 
were noted (cf. Bernauer 2006:784–785; Lynch 2007:169–176). For a more favourable and 
indeed balanced review of the work, see Elahi (2007:157–162).
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scholars of Foucault’s writings reacted to these texts on events in 
Iran with puzzlement, if not outright embarrassment […] (they) make 
serious errors both in their rendering of Foucault’s views and in their 
account of the Iranian revolution […] (they) fall back on a number of 
modernist and secularist concepts and assumptions that are explicitly 
called into question by Foucault. These concern, first and foremost, 
the concept of revolution. (pp. 8–9)
Although Afary and Anderson’s work can be regarded as an 
example of the initial and rather confused phase of the scholarly 
reception of Foucault’s Iran writings,59 Behrooz Ghamari-Tabrizi 
(2016:75–112) recently argued extensively against Afary and 
Anderson’s reception, indicating that the two authors overstated 
the leftism of the Iranian revolution and that by the time of 
Foucault’s arrival and involvement in Iran, the Iranian left had 
basically stopped to be a charioteer of revolt in Iran. His critique 
of Afary and Anderson’s work is penetrating to the extent that it 
renders it, save their translations of Foucault’s Iran writings, 
which will always be the most valuable and authentic contribution 
of the volume, somewhat outdated, just more than a decade 
after its publication. Yet again in all fairness, it should be noted 
that the work had a significant impact on the scholarly scene in 
the years immediately after its publication in 2005: few 
commentaries since ignored the valid contributions made by 
this first extensive introduction to Foucault’s involvement in Iran. 
The same evidently applies to this discussion: Afary and 
Anderson’s work, with its limitations, still deserves a thorough 
consideration from Foucault’s readers. There must a good reason 
59. The author’s initial work (Beukes 2009a, 2009b) must unfortunately be placed in this 
rather bedazzled category as well: besides Leezenberg, who was from the outset (1998, 
republished 2004) very clear about his reading of Foucault’s involvement in Iran in terms 
of a strict adherence to Foucault’s own theoretical framework, holding himself close to that 
premise still today (cf. Leezenberg 2018:4–28), few scholars at the time really understood 
what to make of Foucault’s expeditions to Iran. Today the picture seems clearer: Foucault 
did not make a ‘mistake’ in Iran or in the months immediately after his two visits to the 
country, as long as his Iran writings are interpreted from within his theoretical framework, as 
Leezenberg insisted from the beginning. Foucault certainly could have been more obvious 
on a number of points, but the fact that his reputation was damaged must be ascribed to 
misplaced interpretations of Foucault, as Ghamari-Tabrizi (2016:75–112) insists, rather than as 
a consequence of some ‘seduced’ or ‘peculiar Orientalist’ failure on his side.
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why Ghamari-Tabrizi (2016:73–103) considered it necessary to 
dedicate more than 30 pages in his erudite work specifically 
addressing Afary and Anderson’s reception of Foucault, critical 
as he too was of it.
A more balanced, yet still curious, accusation of Foucault as 
being ‘seduced’ is offered in a condensed intellectual landscaping 
of early 21st-century political activity in Iran, shortly published 
after the Afary and Anderson volume, namely, Danny Postel’s 
(2006:59–71) Reading Legitimation Crisis in Tehran, especially 
the section ‘The necropolitical imagination: Foucault’s Iranian 
odyssey reconsidered’. This contribution covered four overlapping 
themes: the confusion in the Western liberal tradition about 
Iran,  which the author (Postel 2006:1) considers to be 
‘widespread’; the reasons why dissident intellectuals in Iran today 
are nevertheless liberalist, rather than reactionary or Marxist; the 
tremendous energy of the political and intellectual scene in 
contemporary Iran and how Foucault’s complex engagement 
with the Iranian revolution, as well as the hostile reaction towards 
it, both somehow encapsulate the confusion and the energy of 
the liberal project as manifested in 21st-century Iran.
Postel (2006:4–58) argued that, for the Western left, the 
modern-critical acknowledgement of failures in the damaging 
modern project of colonialisation of the East and the recognition 
of the misleading perspectives of modern Western Orientalism 
generated an often-uncritical adoration of aspects of the non-
Western Other in the Western world. For the non-Western world, 
on the other hand, the modern-critical enterprise implied the 
rejection of all which bore the signature of their oppressive Other, 
which led to a search for some pre-colonial truth, untainted by 
Western influence. In the ideological confusion that followed, 
religious fundamentalism seized the opportunity to set up itself 
as an authentic reaction to both the modern-critical claims of the 
Western liberal tradition and the seemingly resonating premodern 
reactions of its Orient counterpart. Against this backdrop, 
religious fundamentalism produced a political discourse that, 
today more than ever, thrives on the coarse principle that ideas 
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have merely singular geographical sources that dictate the 
status of their authenticity and relevance. In countries such as 
Iran,  anti-imperialist arguments have therefore been appropriated 
by theocratical structures, and religious faith has been 
cunningly  manipulated as a means to delegitimise any and 
every form of dissent.
Postel (2006:31–57) claimed that observing liberalism through 
an Iranian spectre reveals the failure of the Western liberal 
tradition to emerge from a remarkable narrow-mindedness that 
prevents it from accepting the reality that the Other can engage 
with and have internal connections with ideas, that may be 
highlighted by similarity rather than difference. Close to the 
proximity of Almond’s (2007) central argument which is 
presented infra, he elaborated on how the same limitations that 
bound the old modern Orientalists in the 21st century have 
created a new breed of Western liberal, which is not all that 
different from and not less damaging and dangerous than its 
outspoken modern-Orientalist predecessor. Now focusing 
solemnly on difference, these new ‘Orientalists’ are virtually 
indoctrinated to expect only difference from the Other, whilst 
completely disregarding similarity. Fighting the injustices against 
the Other in this sense has become as problematic as the modern 
fetishisation of the Other.
The work (cf. Postel 2006:11–13) utilised Iran’s early 21st-
century intellectual environment to illustrate how the late 20th-
century liberal movements in Iran, led by dissident intellectuals 
such as Akbar Ganji and Ramin Jahanbegloo, had begun the 
laborious political project of re-reading and re-implementing the 
thought of some of the most prominent Western intellectuals of 
the past decades, notably Habermas, Foucault, Rorty and Taylor, 
to engage the theme of ‘modernity in Iran’ – the tajadod, in 
Persian – which loomed large in public life and was far from being 
a mere theoretical issue: [i]n the Iranian context, liberalism is a 
matter of life and death […] a fighting faith’ (Postel 2006:37). For 
these Iranian intellectuals, their lives literally depended on what 
they could distil from the liberal Western tradition. Yet, the liberal 
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tradition failed them, as is intensely and repeatedly accentuated 
(Postel 2006:44–57), because of the liberals’ modern-critical 
fixation on difference rather than similarity, because of their 
unwillingness to respect the actual and frequent similarities to 
the Other.
The dialogue between civilisations is therefore not construed 
as a reductionist exchange of two alienated Others, defined 
solely by their differences. Instead, it appears as an interchange 
in which landscapes and localities undergo symbolic meta 
morphoses, and that experiences once localised in a given place 
increasingly find echoes or resonance chambers amongst distant 
societies and peoples. The modern-critical gaze on difference, 
combined with opposition to the neo-conservative agenda in the 
United States, has in this way silenced the liberal tradition in Iran 
(Postel 2006:57).
Somewhat indebted to the basic tenets of Afary and 
Anderson’s analyses and their basic conclusions, Postel 
(2006:59–64) nevertheless affirms the importance of the 
notion of a political spirituality in Foucault’s perspectives on 
the revolution, precisely because it places the reluctance of 
the Western left to get involved with Iran in the context of 
modern-critical thought. Postel’s reading of Foucault’s Iran 
writings is otherwise thematically interwoven with Afary and 
Anderson’s perspectives: he concurs, for example (Postel 
2006:64–71), that Foucault’s stance on the Iranian revolution 
was marked by a rejection of the scepticism that was 
characterised by Foucault’s cynical perspectives on Western 
institutions of power and that Foucault in Iran seemed to treat 
power in Iran ‘differently’.
On the one hand, Postel (2006) agrees with Afary and 
Anderson that Foucault adopted and embraced the singular kind 
of theocracy he was witnessing in Iran because of its sheer 
‘difference’ rather than its ability to govern equitably and respect 
human rights. He also agreed by implication with the ‘Orientalist 
objection’ to Foucault, namely, that Foucault’s Iran writings 
present how philosophical estimations of the Other have evolved 
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out of what is judged by Westerners to be ‘most authentic’ about 
the Other – in this case, as in most other cases, the most exotic 
and most different aspects of Islam.
On the other hand, Postel (2006) stood on the brink of a 
breakthrough in his reading of Foucault and yet he did not claim 
it. If it is true, as he argued, that the liberal tradition failed Iran in 
its unwillingness to compromise its own gaze of differentiation, 
to cross over into the strained domain of the Other as an ‘Other 
Self’ – in other words, if the liberal tradition failed Iran because of 
its unwillingness to interrupt the safe theoretical haven of the 
modern-critical respect for the Other’s Otherness, whilst the 
Other’s Sameness was being sacrificed in the process – Foucault, 
actually, is precisely that kind of liberal intellectual Postel was 
looking for.
Whilst Postel (2006:71) recognised and even appreciated 
Foucault’s ironical quirks, that Foucault should be read cautiously 
in terms of his vagueness, his understatement, the strained quality 
of his efforts, ‘however quietly, to come to grips with […] Iran’, he, 
in a cruel rebound of irony himself did not recognise that Foucault 
was exactly the ‘different kind of liberal’ he sought for – one who 
indeed always preferred to be quiet, if not silent; one who was 
willing to admit Sameness in the Self-posed Other; who not only 
saw difference but likeness; who was consciously willing to cross 
over into the strained domain of the Other by severely 
compromising his acute sense of Self, or his ‘West-essentialisation’, 
as some of Foucault’s harsher critics called it; one who was willing 
to interrupt the predictable yet unproductive reception of the 
Iranian revolution in the minds of Western (liberal) observers. 
What initially brought Postel to isolate Foucault’s ‘necropolitical 
imagination’ in his Iranian ‘Odyssey’ as of fundamental importance 
in his reconsideration of the relationship of Self with Other, and 
the liberal tradition’s role in keeping both the tensions and 
similarities in this regard alive, is an avenue in the end not 
explored. Instead of using Foucault merely as a token for 
postmodernity’s fixation on difference, Foucault could have been 
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read as the one thinker who broke that one-sided gaze and 
disturbed that fixation. Postel (2006) did the exegesis, but he 
himself did not follow Foucault into that strained domain between 
Self and Other.
Whilst Afary and Anderson often went too far in their 
analyses, Postel did not go far enough. He missed out on 
Foucault’s sense of Self-interruption, neglecting the opportunity 
to rather view Foucault as a ‘self-conscious Greek in Persia’. 
Postel, in conclusion, noted a worthwhile to ponder irony. 
Foucault’s ideas had, since his death, been deployed by liberals 
in Iran to unmask the clerical system and its operations of power: 
that is, as a tool of analysis against the same revolutionary 
forces about which Foucault had galvanised in their inception. 
‘To his credit, I think this irony would have pleased Foucault a 
great deal had he lived to witness it’ (Postel 2006:64–71). That 
is certainly true.
‘Orientalist?’
In 2017, an outstanding contribution to the interpretation of 
Foucault’s relation with precisely the ‘Orient Other’ was made 
by Lazreg (2017), in Foucault’s Orient: The Conundrum of 
Cultural Sifference, from Tunisia to Japan, that for the first time 
dealt with this issue specifically in Foucault scholarship – and 
it did so with remarkable efficacy. Lazreg60 scrutinises the 
function of the ‘Orient’ and generally non-Western cultures in 
Foucault’s writings during and before the Iran episode. She 
endeavours to illuminate the perplexing cavity between 
Foucault’s commanding and elucidating reflections on the 
Western condition on the one hand, and his understanding of 
the ‘Orient’ as a perplexity beyond the clutch of Western 
rationality on the other hand.
60. See Lazreg (2017:1–7) for a broader introduction; for the ‘Orientalist’ issue at hand, see in 
particular ‘Foucault’s anthropology of the Iranian revolution’ (pp. 122–158).
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Lazreg (2017:1–2) notes that, throughout his life, Foucault 
maintained a profound interest in non-Western countries. He 
lived in Tunisia from 1966 to 1968 and once even contemplated 
moving to Japan, as mentioned earlier, a country he visited twice, 
on a short visit in 1970 and then during the reflective tour of early 
1978. He voiced the responsibility he felt to survey ideas 
constructed particularly among the minorities or people who 
historically have been bereft of the ability to speak or make 
themselves heard. Yet, in spite of this commitment and numerous 
travels, Foucault did fashion a concept of Western rationality in 
contradistinction to the Orient, as explained in the first and 
original 1961 preface to History of Madness, in which he wrote 
that ‘the Orient is for the Occident everything that it is not […] it 
constitutes the limit of Western rationality’ (Foucault 1961:xxx).61
Lazreg (2017:1–2) argues that, at first glance, Foucault’s 
observation of an insuperable rift between East and West is 
inexplicable, as it seems to be completely unaligned with his 
political perspectives. He had after all been a member of the 
61. Lazreg indicates that the preface was removed from the 1964 French abridged edition: ‘for 
decades, all foreign language translations (except for the Italian) were based on this abridged 
edition, and therefore did not contain the 1961 preface with the passage on the Orient. The 
revised 1972 edition, under the abridged title, Histoire de la folie à l’âge classique (History of 
Madness), contained a new and very brief preface again without the passage on the ‘Orient–
Occident divide. It was not until 2006 that a translation of the 1972 version reproduced the 
1961 preface in its entirety in the English language’ (Lazreg 2017:1,10, fn. 3); […] ‘The removal of 
the preface does not mean that Foucault had had second thoughts about the exclusion of the 
Orient from the Western ratio. On the contrary, the preface to The Order of Things published 
5 years later introduced the book with a citation from Borges about a fictitious Chinese 
encyclopaedia. Discussing the encyclopaedia as if it were real, Foucault analysed a bizarre 
Chinese enumeration of dogs as reflecting the peculiarities of Chinese culture and language 
as opposed to the scientific orderliness of Western culture. Foucault’s foregrounding of the 
discussion of the Chinese encyclopaedia in the book transcends his penchant for provocative 
literary examples; it is also hardly attributable to what Georges Canguilhem called Foucault’s 
espagnolisme or predilection for things Spanish. Indeed, the fiction in which The Order of 
Things found its inspiration is different from the works of literature such as those of Flaubert, 
or Robbe-Grillet, that he was prone to cite. Furthermore, the epistemic significance of the 
Chinese encyclopaedia has not been fully explored, although several analysts have cited it 
but ignored its role in Foucault’s conception of the Orient’. Lazreg’s first contribution to 
contemporary Foucault scholarship is that she does not ignore this role.
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French Communist Party (even if only for two years). He had 
taken stations typically linked with the Western left on an 
assortment of topics, such as the rights of immigrants, 
prisoners in Tunisia as well as in France, psychiatric patients 
and Polish insurgents against Soviet rule. Yet in reconsideration, 
a number of dynamics implicitly indicate precisely the 
compatibility of Foucault’s deep-rooted standpoint on cultural 
Otherness with his general philosophical configuration. For 
instance, as a ‘specific intellectual’ or a ‘philosopher of 
particularity’, he attentively handpicked amongst the (many) 
questions of his time, rather than ‘availing himself of a universal 
principle of justice, freedom, or democracy to guide his stance’ 
(Lazreg 2017:2).62 That is why, whether in Tunisia, Iran or Japan, 
Foucault never passed an opportunity to refer to Marx and 
Marxism in general in very hostile terms. In Tunisia, he was 
surprised by the gravity with which students, campaigning 
against Bourguiba’s repression, took Marx’s ideas – which 
Foucault considered totally obsolete – to the point of 
endangering their lives for those Marxist ideals. On the other 
hand, Foucault also shelved their understanding of Marx as in 
itself antiquated (cf. Lazreg 2017:2).
However, in Iran, Foucault was convinced that he had located 
a clear repudiation of Marx’s conception of religion, which 
treated religion as pure escapism and an evasion of the socio-
philosophical issues at hand. Strangely yet again, when 
confronted in Japan with the president of the Socialist Party, 
who was certainly not taking up any opportunities to 
62. ‘In explaining Foucault’s understanding of his role as an intellectual, Bourdieu pointed out 
that Foucault wished to avoid being “the moral and political conscience,” or “the spokesman” 
and “entitled advocate,” a stance seen as typical of “the universal intellectual,” as Sartre was’ 
(Lazreg 2017:2). More specifically, Foucault was critical of the French left, and defensibly so, 
ascribing its deficiencies to Marxism: ‘[…] informed by the Communist Party’s initial support 
for Stalinism, Foucault’s interpretation of Marx typically rested on an economic-deterministic 
viewpoint. And Foucault was opposed to socialism in Europe, as well as in the Third World 
societies, such as Vietnam, that had founded socialist governments in the aftershock of 
conflicts of decolonization’ (Lazreg 2017:2).
Crucial perspectives from the Foucault scholarship, 1979–2017
128
collaborate with French socialists, Foucault drew on the 
universalistic tone of Marx’s general philosophical attitude to 
put pressure on the president to alter his position.63 A particular 
result of this resistance to Marx as well as of Foucault’s 
apparently arbitrary links to the French left, and more general 
European Left, was his inhibition towards the thought of the 
Nouveaux Philosophes (Paras 2006:57–97), inter alia that of 
André Glucksmann, as well as his apparent indebtedness to 
Neoliberalism during the last years of his life, both in Europe 
and the United States.64
Foucault was never alone in his general denunciation of Marx 
and Marxism, or unaccompanied in his later interest in 
Neoliberalism and his offhand flirtations with the left, when 
measured from within his theoretical framework. It is precisely 
when Foucault’s ‘inconsistencies’ and ‘oddities’ are interpreted 
from his own theoretical context – and not a Marxian framework, 
for instance65 – that his work actually ‘[…] give(s) a surplus 
meaning to his conception of the Orient’ (Lazreg 2017:3). Of 
course, this is precisely against the insistence that the acceptance 
of historical materialism is a prerequisite to consider cultural 
difference. It could be reasonably stated that resistance to Marx 
and Marxism was only one side of Foucault’s broader antagonism 
63. The importance of Foucault’s tenacious resistance to Marx’s philosophical positioning is 
often concealed by ‘his ties to the Gauche Prolétarienne, a Maoist organization founded in 
1969, which organized factory workers, considered France an occupied territory, and called 
for a general people’s uprising. Its charismatic leader, Pierre Victor, whose real name was 
Benny Lévy, ultimately renounced his politics and turned to Orthodox Judaism instead. Victor 
and Foucault held a long discussion on popular justice, published in Les Temps Modernes 
in 1972’ (Lazreg 2017:3). Daniel Defert explained to Lazreg (2017:3) ‘[…] that he had been 
a militant of the Gauche Prolétarienne, as well as the initiator of the establishment of the 
Groupe d’Information sur les Prisons (GIP), to which he had asked Foucault to lend his name 
because of his notoriety’ (Lazreg 2017:3).
64. See Leezenberg’s (2018:4–29) critical evaluation of the relation between revolt, religion 
and Neoliberalism in Foucault’s later thought.
65. As Afary and Anderson (2005) did, when they interpreted Foucault’s understanding of 
‘revolt’ and ‘revolution’ not from Foucault’s own theoretical framework, but a modernist one 
(Leezenberg 2018:4–7; Ghamari-Tabrizi 2016:75–112).
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towards a humanist philosophy, in which Kant’s ‘cosmopolitan 
anthropology played an essential role’ (cf. Lazreg 2017:3).
Lazreg (2017:3) persuasively contends that there is no doubt 
that Foucault’s more general critique of humanist philosophy and 
the social sciences it informs is valuable for the issue at hand, 
namely, how to come to terms with Foucault’s ‘Orientalism’. It is 
true that humanist philosophy commonly combined the ‘Western 
experience’ with the ‘human experience’; it also employed the 
‘Western experience’ as a norm against which to estimate non-
Western cultures. Foucault’s antagonism to humanism’s universalist 
assertions does however not unavoidably mean that he could not 
have used Western rationality as a sort of stocktaking in making 
sense of non-Western cultures. He simply decided not to use it.
On the other hand, it may be argued that Foucault’s critique of 
humanism did not decentre his own view of humanist philosophy 
(Lazreg 2017:3). For experiencing other cultures necessarily 
brings the human being back to the forefront of understanding 
the subject itself – himself or herself as a subject of culture – in 
this case, the French subject Michel Foucault. It is against the 
milieu of Foucault’s critique of Kant’s Anthropology from a 
Pragmatic Point of View (very early in his career though) that 
Lazreg (2017:122–158) pursuits the justification as well as the 
significances (and the penalties and costs, in terms of her 
reception) of Foucault’s segregation of the Orient from Western 
rationality. Lazreg, in a provocative and enthralling way, 
disentangles the consequences of this segregation from 
Foucault’s understanding of cultural difference, as well as his 
relation to non-Western cultures.66
66. Lazreg’s (2017:3–4) argument can adequately be summarised in her own words: ‘[…] 
Foucault’s Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology foreshadows the unresolvability of his 
cultural conundrum as initially expressed in History of Madness: although posited as the outer 
limit of the Western ratio, the Orient’s reason remains unfathomable, and glimpsed only as 
“different” or “mysterious”. Hence what this “outside reason” actually is, how it relates to the 
sundered interior of Western reason, is left till the end of (Foucault’s) life unexplored, as if 
for fear it might reveal the operation of the very same reason Foucault analyzed so precisely 
from the inside.’
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The ‘last woman standing question’ amongst Foucault 
scholars therefore is (and the delta of questions arising from it, 
of course): did Foucault succeed in postulating an alternative 
approach to an understanding and explaining of cultural 
difference – for example, Occident-Orient and West-East – in 
terms other than as an epistemological transgression (or, from 
his vocabulary, a ‘limit-experience’)? In other words, specifically 
with regards to Iran, is Foucault’s sense of Self-interruption 
properly distinguishable in his Iran writings and other writings 
from the period? Is Foucault discernible, as the author 
contends, as the silent one who indeed always preferred to be 
quiet, if not altogether silent; the one who was willing to admit 
Sameness in the Self-posed Other; the one who not only saw 
difference but likeness; who was consciously ready to cross 
over into the strained domain of the Other by severely 
compromising his acute sense of Self? Or, after Lazreg’s 
reading of Foucault, have we finally missed the opportunity to 
view Foucault as a ‘self-conscious Greek in Persia’? To answer 
the ‘last woman standing question’ and the many questions 
after that, it is crucial to provide ample room for two compelling 
arguments for and indication of Foucault being ‘uniquely 
Orientalist’ (encapsulated in the delta of questions above), 
namely, that of Lazreg’s and Ian Almond (2007; cf. 2004). 
Lazreg’s work is, next to Ghamari-Tabrizi’s (2016) Foucault in 
Iran – Islamic Revolution after the Enlightenment, one of the 
most significant presentations from the Foucault scholarship 
over the past years. Whilst Tabrizi’s work will be presented in 
the next section, the core of Lazreg’s and Almond’s arguments, 
more or less in favour of the notion of a ‘uniquely Orientalist 
Foucault’, will be presented below.
Lazreg maintains67 that the critical issue regarding 
‘Foucault’s Orient’ is not ‘Self-interruption’, but that once 
Foucault characterised humanist anthropology as a deceptive 
67. The following paragraphs summarise Lazreg’s (2017:1–10, 122–158) reading, followed by an 
appraisal of Almond’s analysis.
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effort to apprehend ‘man’, a beast he supposed have 
disappeared with the death of God, as proclaimed by Nietzsche, 
he himself could not have written about the Orient in the 
absence of anti-humanist anthropological assumptions. 
Incidentally, Foucault did fiddle at times with structuralist 
anthropology in his study of Western culture (but that was 
very early in his career of course, and he left even ‘post-
structuralism’ behind in the mid-1960s altogether; Lazreg 
2017:4; cf. Beukes 2002b:994–999; 2020b:vii–viii, xv–xvi). 
Thus, assuming the profile of ‘the anthropologist’ at the time, 
Foucault attempted to use the ethnological method for the 
history of ideas, in a delicate attempt to do for Western culture, 
what Claude Lévi-Strauss  did for preliterate societies. 
Foucault’s ethnological-archaeological premise initially aided 
him well in understanding the history of ideas in Western 
culture. However, the ‘Orient’ stayed an enigma in his thought, 
as this method he so ingeniously constructed did not apply 
and could clearly not be applied to living subjects and events 
in non-Western cultures. Foucault’s ethnological-archaeological 
method, according to Lazreg’s reading, in this sense proved to 
be a hindrance to an interpretation of the intersubjective 
character of cross-cultural engagement.
In the face of the methodological reality of the non-applicability 
of his method to non-Western structures, the question for Lazreg 
(2017:4) stands: did Foucault eventually foster a non-humanist or 
even anti-humanist anthropology? Is such a ‘non-humanist 
anthropology’ at all possible? To what degree did Foucault’s view 
of the ‘Orient’ as well as his (indeed, rather limited) involvement 
in non-Western cultures, like that of Japan early in 1978 and Iran 
later that year, contrariwise disclose a kind of anthropology he 
had exactly proposed to move beyond? Stated in simpler terms, 
when physically in the Orient, how did Foucault come to grips 
with the human subject in that culturally ‘Other’ or ‘different?’ 
Again, to use Lazreg’s own question, did Foucault’s assessment 
of the ‘Orient–Occident division’ signify the limit(s) of his possibly 
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anti-humanist and undeniably nominalist understanding of 
cultural difference?68
If the epistemic role of experience as some sort of 
‘epistemological constant’ is granted, this for Lazreg also points 
to the significance of the interviews Foucault gave about his 
stays in Tunisia, Iran and Japan, indeed as sources for an 
understanding of his views of cultural ‘Otherness’. From the many 
interviews she painstakingly disseminates, Lazreg eventually 
concludes that Foucault’s lifelong work was to expose the 
organisation and purposes of Western cultural (self)knowledge, 
as a way of revising how and why Western modernity in its 
multifarious appearances became what it still is, namely, a 
devastating cultural force.
Of course, it is true that Foucault never wrote a book or 
lectured on cultural Otherness or difference at the Collège de 
France. Sketching the journey of his views on the ‘Orient–Occident 
divide’ indeed requires placing him ‘in conversation with himself’, 
as it were, as well as with the people he met on his excursions to 
non-Western countries. To put him ‘in conversation with himself’ 
implies reading his texts in conjunction with dialogues he gave to 
the press, obviously his lectures, as well as his conferences. 
Foucault’s experience of non-Western cultures thus forms the 
empirical site within which his philosophical view of the Orient–
Occident divide can be assessed in its temporal and spatial 
deployment. It provides the advantage of concretising the 
68. Lazreg (2017:4) accentuates that the ‘way in which Foucault expressed his experiences of 
non-Western cultures cannot be dismissed as mere travel impressions; they were indicative of 
the manner in which he thought of the Orient. From his perspective, any experience has thought 
content’; ‘He argued that thought “can and must be analyzed in all the manners of speaking, 
acting, behaving in which the individual appears and acts as a subject of knowledge, ethics or 
law, as a subject conscious of himself and others”’ (Lazreg 2017:5). The question however, and 
it is one that Lazreg does not answer, is whether that ‘experience-content’ is fixed or whether 
it is contingent. Were these ‘experience-contents’, real as they were for Foucault, not always 
revisable, subordinate to a diverse sets of contingents? It seems, as was the case with Afary 
and Anderson, that Foucault is read and interpreted here as ‘an author’, thus one ‘who speaks 
on behalf of Others’. As indicated from the very beginning of this book, ‘authorship’ is always a 
problematic notion in the Foucaultian context because of its inherent inconsistency.
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meaning of the ‘empirico-transcendental doublet’ that he pre-
positioned in his critique of the ‘human sciences’ in The Order of 
Things. In the world(s) of cultural Otherness in which Foucault 
threw himself, he was in a position to disengage that doublet by 
suspending the ‘transcendental’ (by which he unsurprisingly 
meant the assumption of a ‘universal human nature’) and 
experimenting with a new way of making sense of cultural 
diversity.
Lazreg’s work pursues this question, whether Foucault allowed 
his exposure to non-Western societies to transform his thought 
as well as methodological practice. She is convinced 
that  what  Foucault overlooked is the effect of his view of the 
Orient, not only on the other side of Western rationality (which 
he left unexamined), but also on himself. Lazreg thus answers in 
the  negative: neither Foucault’s thought nor his methodology 
was particularly affected by his experience of non-Western 
domains, specifically the ‘Orient’.
There are obvious variations in tenor and Stimmung in 
Foucault’s noted experiences of non-Western cultures. Although 
varied, the three countries (Tunisia, Japan and Iran) that Lazreg 
analyses in terms of Foucault’s ‘Orient’ have in common a sort of 
moral geographical location in the ‘Western map of the East’ 
(‘Near’ [or ‘Middle’] and ‘Far’). The three countries also have in 
common social topographies conventionally taken to be 
categorically ‘non-Western’. In Tunisia, for example, Foucault 
mapped ancient Greece onto the ‘local cultural present’; yet living 
in the historical heterotopia of the village of Sidi Bou Saïd, he 
missed that particular part of Tunisian culture that is veiled behind 
its French façade. Tunisian culture, according to  Lazreg’s reading, 
thus formed a  ‘blank’ in Foucault’s imagination.
In Iran, on the other hand, Foucault felt more liberated to 
discover the resident culture by probing into the importance of 
Shia Islam to elucidate the conflict and the risks the anti-Shah 
protesters were more than willing to take. In Japan again, Foucault 
experienced the profound ‘limit’ of the ‘Orient–Occident divide’. 
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However, unlike by far the majority of Western philosophers 
before him, or sociologists and political theorists who endeavoured 
(more often than not without any sense of accomplishment) to 
reinterpret and – in modern Western fashion, reschematise – 
Japanese thought and culture, Foucault remained steady in his 
own schematic view of the Orient. Yet in Japan, his experience of 
the culture itself obliged him to recognise that he should expand 
his interpretation of that culture. This apparent attempt to make 
‘a history of this great divide’, which he implied in the original 
preface to History of Madness, was, according to Lazreg’s reading, 
never completed or fulfilled: hence, the ‘enigma’ of Japanese 
culture was left unknotted for Foucault.
Lazreg in no sense of the word reads Foucault as a victim of 
his own schematic divide of the West and the East, the Occident 
and the Orient and the Self and the Other. The problematic 
choices Foucault was up to in his efforts to comprehend the 
dissimilar cultures of Japan, Tunisia and Iran during his ‘Oriental 
expeditions’ mirror his unwillingness to transcend the epistemic 
divide he himself created between the West and the Orient. He 
consistently stressed cultural differences using Western culture, 
which he indeed considered to be uniform in modern guise, as a 
standard of reference, not realising how normalised his own 
‘norm’ has become in the process. Of course, Lazreg is too 
delicate an exegete even to start to imply that Foucault was 
convinced of a presumed superiority of Western culture. Instead, 
for Lazreg, the West was for him a constant frame of reference 
and this repeated reference, when joined with what he himself 
indicated about non-Western cultures as ‘Other’, calls into 
question his often proclaimed antagonism to the universalist 
claims of humanist thought.
If in Japan Foucault expressed sheer estrangement, in Iran, 
where he thus travelled to only months after he had been in 
Japan, he vigorously attempted to bridge that divide between East 
and West, at least conceptually. In guarding his interpretation of 
the Iranian revolution against his critics, he defined it as a special 
case of past protest movements in Europe, including the French 
Chapter 8
135
revolution, all of which were moved by a political spirituality. 
However, his idealist conception of the dogmatical features of 
Shia Islam excluded considerations of social class (a fact Foucault 
indeed acknowledged after the fact), social inequality and 
material needs at the roots of the Iranian movement and its 
evolution. In this sense, according to Lazreg’s overall reception, 
Foucault, in never being able to cross the great divide, was a 
somewhat unfortunate, rather displaced Orientalist – whatever 
he was hoping to achieve in Iran, was against the above backdrop 
that Lazreg so comprehensively illustrated, bound to fail. In the 
exposition in the last chapter of this book, Lazreg will be held 
close to the contents of this paragraph – because Foucault, 
indeed in ‘radiant uncertainty’, lost as only a ‘Greek in Persia’ can 
be, eventually crossed that divide.
Now, Almond’s (2007) contribution to Foucault research on 
the Iran issue, in an exquisite chapter in his The New Orientalists – 
Postmodern Representations of Islam from Foucault to 
Baudrillard, stands in close discursive proximity to Lazreg’s 
conclusion: Foucault was indeed a unique kind of Orientalist. Yet, 
Almond offered more than a clear yet aloof conclusion about 
Foucault being a ‘unique Orientalist’.
To start with, Almond worked with different tools from those of 
Lazreg, with philosophical legacies rather than a strict exegesis of 
texts. Almond accordingly investigated the West’s ‘Orientalism’, 
that curious yet seemingly spontaneous construction of an Arab 
or Islamic Other, as he detected in the works of some of the most 
profound thinkers of the 20th century: Nietzsche, Foucault, 
Derrida, Borges, Kristeva and others. Almond showed how the so-
called ‘postmodern’ thinkers over the past decades had employed 
motifs and symbols of the Islamic Orient, its alterity and 
anachronisms, within their attempted critique and relocation of 
modernity (Almond 2007:2). However – and this is where Almond 
radically dissected the postmodern discourse – these thinkers 
presented to him a new and more insidious Orientalist strain – an 
argumentative notion which resonates with what Lazreg stipulates 
(by implication) as Foucault’s ‘unique Orientalism’. Almond’s 
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(older) analysis, juxtaposed with the more recent reading of 
Lazreg, is important because it quite unintentionally sheds light on 
the distinguishing portrayal of Foucault in Iran in this book as ‘a 
self-conscious Greek in Persia’. Furthermore, it is of importance to 
this book’s perspective on the relationship between Foucault’s 
critique of modernity and Islam, which will be presented in the last 
chapter of this book as a Nietzschean ‘ethics of Self-discomfort’, 
that Almond explicitly embedded Foucault’s regarded ‘unique 
Orientalism’ in a Nietzschean context.
Crucial then is Almond’s reading of Nietzsche and the Orient. 
He indicated that although a wealth of studies exist on Nietzsche 
and the ‘high Orient’ (to use Edward Said’s famous distinction 
between the ‘high’ and ‘low’ Orient, the ‘high Orient’ indicating 
the established and well-published documentation of Nietzsche’s 
relation to themes in Buddhism, Hinduism, Japanese and Chinese 
philosophy), not a single monograph exists on the subject of 
Nietzsche and the ‘low Orient’ (Islamic cultures), although more 
than a hundred references to Hafiz, Arabs and Turks are to be 
found in the many volumes of Colli and Montinari’s Nietzsche 
Studien (Almond 2007:7–8), which has been for many decades 
the standardised scholarly collection of Nietzsche’s writings. 
Almond (2007:8) argued that for Nietzsche Islam is an ‘affirmative 
Semitic religion’ and forever hovering in the back of Nietzsche’s 
writings. And it was progressive: Nietzsche’s Der Antichrist, his 
last finished work, devoted more attention to ‘these enemies of 
the Crusades’ than any of his other works (Almond 2007:8).
According to Almond (2007:8), there are at least two reasons for 
Nietzsche’s ‘inordinate’ and generally sympathetic interest in Islam. 
Firstly, Islam provided for Nietzsche a criterion for establishing 
difference, a system of alternative customs and beliefs well equipped 
to undermine the universalist claims of both European Christianity 
and modernity, fulfilling the desire for the acquisition of a ‘trans-
European eye’ which would relieve Europeans from their short-
sightedness or greisenhaften Kurzsichtigkeit (Almond 2007:8); 
secondly, it departed from Nietzsche’s infamous Selbsthass, his 
contempt for German culture, his discomfort with the Self, the 
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limitedness of the Self and the own position, identity, perspective, 
inclination and so on (Almond 2007:9). This notion of self-
interruption and self-critique, as we have already seen in the 
preceding chapters, played in terms of this book’s reception a vital 
role in Foucault’s ‘radiation of uncertainty’ about the ‘philosophical 
nature’ of his Iran endeavour, which will be synopsised in hopefully 
a subtle but fruitful way in the last chapter.
Almond sliced deeply into Nietzsche’s texts, showing that 
Nietzsche’s favourable disposition towards Islam stems from the 
fact that it seems to be ‘less modern’ – less emancipated, less 
Enlightened, less democratic – leading Almond to isolate four 
categories of Nietzsche’s appropriation of Islam for his critique of 
modernity: Islam’s ‘un-Enlightened condition’, with all its social 
consequences for issues of equality; its perceived masculinity, or 
to use a more manly word, its ‘manliness’; its perceived non-
judgementalism; and its affirmative character, leading Nietzsche 
to consider Islamic cultures, alongside the Roman, Japanese, 
Homeric and Scandinavian cultures, as ‘more honest’ cultures, 
purer – not weakened by the ressentiment of Christianity and its 
influence on the West’s self-understanding; in other words, not 
weakened by the life-denying values of chastity, meekness and 
equality, which he considered to be typical of the Occident 
(Almond 2007:9–10). Almond meticulously disseminated every 
one of these four categories of Nietzsche’s appropriation of Islam 
as ‘more honest and pure’, showing that Nietzsche followed 
exactly the same logic as those of generations of ‘old European 
Orientalists’ before him, who again and again fixated on Medieval 
Islam in their interpretations, characterising Islam as incapable of 
democracy, as fanatical, as socially unjust, as combative and as 
antagonistic. The only difference between Nietzsche and the 
Orientalists who preceded him is that he affirmed these prejudices 
instead of lamenting them (Almond 2007:10–21). Nietzsche’s 
Orientalism thus merely featured on a meta-level.
However, Almond (2007:21–22) argued that Nietzsche differed 
from his Orientalist predecessors in one crucial sense, namely, that 
he sympathetically viewed Islam as a ‘pool of signs’ to employ in 
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his critique of modernity, using Islamic imagery in uniquely self-
serving, modern-critical terms. According to Almond, in an 
eloquent affirmation of a consistent theme in this book, which is 
based solely on Foucault’s Iran writings, it is precisely this ‘self-
serving attitude’ which characterised Foucault’s perspective on 
the events in Iran in 1978–1979 as events that should be understood 
according to modern-critical considerations: the uniqueness of 
Nietzsche’s Orientalism is thereby repeated, if not broadened. 
According to Almond (2007:22–23), the complexity of Foucault’s 
approach to the Islamic Other lies in a consecutive analysis and 
appropriation of Islam’s alterity: a critique of what makes Islam 
Other, yet at the same time keeping Islam docile, in its place.
Almond (2007:27–32) considered Nietzsche’s influence on 
Foucault in his evaluation of non-European cultures as absolutely 
profound, which, combined with Foucault’s unique and subtle 
‘essentialisation of the West’, should be integral in our understanding 
of Foucault’s perspectives on Iran. To understand Foucault’s views 
on the events in Iran, according to Almond, one should actually not 
start with the Orient, but the Occident in Foucault’s thought (in 
this crucial sense, Almond and Lazreg overlap again). Again, in a 
refined examination, Almond shows how the Occident, and the 
repetition of the word itself, plays a central role in all of Foucault’s 
projects – Foucault is forever reminding us of the Western 
specificity of his subject, ‘always careful not to stray too far outside 
the limits of his tribe’ (Almond 2007:23).
The repetition of the word Occident is Foucault’s way of 
emphasising the geocultural locatedness of the language game 
he is scrutinising, his technique of avoiding any lapse into an 
‘unthinking universalism’. Foucaultian key phrases such as ‘we 
Western Others’ and ‘the limit-experience of the Western world’ 
indicate for Almond Foucault’s sensitive awareness of the 
limitations of his own vocabulary.
A paradox now arises: is it precisely Foucault’s desire to 
delineate the finite, limited, Occidental boundaries of the collection 
of ideas and practices he is studying that leads to an indirect 
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‘essentialisation of the West’ (and implicitly, ‘the East’)? Almond 
(2007:24) did not forward this oxymoron as a critique or judgement 
against something banal or obvious in Foucault’s work: he was 
merely stating that wherever the West appears in Foucault’s work, 
which is practically everywhere, there are notions that silently 
assume the absent Orient to be its inverse. Foucault’s Occident 
takes on several elusive, yet sometimes obvious characteristics 
that vary according to the (kind of) Orient it is being juxtaposed 
with, whether it is Japan, Tunisia or Iran. One of these characteristics 
is that of Western superficiality and self-denial vis-à-vis Eastern 
honesty’, as Nietzsche would have it.
Almond (2007:25) displays how often Foucault had followed 
Nietzsche, representing the East as the lost domain where 
Europeans used to think, a place where the Orient masculine 
and the clear affirmation of sexuality and hierarchy remain 
intact. This Eastern consideration in Almond’s reading 
(2007:25) is integral to Foucault’s description of power as 
‘everywhere’, as technical and positive, rather than judicial and 
negative, as unashamed of hierarchy, as a ‘healthy attitude 
toward power’.
Foucault’s Occident however, apart from being ‘less honest’ or 
at least ‘more dishonest’ than its Orient counterpart, is also more 
complex, precisely because of its deceit, its dishonesty. The 
reason–unreason opposition in Western thought is a typical 
example of the kind of complexity that follows from the not-
direct, not-honest, binary thinking of the West, leading to 
Foucault’s repeated linking of individualist Western subjectivity 
and the more homogeneous Eastern collectivities (Foucault, 
cited in Almond 2007):
[T ]here has never been in the West [at least not for a very long time] 
a philosophy that was capable of bringing together the practical 
politics and the practical morality of a whole society. (p. 26)
This notion confirms Foucault’s appreciation of the Iranian 
revolutionaries’ spontaneous, coherent resistance to power ‘as 
one’, as a collectivity.
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Yet, Almond indicated that this notion is genuinely and acutely 
ingrained in Foucault’s thinking, perceptible throughout his 
extensive oeuvre: Foucault’s ‘Orientals’ lend themselves to 
collectivities with far greater ease than his ‘Occidentals’, giving 
rise to the notion of Oriental holistic collectivity versus Occidental 
fragmented individuality, a clash between a harmonious, 
unchanging Orient and a volatile, mutating Occident (Almond 
2007:26). Almond (2007:27–28) daringly asserted that ‘Foucault’s 
Orient’ carries a social ethos of unity that cannot any longer be 
found in his Occident (which has long moved on, which could 
after modernity never again be viewed in utopian terms), 
becoming a paradise-state of Nietzschean innocence where 
power is exercised freely, a place where it is still possible for the 
state to intervene in its subjects’ lives without it being viewed or 
experienced as problematic.
Scrutinising Foucault’s Order of Things and the second and 
third volumes of The History of Sexuality, Almond (2007:29) 
elaborates on Foucault’s volatile Occident versus this unspoken, 
silent, ‘unthought’ Orient, which lies as a sort of palimpsest in 
Foucault’s texts – in between other Foucaultian key phrases, such 
as ‘the fate of the West’, ‘our modernity’ and the ‘old rational goal 
of the West’, lies a silent Orient, with all the inverse qualities 
assigned to it: serenity, freedom from the death of their God and 
all the tragedy that death invokes. In the Orient, gods are still 
alive. That is why the ‘Orient’ is a place where political spirituality 
(can) flourish and thrive.
Almond’s examination, therefore, does not only confirm the 
repeated emphasis in this book that Foucault’s enterprise in Iran 
was above all other considerations modern-critical in nature and 
orientation: Almond even provided us with a description of the 
precise Nietzschean development in Foucault’s thought in this 
regard, with the interchange between the fragmented Occident 
and the intact Orient – an interplay that formed the initial and 
most profound Foucaultian inclination, namely, his quite 
elementary contra-modern constitution in Iran. The staunch, 
silent demeanour of the masses in Iran in 1978 was for Foucault 
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an expression of the intense, masculine yet static energy of the 
Orient, unlike any of the Occident could ever again generate.
After providing an overview of Foucault’s first ‘real’ contact with 
Islam in Tunisia, working at the University of Tunis from 1966 to 1968, 
where Foucault found ‘something refreshingly active’ about the 
political struggles in Tunisia at the time (the students’ lack of 
theoretical knowledge about Marx and Sartre being more than 
compensated for by ‘their violence’, their ‘radical intensity’, their 
‘impressive momentum’ [Almond 2007:31]), clearly a prologue to 
his experience in Tehran in 1978), Almond (2007:31–34) proceeds to 
interpret Foucault’s Iran writings himself. Almond’s reading is an 
invigorating exhibition of some of the best the dedicated Foucault 
scholarship has had to offer on this subject, even up to 2019.
According to Almond (2007:35–36), the ‘static yet violent’ 
energy Foucault witnessed on the streets of Tehran in the last 
months of 1978 was the expression of a force Foucault deemed 
not possible within European boundaries – again, almost 
immediately, contrasting East and West in his experiences. Almond 
(2007:35–36) is taken by just how closely Foucault’s preferred 
terminology in his Iran writings resembles Nietzschean terminology. 
Examples of terms and phrases used in Foucault’s Iran writings, 
which Almond connected with the explicit Nietzschean influence, 
are ‘life-affirmation’, ‘the militaristic’, ‘the Medieval’, ‘a regime of 
truth close to that of the Greeks […] and the Arabs of Maghreb’, 
‘vitality’ and ‘consciousness’. And there are quite a few more.
The first step in Foucault’s modern-critical endeavour in 
Iran is depicted as an opportunity to remind Marxists of their 
own epistemological finitude, having Iran as a reminder of how 
culturally finite the West’s idea of ‘revolution’ really was 
(Almond 2007:35). Once again, for Foucault (as for Nietzsche), 
Islam becomes a nostalgic glimpse on what Europe had lost 
and how Europe ‘used to think’: for Almond, by travelling to 
Iran, Foucault was actually travelling back in time – to a time 
where there was still a possibility of a transcendental faith, 
which could ‘move things in this world’ to a set of practices ‘we 
Europeans’, as Nietzsche would say, ‘no longer’ (for a very long 
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time though) believed in’. Iran thus constituted for Foucault a 
positive space, a space where his notion of political spirituality, 
with its clear theoretical potential for a reconfiguration of 
traditional (modern) subject–object schemes, could flourish 
(Almond 2007):
[A] space (thus) […] where the possibility of a spiritual dimension 
to the political quotidian has remained intact […] the East becomes 
the retainer of a forgotten vitality, the preserver of a wisdom, which 
has long since trickled through European fingers […] what Foucault 
is seeing, in effect, is a reversal of the French revolution. (pp. 36–37; 
[emphasis in original])
For Almond (2007:37), the energy of the Islamic revolution 
becomes a ‘disruptive energy and a positive moment of 
discontinuity’. Foucault’s Iran writings therefore ‘serve a purpose 
in the wider context of his writings […] a collapser of Occidental 
teleologies and provincializer of Western historiography’. The 
notion of the Iran revolution as a dissociative, subversive force 
brings to the fore Foucault’s ‘fascination’ – a notion which has in 
this book repeatedly been confirmed and acknowledged as 
indeed correct – with the spontaneous, almost insane nature of 
the Iranians’ revolt, with the uncontainable energy of a people 
breaking free from Western hegemony: whilst his fascination was 
mostly implicit, it has in the previous chapters been shown just 
how explicit that fascination in the end turned out to be, with 
reference to, in almost lyrical terms, his depiction of the revolt as 
one executed with ‘with bare hands’, against one of the biggest 
military forces in the world at the time.
This mad energy of the demonstrators, as they resisted the 
control and containment of the West, offered a threat to 
modern Europe in particular, the same kind of threat the ‘free 
reign of Medieval madness’ held for the asylums and clinics of 
the 18th century. Therefore, and there is no other reason, this 
energy had to be ridiculed, mocked and scorned by Western 
commentators. That is why Foucault’s reputation was damaged: 
not because of Foucault’ Iran writings or anything he said or 
wrote at the time, but because of Foucault’s quasi-teleological, 
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Marxist jesters’ last attempts to breathe a final Western 
certainty from their vapourising lungs, when all that is ‘solid’, 
already ‘melted’ into air.
Foucault ‘in Iran’, with all his restraint and ironic peculiarities, 
which Almond reworked in abundant fashion, is always still a 
‘Western thinker about the East’, or, to again use the delineation, 
a ‘self-conscious Greek in Persia’. This delineation is, according to 
Almond’s own and inimitable breakdown, especially valid, in at 
least two regards: firstly, Foucault was indubitably impressed by 
Iran’s Islamic-Oriental wholeness, its unity and the absence of a 
brusque (and consumerist) individuality; secondly, he was 
convinced of the durability and non-volatility of its institutions, 
especially its religion, which itself is forcefully old. As we have 
seen in terms of rather understating arguments thus far, the 
‘solidarity’ and ‘unity’ of the Iran revolution are aspects often 
stressed in Foucault’s Iran writings, yet he is considered to have 
overlooked that sense of individuality (or in-community), at least 
with regard to Afary and Anderson’s (2005) reception of 
Foucault’s ‘natural dissidents’ of the revolution – their nominated 
‘women’, ‘homosexuals’ and ‘many secularists’.
There were indeed ‘internal struggles’ in the revolution: 
Almond’s analysis is absolutely correct in this regard, and 
Foucault did not deny the truth and validity of any of these 
struggles. Neither does the author: of course there were women, 
children and other vulnerable subjects in Iran at the time. Foucault 
did not abolish them, but at the same, he never proclaimed to 
rescue them. He was ever too silent and delicate a thinker to be 
some ‘salvation figure’ for anyone of any kind: especially his ‘true 
kind’, whether they be Western, French, intellectual, or gay – or 
not. Again, Foucault was a philosopher and not a prophet. Who 
looks for more, either in his personality, his numerous personal 
guises or his philosophical pursuits, will be profoundly 
disenchanted.
Almond (2007) nonetheless went further and posed that, 
uncharacteristic for a thinker as self-critical as Foucault, there 
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appears to be for Foucault no doubt about the correctness of his 
analysis of the revolution itself:
[A]t no point in any of his Iran writings did Foucault seem to wonder 
whether his conviction of the oneness of the Iranians, their unity, their 
madness and everything else he witnessed in the streets of Tehran, 
may have been facilitated by his utter unfamiliarity with the culture 
he was observing. (p. 39)
When Foucault (1988a:215–216) stated in an interview that what 
had struck him in Iran ‘is that there is not a struggle between 
different elements’ and ‘we met in Iran the collective will of a 
people’, it seems as if his self-awareness essentially as a tourist in 
Iran was mainly absent; it seems this Greek in Persia was, for 
Almond, not self-conscious enough. At this point, the author 
would have to slightly fluctuate from Almond’s otherwise solid 
analysis. There are, according to the reading of the primary texts 
presented in the previous chapters, many examples which would 
show how much uncertainty Foucault radiated, not only during 
the time of the writing of his Iran essays and clearly in the texts 
themselves, but even in his preparation for his expeditions and 
his ‘vagueness’ about his philosophical disposition towards what 
he was possibly going to find in Iran. To quote just a few of those 
remarks again: ‘[i]ntellectuals will merely work together with 
journalists at the point where ideas and events intersect’ 
(Foucault, in Eribon 1992:282); ‘I go to see what is happening, 
rather than referring to what is taking place’ (Foucault, in Miller 
1993:308, fn. 82); and ‘let us admit that “we Westerners” would 
be in a poor position to give advice to the Iranians on this matter’ 
(Foucault 1978e:213; cf. Foucault 1978h:220). In terms of Lazreg’s 
consequent depiction of an ‘already very early Occident-Orient 
divide’ in Foucault’s thought, as thoroughly isolated by both 
these two authors, it is therefore only to an extent true that he 
‘already knew what he was going to experience in Iran’ (Almond 
2007:41).
Yet, Almond’s conclusion can be accepted for the best part of 
it: it is indeed true that Foucault’s perceptions of the ‘insane 
energy’ of the Iranians, and what he observed to be the ‘authentic 
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and affirmative’ nature of their religion, and what he thought they 
‘forever were and always will be’, namely, ‘deeply spiritual’, with 
all its reconfiguring consequences for the ‘old Western subject–
object scheme’; of what he understood to be the millennia-old 
permanence of their institutions; of what he considered to be the 
absolute homogeneity of their collectivity, are not what he 
actually found in the streets of Tehran. He found the 
epistemological conditions for those perceptions already in 
Nietzsche and in his brief encounter with Islam during his two-
year lecture tour in Tunisia.
Whether it was unconscious or not, stated Almond (2007:41), 
the Islamic Orient that Foucault found in Iran reflected the same 
unique Orientalism we find in Nietzsche’s Der Antichrist and 
Geneaologie der Moral, the same decisive rejection of modernity, 
‘the same association with Greeks and Romans’. Almond in the 
process does not acknowledge Foucault’s ‘self-consciousness’, 
his uncertainty and vagueness, which is crucial. His analysis of 
Foucault’s Occident is formidable; however, also this commentator 
goes too far, taking Foucault where he would not want to be. The 
implicit assertion that Foucault was not self-conscious and 
therefore not self-critical enough, that he was unaware of his 
silent Orient, of his own prejudices, of his indebtedness to 
Nietzsche with regard to the Islamic Other, is off the mark. The 
tense, uncertain tone of Foucault’s Iran writings and interviews 
does not substantiate this claim. That is why the notion of 
Foucault in Iran being a self-conscious ‘Greek in Persia’ is stressed 
so repeatedly in this work.
One would be able to isolate some thematic parallels between 
Almond’s analysis and Eric Paras’ equally intriguing ‘Foucault 2.0’ 
contra-standardised reception, with specific regard to the later 
Foucault’s notion of subjectivity, which undoubtedly – and 
consciously – rehabilitated pertinent Oriental sentiments, 
especially in the first two volumes of The History of Sexuality. 
Paras approaches Foucault not from his standardised texts and 
famous publications, but from his less well-known published 
lectures at Collège de France during the last decade of his life, 
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setting a mature Foucault within the broader context of French 
and Western intellectual history.
Almond did not investigate Foucault’s two Iranian expeditions 
as such: he concentrated on the division between the Occident 
and Orient in Foucault’s thought and the way it predisposed him 
to view the events in Iran from a Nietzschean, modern-critical 
angle. Yet, it must be emphasised that Foucault was critically 
aware of the fact that he had no clear philosophical objective, in 
the conventional sense, for his Iran undertaking, that he was 
vague with purpose, that he radiated uncertainty, that he was 
aware of his own limitedness – whilst Almond maintains that 
Foucault knew exactly what he was doing and simply was not 
self-critical enough.
‘Inconsistent?’
As Behrooz Ghamari-Tabrizi was writing his now leading book 
on the topic (for a solid review, see Bargu 2017:1–6), Foucault in 
Iran – Islamic Revolution after the Enlightenment (2016; for an 
initial indication of his defence of Foucault, see Ghamari-Tabrizi 
2009:270–290), many colleagues and critics asked the author, 
who himself is existentially closely linked to the Iranian revolution 
of more than four decades ago: ‘why should we care about what 
Foucault says about the Iranian Revolution?’; ‘Is he not just 
another abstruse French intellectual with the colonial habit of 
poking his nose into another peoples’ affairs?’ Tabrizi took those 
questions seriously. He envisaged his work not to be a 
commentary of Foucault’s academic opus, but rather to utilise 
Foucault’s Iran writings as ‘a perfect window through which one 
could look at the revolutionary events in Iran outside the 
discursive frames that make revolutions legible’ (Ghamari-
Tabrizi 2016:xiii). The fact that the revolution in Iran altered 
Foucault’s theory of power and subjectivity has for Tabrizi less 
to do with Foucault than with the ongoing conceptual 




Tabrizi (2016:xiii) argues that at the centre of Eurocentrism is the 
acknowledgement of hypothetical meaning to European historical 
experience – such as ‘class formation, race and gender relations, 
state and politics, life-course and ageing, power and subjectivity’. 
The universal is in this generalising sense the ‘European tangible’. In 
his Iran writings, Foucault presented significant indicators regarding 
how to understand the Iranian revolution, but precisely not as an 
example of Eurocentric theories of power, politics, and history. 
Ghamari-Tabrizi (2016:xiii) is, however, convinced that, in the end, 
Foucault ‘failed to acknowledge the theoretical significance’ or 
conjectural meaning of the Iranian revolution. According to Tabrizi, 
although Foucault presented a theory of subjectivity in his later 
writings, he never articulated that theory about its origins in the 
political spirituality of the revolutionary subjects in the streets of 
Tehran. There is thus an ‘inconsistency’ involved in Foucault’s theory 
of subjectivity presented during the late 1970s and what his Iran 
writings themselves reflect.
Tabrizi’s view is a mesmerising reception and one that deserves 
to be thoroughly explored. According to Ghamari-Tabrizi 
(2016:55–112), the paramount achievement of Foucault’s Iran 
writings lies in the way Foucault considered the subject neither as a 
result nor as a fabricator of power, but rather as an agent of 
opposition to power. Significantly for Tabrizi, Foucault evaded the 
rather common epistemic violence that indeed turned the 
revolutionary movement in Iran into a violent enterprise that 
corresponded to Euro-familiar chronological teleologies. Foucault 
was convinced that by emancipating their ‘bodies from the prison 
houses of their souls’, by marching audaciously on the Tehran streets 
in insubordination to military law, the Iranians re-invented themselves 
through a transformative action, which we have seen, Foucault 
typically called ‘political spirituality’, which is a spirituality driven 
change of subject–object relations, fashioned by multifaceted 
historical contexts and conditions, yet irreducible to it.
The crispness of Tabrizi’s reception is established therein that 
he reads the revolt of the Iranians as creating a ‘new Man’ in the 
Fanonian sense (Ghamari-Tabrizi 2016:72). This Fanonian Man 
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was motivated by a partisan rearticulation of the Shia Muslims’ 
rising against injustice, their speaking a ‘distinctive language’ 
(acquainted yet new), their inventing a new way of being with the 
Other and relating to the Self, as well as in their finding particular 
transformative powers in political modi, previously considered to 
be unmanageable and unsustainable.
Thus, from the same idealistic disposition that Frantz Fanon 
(1925–1961) assumed, namely, that via the concrete act of 
resistance the colonialised subject would expunge past suffering 
and distress, Foucault, via his distinctive notion of political 
spirituality, believed that the Iranian revolution would somehow 
reverse the Iranians’ relation with their own history, forceful as it 
once was, yet fragile and unstable as it had become in the second 
half of the 20th century. Fanon expected that the emancipated 
new Man had the ability and the historical compulsion to introduce 
a radically new opening on a blank political slate. However, as the 
Algerian experience confirmed, the past easily outlives ‘the 
revolution’, its weight flustering the present. According to Tabrizi’s 
argument, Foucault attempted to accentuate the weight of ‘living 
the revolution’, but he, like Fanon, ignored the possibility that the 
same vast revolutionary vigour could then relapse into firing up 
an oppressive, harsh and tyrannical state apparatus.
Foucault and Fanon, according to Ghamari-Tabrizi (2016:72–
75), also have in common something conceivably even more 
significant, namely, that they both had an ‘inadequate familiarity 
of the very culture that has given rise to the emancipatory battle’, 
on which both referenced. For example, in his Dying Colonialism, 
Fanon attempted to ‘reinterpret cultural practices in Algerian 
society outside their abstract, anachronistic context’. Although 
Fanon was profoundly engrossed in the Algerian conflict, he was 
not fluent in Arabic and had a remarkably restricted understanding 
of Islam and its relation to Algerian society. He however correctly 
indicated that cultural insignia are never fixed, neither in their 
meaning nor in the practical expression thereof. However, Fanon 
failed to recognise how these signs, as supple and consulted as 
they might appear, still exist in deeply entrenched, persistent 
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structures of power and control, predominantly so in gender 
relations.
Fanon, for instance, linked women’s ‘ardent love of the home’ as a 
sign of challenge to the colonial structure that has disavowed mutual 
justification of interaction between the oikos and the polis, the home 
and society at large. The Algerian woman, as Fanon asserted, in 
imposing such a constraint on herself, in choosing a mode of existence 
reduced in range, was in fact deepening her sense of confrontation, 
preparing her for revolutionary hostility. Yet, the vivacity and the 
revolutionary spirit have been kept alive by the woman mainly whilst 
‘in the home’. Women, therefore, assumed the cover of the veil to 
create a sort of ‘inverted panopticon’ against the French colonial 
officers. Fanon believed that the revolutionary war in Algeria had 
presented a displacement of the ‘old myths’ and had altered 
seemingly irrevocable gender relations in Algeria.
Of course, Fanon’s sensitivity for the revolutionary-constructive 
presence of Islam in Algeria was made possible by his profound 
participation in the revolution. However, for Fabrizi, Fanon ‘lacked 
a nuanced appreciation of the complexity and significance of 
religion in Algerian society’ (Ghamari-Tabrizi 2016:58). Similarly, 
for Tabrizi, Foucault’s view of Islam and the way the revolutionaries 
adopted it in the streets of Tehran were significantly influenced 
by the political spirituality that he indeed correctly identified as 
the guiding light of the revolution.
However, by (primarily) appraising Massignon and Corbin, 
who centralised mystical Shi’ism and Sufi transcendentalism in 
their account of the historical development of Islamic thought, 
Foucault was almost prompted to understand the revolution he 
witnessed in terms of a spiritual restoration of these very long-
standing ‘Seekers of the Truth’. Although Foucault appropriately 
highlighted the importance of ‘the hegemonic position of religion 
in giving rise to the revolutionary movement’, he failed to 
recognise ‘the deeply rooted networks and ethos of legalistic 
and doctrinal Islam that would eventually dominate the post-
revolutionary state politics’ (Ghamari-Tabrizi 2016:74). Foucault, 
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according to Tabrizi’s reading, was also too committed to 
assigning ‘Otherness’ to the Iranian revolution. As we have seen 
in the appraisal of Lazreg’s and Almond’s indicators to Foucault’s 
‘unique Orientalism’, Foucault attempted consciously not to 
evaluate the revolution through the magnifying glass of a Western 
conceptual framework, in the process ironically risked 
‘Orientalising’ it. As a consequence, according to Ghamari-Tabrizi 
(2016:74), he overlooked ‘the extent to which the revolution 
belongs to a historical situation different from, but (still) related 
to the Western context’. This worked towards what Tabrizi 
regards as an inconsistency between his texts produced in France 
in the late 1970s and his Iran writings during the same period.
Tabrizi’s findings and conclusion are supported and can be 
summarised as follows (Ghamari-Tabrizi 2016:187–192): in his writings 
on the Iranian revolution, Foucault was sensitive enough to recognise 
a ‘constitutive paradox’ of the revolutionary movement. He was 
convinced that the Iranians at once wanted to produce history, yet 
at the same time be liberated from history, thus becoming historical 
subjects without being subjected to modernist-determinist logic; 
therefore to be ‘both included in and to be able to exit from history’. 
Foucault found the exhibition of this oxymoron in the radical 
particularity he perceived in the revolutionary movement: in all its 
aspects, in its spiritual manifestation, in the more often than not 
obscurity of its positive demands, in its distinctive adamant tone, as 
well as in its unfathomable transformative ability. Foucault’s concept 
of political spirituality served this paradox and ‘immeasurable ability’ 
exceptionally well. He was convinced that the revolutionary 
movement did not have to stand down to the burdens of a universal-
teleological sense of history. He rejected any attempts to make the 
revolution easily comprehensible with relaxed indications to all 
kinds of modern binaries of the ‘premodern–modern’, the ‘secular–
religious’, the ‘reactionary–progressive’, the ‘male–female’, as well as 
the ‘subjugated–emancipated’ (Ghamari-Tabrizi 2016:187–188).
For Foucault, understanding the Iranian revolution required a 
kind of a time-chart that at once recognised the contingencies 
and variables within which the revolution was disclosed. 
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The revolution and its aftermaths appear inevitable only (Ghamari-
Tabrizi 2016):
[T ]to those who expunge those contingencies in and conceptualise 
the revolutionary movement in a historical narrative, in which the 
colonised appears as the European past and Europe shows the 
colonised its own future. (p. 188)
Foucault saw in the Iranian revolution an example and expression 
of his profoundly anti-teleological philosophy: a revolution that 
cannot be modestly appropriated into the normative ‘enlightened’ 
discourses of modernity’s views on history. What concerned (and 
indeed fascinated) Foucault in Iran was precisely the same feature 
for which his critics, such as the Broyelles, ridiculed him, namely, 
its ambiguity. For him, the revolution produced a ‘new subject’ 
with an unstipulated relation to the Self and this Self’s history. It 
was as much his captivation by death as his fascination by an 
aesthetics of violence, than the inexplicability of human behaviour 
in revolt, that spurred his Iran writings.69
Foucault abstracted the notion of political spirituality not in 
defence of the establishment of an Islamic republic, which soon 
turned out to be a violent theocracy, but in commendation of the 
transformative abilities of the revolution. The spirituality he 
observed in the streets of Tehran ‘had nothing to do with either 
doctrinal commitments to Islam or devotion to the undisputed 
leader of the revolution, Khomeini’ (Ghamari-Tabrizi 2016:189). As 
we have seen, by this spirituality, Foucault meant the acts and 
practices through which one could transform oneself into a new 
subject – indeed, a ‘subject that one could never imagine capable 
of becoming’ (Ghamari-Tabrizi 2016:190).
69. My interpretation is that Miller’s (1993:309–315) - however confrontational about it - 
reading of Foucault’s appreciation of the spontaneous eruption of resistance to established 
power, of the exploration of the contemporary disclosed limits of rationality, of the dubious 
nature of discipline, of the enigmatic voices of Otherness, of the violent confrontation with 
identity, of puzzling labyrinths and dark esoteric corners, of the entropy of madness and 
hence the mad creativity unleashed by people willing to risk death, should not necessarily be 
understood as in opposition to Tabrizi’s accent on the intrinsic appeal of the revolution itself. 
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During the last few years of his life, Foucault linked this 
spirituality to ethics and parrhesia, or fearless speech. The activist 
demonstrators in the streets of Tehran showed him the prospect 
of a transformative politics, which is one that can be practised 
outside the normative corset of the Enlightenment. The revolution 
disclosed to him that in the care of the Self, rather than Self-
absorption, the ethical subject executes a certain Self-creation 
and is willing to sacrifice for it. The violent aftermath of the 
revolution that gave rise to the amalgamation of power structures 
by the clergy and the subsequent reign of terror should not 
relativise the worth and consequence of Foucault’s endorsement 
of the revolution. That is why, in response to his critics, he insisted 
that how the revolution was lived must be distinguished from its 
‘success’ or its ‘failure’.
This is Tabrizi’s take on Foucault’s involvement in Iran, and the 
second half of this book is aligned to his inferences: give or take 
minor differences. However, there is by way of conclusion a final 
and extremely important contribution in Fabrizi’s work, namely, 
in the way that he spectacularly deflates two familiar hostile 
claims about Foucault’s presence and involvement in Iran 
(Ghamari-Tabrizi 2016:190–192). Firstly, Tabrizi disputes the 
widespread perception that the revolutionary initiative in Iran 
revealed its true colours by accentuating as so-called ‘internal 
tension’ between the secularist and Islamist forces, which 
eventually made it possible for the Shia clergy to ‘steal’ Iran’s 
leadership. It is unquestionably true that communists and liberal 
political organisations played a significant role in the earliest 
phases of the revolution: yet these groups never understood 
themselves as the agents of ‘secular forces’ in the revolutionary 
undertaking. A substantial majority of the involved communist 
organisations actually considered liberalism to be the main inner 
antagonist of the revolutionary movement. For example, until a 
very late point of the revolution, the liberals vigorously promoted 
the old slogan: ‘let the king reign but not govern!’. To bring the 
full progressive potential of the revolting masses to expression, 
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the communists were convinced that they first and foremost had 
to triumph over these liberal schemes to ‘save the monarch’.
For the entire period of the revolutionary movement from 
January 1978 to at least April 1979, the Iranian left-wing remained 
firmly on the side of the anti-Shah and anti-imperialist extremism, 
the undisputable leader of which was Khomeini. Both in theory 
and practice, only in a teleological perspective on history was a 
binary opposition between ‘seculars’ and ‘Islamists’ amongst 
these revolutionaries therefore possible. Political goals were 
nevertheless not expressed in those terms and seculars were thus 
considered only those who did resist the revolution. 
Consequentially, safeguarding secularism politically in the period 
from January 1978 to February 1979, effectively meant ‘supporting 
the Shah’. During the same period, there were commentators 
outside Iran who warned about the now definite religious 
character of the revolution. Yet, Foucault attempted to remain 
alert to the revolutionary vocabularies inside Iran, with all its 
obscurities, rather than projecting a ‘normative European 
discourse of revolution’ back onto the Iranian revolt.
The tension between what a proper revolution ‘should be’ and 
the street bound realities of the Iranian experience also moulded 
the depictions of gender politics after the revolution. As Tabrizi 
effectively illustrates, the March 1979 demonstrations in Tehran 
against the compulsory donning of the veil mirrored a clear split 
between the way Iranian women who themselves partook in these 
demonstrations understood their predicament and the way Western 
feminists (like the exiled ‘Atoussa H’; cf. ‘Foucault and “Atoussa H”’ 
in ch. 7) justified their intervention on behalf of their Iranian 
counterparts. This is truly an important contribution of Tabrizi’s 
work: he shows that Western feminists’ understanding of the female 
predicament in and after the revolution was more often than not 
misguided, if not pedantic. A  good example is the conventions 
French and American feminists held in Tehran and Paris to ‘save’ 
Iranian women, with whom they quite obviously had neither a 
natural nor a thorough theoretical connection. They stood in 
support of their Iranian ‘sisters’, not because of or on behalf of these 
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‘sisters’, but because they stood for the universalistic demands of 
feminism and emancipation, as embedded in Western modern 
liberation discourse. This is the reason why Foucault did not support 
the ‘feminist cause’. Actually, in every single instance in his Iran 
writings, Foucault purposely privileged the particularity of the 
Iranian voices over the pedantic, ‘all-inclusive’ spheres of universality 
and the undiscerning teleological vocabulary of the Western 
modernistic understanding of progress.
Tabrizi’s (2016:191–192) second devaluation of typical Western 
claims about the Iran revolution is set up in his critical and detailed 
interrogation of the common contention that the Islamic reign of 
terror after February 1979 was the unavoidable outcome of the 
revolution and the so-called ‘expected development of Islamism’. 
Without exception, those who attacked Foucault so passionately 
from 1978 to even still in 1980 understood Islamism as a political 
movement for ‘the realisation of an essentialised Islam without 
significant distinction in its application in Iran or Saudi Arabia’. 
They castigated and rebuked Foucault for his ‘failure’ to distance 
himself from this ‘archaic fascism, and they linked this failure to 
Foucault’s critical view of the Enlightenment rationality’ (Ghamari-
Tabrizi 2016:191).
In terms of Tabrizi’s analysis however, as a political ideology, 
Islamism has always been ‘informed by the contingencies of time 
and place and has reflected particular historical trajectories of its 
emergence’. For instance, Tabrizi coherently argues throughout 
the course of his book (but especially in pp. 19–54) that even 
Khomeini considered distinctive political theologies in diverse 
periods in his life: for example, at one stage Khomeini promoted 
orthodox Shia political quietism and defended the monarchical 
order against chaos and unruliness; at another stage, toward the 
end of his life, Khomeini accepted the codes of anti-monarchism, 
republicanism and democratic politics. At one stage he was very 
negative about women’s involvement in unrestricted community 
life; at another stage, he held that precisely without women’s 
participation and concrete involvement, the revolution would fail. 
Therefore, Tabrizi commendably reproaches those dull observers 
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of the revolution who treated Khomeini as an inert, fixed monolith, 
and not as an evolving, fluctuating subject. This is another 
remarkable contribution by Tabrizi, not to be found in any of the 
earlier commentaries on Foucault’s involvement in Iran.
Indeed, Foucault himself was such an evolving, fluctuating 
subject, like Khomeini and all the other participants in the revolution, 
one of many subjects whose subjectivity was changed by the revolt. 
That is why Foucault never had any intention to become a ‘penitent 
liberal’, as so many have argued he should become, ‘confessing his 
mistake’. Foucault recognised anew the value of and committed 
himself to his notion of political spirituality, the possibility of a new 
form of subjectivity and a new sense of political virtue in exploits of 
subject–object transformations. Revolutions at the margins, as 
in  Iran, have always presented what Tabrizi calls a ‘double 
consciousness’, namely, an intent to claim the relevant universals 
and simultaneously an aspiration to proclaim their particularity. It is 
in this minimalistic particularity of the revolutionaries in Iran where 
Tabrizi positions Foucault’s fervour in the last years of his life, about 
the ‘care of the Self’ and an ‘ethics of Selfhood’.
However – and this is where Tabrizi draws the line – Foucault 
was not consistent in the translation of his own theoretical 
positions in the late 1970s to the streets of Tehran – and vice 
versa, and specifically so (Ghamari-Tabrizi 2016):
Like Hegel before him, who never acknowledged the real slaves and 
the real masters in the struggle for freedom in world history, Foucault 
remained silent about the origins of his newfound interest in ethics and 
the hermeneutics of the Self. His silence gave rise to a commonplace 
assertion that the critic par excellence of modern governmentality saw 
its prudence before the end of his life. (pp. 191–192)
This is at the heart of what Tabrizi’s isolates as, what can be called 
on the basis of his reading, an ‘inconsistent’ Foucault.70 In terms 
of his analysis, Foucault’s Iran writings are quite certainly not to 
70. Except for one reference (Ghamari-Tabrizi 2016:166) which itself has to be read in context, 
Tabrizi does not use the term outright to depict Foucault’s ‘inconsistency’, but his whole 
reception points towards it.
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be valued as brochures for understanding Islamism. Foucault 
might have been fascinated by the aesthetics of the revolution or 
its death rituals, but what motivated his writing, as far as Tabrizi 
is concerned, was Foucault’s conviction that rationality in its 
Enlightenment guise ‘has not closed the gate of unknown 
possibilities for human societies’. Of course, such a conviction is 
upsetting, precarious and hazardous, as the carnages committed 
by the Islamic republic confirm. Nevertheless, how a history of 
the present discloses itself and what the future holds ‘must not 
remain in the prison-house of the past, be it in the instrumental 
rationality of the Enlightenment or other kinds of fundamentalisms, 
religious or otherwise’ (Ghamari-Tabrizi 2016:192).
As has been denied that Foucault was in any way ‘seduced’ 
by Islamism (see ‘Seduced?’ in ch. 8) yet acknowledged that 
he was ‘Orientalist’, but in a very unique Nietzschean sense 
(see ‘Orientalist?’ in ch. 8), the basis of the outcome of Tabrizi’s 
investigation is supported, in that Foucault was indeed 
‘inconsistent’ to a partial degree, in the sense that his theoretical 
work from the period was not reflected clearly enough in his 
Iran writings, and that his Iran writings did not find their way 
adequately back to his last works on the care of the Self. 
However, the most recent reconsiderations on Foucault’s 
predicament in Iran, in the gripping edition of Iran Namag 
(2018:3/2), shed light on all these three deliberations – and 
more.71
71. Sections ‘Seduced?’ and ‘Orientalist?’ of Chapter 8 represent a substantial reworking, with 
permission from the publisher, from Beukes (2009b:116–122) regarding the author’s reception 
of the works of Afary and Anderson (2005) and Postel (2006), whilst Almond’s (2007) 
Nietzschean reading was maintained as it was initially presented (Beukes 2009b:120–122). 
Beukes (2009b) was published under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International 
(CC BY 4.0) licence, according to which permission was granted for reworking.
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What was there to 
liberate in Iran?
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What was there to liberate in Iran
At the heart of this chapter is the unavoidable question, after the 
fact: what was there to liberate in Iran (and what is there to 
liberate elsewhere)? This question obviously cuts to the critique 
of Foucault’s notion of freedom (cf. Prozorov 2007:25). To speak 
of ‘Foucault’s notion of freedom’ may appear contentious: his 
work is after all often read as refuting the mere prospect of self-
determination, ‘both empirically in its theory of the “carceral 
society”’ (Prozorov 2007:25; cf. Foucault 1977b:165–198) and 
theoretically in its foreboding of the death of that peculiar 
creature called ‘man’, for whom freedom is presumably important. 
Likewise, Foucault’s discourse on sexuality persuasively scorns 
emancipatory positions linked to ‘sexual liberation’ as complicit 
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in the approaches to power they condemn and emphasises how 
‘liberation’ actually functions as ‘the seductive promise of the 
rationalities of government’ (Prozorov 2007:25): ‘[t]he irony of 
this deployment of sexuality is in having us believe that our 
“liberation” is in the balance’ (Foucault 1976:159).
Foucault’s philosophical approach is penetratingly critical of 
those conventions that are usually held to be prerequisites for any 
significant idea of freedom, undermining in the process both the 
essentialist notion of a knowing, acting and free subject and the 
teleological visualisation of the enlightened emancipation of 
humanity. Foucault treats this modern assertion of freedom with a 
vigorous amount of distrust. That is why Foucault’s approach to 
freedom is often misunderstood as a rather limited project, only 
‘exposing the falsity of existing freedoms and designs for liberation, 
but incapable of advancing its own affirmation of freedom’ 
(Prozorov 2007:26). However, this chapter presents two theses 
that confirm that there is a certain kind of freedom at work in 
Foucault’s mind, which requires neither a concept of the anterior 
subject nor a teleology of liberation. Very recent contributions in 
an exceptional gift to the Foucault scholarship are employed, 
namely, from a special issue in the respected quarterly for Iranian 
Studies, Iran Namag (03 February 2018), dedicated (for the best 
part of it) to the question of Foucault in Iran, as edited by Mohamad 
Tavakoli and Behrooz Ghamari-Tabrizi. These contributions 
concentrate on Foucault and Neoliberalism, his relation to French 
secular thought and his understanding of the role of the intellectual 
in the quest for freedom.
Foucault and Neoliberalism
Michiel Leezenberg, the Amsterdam scholar who de facto introduced 
the philosophical significance of Foucault’s involvement in the 
Iranian revolution more than two decades ago with his crucial 
and  timely analysis of Foucault’s understanding of political 
spirituality (Leezenberg [1998] 2004) was again at the forefront 
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of  contemporary scholarship with his article, ‘Foucault and Iran 
reconsidered: Revolt, religion and Neoliberalism’.72 Leezenberg 
started by investigating Foucault’s understanding of the concept of 
revolution, which differs significantly from the Marxist consideration 
thereof. Actually, as Ghamari-Tabrizi (2016:68–72) noted, one of 
Foucault’s key objectives in his Iran writings was a critique of the 
Marxist version of revolt, supposedly pushed forward by class 
oppositions (Leezenberg 2018:9). Leezenberg points out that the 
stronghold of Marxism on the French Left during the 1970s should 
never be understated: the unyielding contra-Marxist character of 
Foucault’s Iran writings, especially when they are read together with 
his lectures on Neoliberalism, is undoubtedly what then annoyed 
and still angers his modernist and secularist readers orientated 
towards the left – precisely leftists like Afary and Anderson (2005).73
Foucault’s rejection of Marxist politics does however not mean 
that he overruled emancipatory revolutionary politics altogether: 
what he did was to interrogate the applicability of a specific (and 
historically and geographically explicit) notion of revolution 
(Leezenberg 2018:9; cf. Foucault 1994:759). That is why Foucault 
accentuated the problems in describing religiously enthused 
revolts, such as in Iran, as ‘revolutions’ in the Western-historical 
sense of the word, which include notions of, for example, class 
oppositions and vanguards (Leezenberg 2018:9; cf. Foucault 
1994:745). Qualifying the Iranian event rather as a ‘theatrical 
event’ than a revolution in the modernist sense of the word, and 
as a communal ceremony analogous to the enactment of a Greek 
tragedy, Foucault argued that the Iranian event did not present a 
72. Leezenberg (2018:4–28). The author is in this eminent Foucault-scholar’s debt for the 
time he set aside for an extensive interview at his office at the Department of Philosophy, 
Faculty of Humanities, University of Amsterdam, on 21 May 2019.
73. Leezenberg (2018:6–9) is vehemently critical of what he considers Afary and Anderson’s 
reading of Foucault to be reductionist, echoing several of Ghamari-Tabrizi’s (2016:75–112) 
reserves about their reception and interpretation of Foucault’s involvement in Iran. 
Leezenberg (2018:9) depicts the editorial work of Zamora and Behrent (2015) as in the same 
reductionist vein as that of Afary and Anderson.
What was there to liberate in Iran?
160
class struggle as the key component of either its terminology or 
its outcome: religiously inspired revolts like the one in Iran are not 
instigated by economic pressures, but have a ‘pure political 
character’ and are inspired by a religion that has pertinent 
immanent ideals and strives towards a radical change, if not 
‘correction’, of the world (Leezenberg 2018:10; cf. Foucault 
1994:748).
As we have seen, in his Iran writings, Foucault consistently 
advocated that the revolt in Iran was branded by precisely the 
non-existence of class oppositions and a vanguard initiative of 
some kind. The uprising in Iran brought together all socio-
economic layers of Iranian society, in a combined act of sheer will 
and a unified determination, namely, for the Shah to abdicate. 
This collective will according to Foucault represented a revolt 
‘against politics’ as such, rather than advancing a definite party-
political agenda. That is why the revolution was for him the ‘most 
modern and the maddest revolt’ because it was at once directed 
against both liberalism and socialism. Furthermore, the revolution 
was led against both liberal and socialist forms of governments’ 
imposing a secularised, modernist subjectivity on its populaces 
(Leezenberg 2018:10; cf. Foucault 1994:716).
Foucault’s robust accent on the unifying character of the will 
he witnessed on the streets of Tehran, did not implicitly argue for 
an underestimation of political, ethnic and sectarian differences 
in Iran (or elsewhere): instead, this emphasis was a contra-Marxist 
attempt to indicate that the Iranian revolts were not the result of 
class antagonisms or produced by a ‘Leninist vanguard’ 
(Leezenberg 2018:10) of some kind. Leezenberg’s erudition in 
Persian history and literature is thoroughly underscored in his 
clarification of this contra-Marxist objective, namely, that Foucault 
was indeed correct in his calling to attention the unique, 
temporary but decisive alliance between the mostazafin [the 
oppressed] and the bazaris [urban merchants]. Leezenberg 
(2018:10) takes Foucault’s corresponding suggestion into definite 
account, namely, that on the grounds of this unique alliance, Islam 
might become a revolutionary force elsewhere in the world, 
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wherever this temporal coalition could be sustained. This would 
mean that, for example, Palestinian resistance could far simpler 
be rallied based on this (sort of) alliance, than had it been reliant 
on Marxist–Leninist rhetoric.
As much as Foucault resisted the marker of him being ‘a 
prophet’ of some kind, there was indeed something ‘prophetic’ 
about his intuition in this regard. After the fall of the Berlin Wall 
in 1989 and the accompanying disintegration of the East Block, 
new arrangements of rebellious Islamism indeed substituted 
communism as a vibrant contra-liberal (and anew, an anti-West) 
political discourse. Yet, Foucault was indeed not a prophet: as he 
could not have foreseen the atrocities caused in the name of the 
Islamic Republic in Iran after 01 February 1979, he did not and 
could not have expected that this newly lobbied strength 
‘Islamism’, in whatever theological or otherwise sectarian 
appearance, Sunni or Shia, would eventually copy several Marxist–
Leninist ideological elements in its ferocious self-arrangement, 
thereby becoming one of most violent political forces to manifest 
itself in the 21st century.
According to Leezenberg (2018:11), Foucault’s resistance to a 
Marxist understanding of the revolution in Iran should however 
be interpreted in the broader framework of his theoretical work 
at the time, notably his lectures on Neoliberalism, which he was 
preparing and had already started lecturing at the Collège de 
France at the time of his visits and writings on Iran in the second 
half of 1978.74 Foucault was as much captivated by neoliberal 
technologies of government as he was by the events in Iran: in 
both aspects, he noticed prospects for transcending existing 
arrangements of government, such as those in socialism, social 
democracy, the European welfare state and the kind of secular 
authoritarianism in Iran before the revolution. This does not point 
74. As indicated, Tabrizi (2016:xiii, 158) is of the opinion that far too little of these lectures 
found its way back to Foucault’s Iran writings, whilst precious little of his Iran writings found 
their way back to his theoretical work on for example governmentality, rendering Foucault 
somewhat ‘inconsistent’, which is a conclusion that is underwritten for the best part of it.
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to some atypical utopianism in his thought and certainly does 
not imply that he was not cautious of the utopian elements in 
both Neoliberalism and Islamism (Leezenberg 2018:11).
But what is ‘Neoliberalism’, at least as Foucault understood it? 
As a point of departure, he distinguished firmly between two 
prominent varieties of the phenomenon, namely, post-1945 
German Ordoliberalism and the Chicago-variant associated with 
Milton Friedman, as manifested in the 1970s. This decade, of 
course, brought about its own challenges and crises, especially 
concerning the development of a so-called ‘post-industrial’ 
society, which transformed the Marxist category of the working 
class and therefore saw the end of Keynesianism. Ronald Reagan 
and Margaret Thatcher’s radical neoliberal reform policies 
accentuated the ominous nature of these watersheds and 
Foucault took a keen interest in it. For him, the question of 
liberalism was one of ‘actuality’ – in the sense of ‘what is happening 
to us right now?’ (Foucault 1994:783) – just as ‘the protests of in 
the name of Islamic government constituted the immediate and 
concrete actuality of the Iranians’ (Leezenberg 2018:12).
Does this keen interest he took in Neoliberalism suggest that 
Foucault’s philosophical – that is, his unique modern-critical – 
vision was so obscured by his unfaltering anti-Marxism that he 
was not able to notice the gloomier edges of Neoliberalism? 
Several contributions in the editorial work by Zamora and Behrent 
(2015) conclude that it was indeed the case; arguing that Foucault 
did not merely take a keen interest in Neoliberalism, but was 
wholly supportive of it in his endeavours to find a plausible ‘other 
way’ than the Marxist ways of the French Left and the French 
Communist Party as such. Leezenberg (2018:13) indicates contra 
this marking of Foucault being ‘positively sympathetic’ to 
Neoliberalism, that Foucault at no point considered neoliberal 
manifestations of power to be ‘less disciplinary’ than liberal or 
socio-democratic types of governmentality, but instead that he 
insisted that Neoliberalism involves non-disciplinary forms of 
power, in the sense that it is not grounded in the normalisation of 
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the abnormal and the exclusion of that which cannot be 
normalised. Neoliberalism thus does involve power and process.
Foucault, therefore, saw liberalism – and Neoliberalism in 
particular – as a non-disciplinary power, in other words, as a non-
normalising, modern technology of government. His interest in 
Neoliberalism was not because he viewed it primarily as an 
economic doctrine or bourgeois ideology, but indeed as a 
technology of government (Leezenberg 2018:16). This technology 
could, as far as Foucault was concerned, be brought to light most 
effectively outside of Europe, or out of the confrontation between 
Europe and non-Europe. The ‘actuality’ of Neoliberalism is thus 
verified when measured against the non-Western world. That is 
why he was convinced that more philosophical attention must be 
given to that ‘other world’ and although the notion of ‘revolution’ 
might have been weakened considerably in the West from the 
early 1970s onwards, one should be philosophically attentive to 
(probably but not necessarily different) procedures and 
expressions of resistance outside Europe in particular. From 
within the framework of his attention to Neoliberalism, Foucault 
thus insisted on a serious mindfulness of the historical and 
geographical specificity of European conceptions of the state 
(Leezenberg 2018:17), that is, philosophically speaking, what 
eventually took him to the streets of Tehran.
In other words, the suggestion that the last decades of the 
20th century marked the ‘end of the age of revolution’, was 
rejected by Foucault in his determination that the end of the 
domination of the idea of revolution does not merely point to a 
return to specific reformist policies: the very notion of protest is 
indicative of the brutal factuality of power and always is and 
remains a struggle against the execution of power. Foucault was 
neither endorsing the idea of or desire for an Islamic government 
in his Iran writings nor was he at any stage in his lectures at the 
time ratifying Neoliberalism as a governmental regime. As 
Leezenberg (2018:17) in the remainder of his detailed examination 
specifies, Foucault’s concern was to utilise both the Iran 
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revolution and Neoliberalism as ‘innovative ways of analysing 
and criticising both’. Foucault’s investigation into Neoliberalism 
thus was not an implicit way of endorsing it, as was his Iran 
experience not a tacit way of endorsing what was taking place 
in the streets of Tehran. In his lectures on Neoliberalism, he 
attempted to open up a fresh and at the time largely uncharted 
way of criticising it as a technology of government, rather than 
merely considering it as an economic doctrine or brusque 
political ideology.
What bound Foucault’s views on Neoliberalism to his 
perspectives on the Iran revolution was his concern with ‘actuality’ 
and the present, his noted attentiveness to different forms of 
governmentality, but most importantly, his idea that modern 
interpretation of ‘revolution’ – which encapsulate the whole 
Marxist–Leninist glossary – is ‘not a universally applicable 
concept, but a historically and geographically specified 
phenomenon’ (Leezenberg 2018:18). Writing and lecturing at a 
time when both political Islam and neoliberal government were 
stepping onto the centre stage of international politics, yet still a 
decade preceding communism’s final demise, Foucault indeed 
showed a unique insight into what is ‘unprecedented in the 
present’.
In spite of all the criticisms he was subjected to in his career, 
especially so after February 1979, there is one thing Foucault 
could never be accused of: hesitancy and fear of frank speech, as 
is apparent in the tone and content of his Iran writings. Parrhesia 
was part and parcel of what this philosopher in the last stages of 
his career was about. Recently, New York philosopher Corey 
McCall (2018:46–69) investigated these trails of parrhesia, read 
through the lens of governmentality and the contemporary 
intellectual’s political attempts to interpret, critique and eventually 
contest modern technologies in Foucault’s Iran writings, 
juxtaposing his reading to Cooper’s (2014:29–58) and to some 
extent to Leezenberg’s suggestions, namely, that Foucault’s 
lectures on Neoliberalism at the time of his expeditions to Iran in 
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1978 should be read in terms of his Iran writings and even his later 
work on the care of the self.
Foucault became progressively interested in parrhesia as a 
theoretical premise well after the Iran revolution in his lectures in 
the early 1980s, although he was already working on it in the 
lecture series of 1977 to 1978, later published as Security, territory, 
population. In this course, Foucault developed the concepts of 
‘conduct’ and ‘counter-conduct’ in power relations, by which 
Foucault’s understanding of parrhesia and the general role of the 
contemporary intellectual are highlighted as well (McCall 
2018:48). Foucault portrays the intellectual as a subject whose 
actions are always already political – or political ‘before the fact’ – 
and argues that ever since the French revolution the role of the 
intellectual has always been associated with ‘prophecy’: although 
he reservedly accepted this understanding of the intellectual, he 
accentuated that the intellectual functions in terms of 
particularities and not the universal (Cooper 2014:32–33). The 
Iranian revolution provided such a ‘particularity’ in terms of 
context and geography. Although Foucault refused to ever take 
the final word on anything and these lectures themselves do not 
provide the last word or have precedence over his earlier works, 
they do provide insights into his Iran writings and his understanding 
of the role of the intellectual in the last years of his life. That is 
why Leezenberg takes them so seriously.
The significance of Leezenberg’s very recent evaluation of the 
relation between Foucault’s lectures on Neoliberalism and his 
Iran writings, both presented in 1978, is manifested in the lucidity 
of Leezenberg’s analysis: Foucault was in retrospect more 
interested in the Iranian revolt than in the Iranian revolution and 
more concerned with genuine spiritual dimensions of resistance 
than in Islamic forms of government. His persistent preoccupation 
with and criticisms of specific techniques of government, as 
established in his lectures on Neoliberalism at the time, avert any 
sense of utopianism concerning Iran’s political future – unless of 
course, one accuses Foucault of a blunt approval of or him, again, 
What was there to liberate in Iran?
166
being somehow ‘seduced’ by either Neoliberalism or Islamism. It 
is true that his lectures on Neoliberalism stayed well clear of 
polemics, yet this should not be considered an endorsement of 
Neoliberalism as such. Quite the contrary: when his views on 
Neoliberalism and Iran are considered in juxtaposition, it becomes 
clear that both insinuate that the concept of ‘revolution’ as 
backed by his leftist, specifically Marxist colleagues in France, as 
a universal given, is in fact a particularity, linked to time, place, 
history and context. As such Foucault’s Iran writings invite us to 
reflect on the truly unique character of that revolt, instead of 
‘reducing it to allegedly universal but ultimately Eurocentric, 
categories’ (Leezenberg 2018:26). The question then arises what 
precisely Foucault’s relation to the French secular thought during 
that volatile decade of the 1970s involved.
Foucault and Islamofascism
As sociologist Bryan Turner (2018:30–45) recently has 
accentuated, religion as such was either largely absent from 
20th-century French social theory or was otherwise considered 
as a riddle that would somehow be settled by history. Religious 
inclinations were furthermore considered as mere scraps of a 
past culture, which itself was increasingly problematised by the 
after-effects of the Enlightenment and French revolution. French 
Marxist sociology, for the best part of it, enthused by Louis 
Althusser’s Marxism, thus considered religion only as an ideology 
that instigated turmoil or increased docility amongst subservient 
groups.
As far as recent secular Marxist receptions of Islam in France 
are concerned, Maxine Rodinson,75 whose work has been referred 
to a number of times so far, is also considered by Turner to be the 
most prominent secular scholar of Islam (and the ‘Middle East’ in 
general) belonging to the late-20th-century generation: as critical 
75. For instance, Rodinson (1978, 1979, 2005).
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as Rodinson was about Foucault being ‘naive’ about the 
developments in Iran, he did open up new avenues for understanding 
Foucault’s involvement in the Iranian revolution by introducing the 
concept of ‘Islamofascism’, to describe the Shia revolt as resulting 
in an Islamic theocracy.76 From the framework of Islamofascism, 
Turner readdresses Foucault’s refusal to withdraw his interpretation 
of Shia radicalism (via his notion of political spirituality), in the 
process raising a more profound question about the nature of 
revolution itself: were the two revolutions in Iran in the 20th 
century, that is, the Constitutional revolution from 1906 to 1911 and 
the Shia revolution from 1978 to 1979, both historical failures? The 
sociological features of Foucault’s Iran writings raise in terms of 
Turner’s reading, an important and persistent question about the 
destructive, yet inadvertent costs involved in all forms of revolt 
(Turner 2018:35–37; cf. Turner 2013:107–109).
Like Lazreg, Turner stresses that an interpretation of Foucault’s 
Iran writings should incorporate his extremely negative relation 
with Marxism, as well as the fact that these writings really did 
annoy most scholars of the Orient in France and elsewhere at the 
time. As has been indicated frequently so far, Foucault’s relation 
with Marxism and Marxists, in general, was highly charged. This 
included Rodinson, who was an exponent of the French Orientalist 
tradition that was deeply influenced by both Marxism and 
sociology. Like many secular Jews, Rodinson, whose parents died 
in Auschwitz in 1943, joined the French Communist Party in the 
1930s but eventually turned against communism in reaction to 
the atrocities committed under Stalinism. Fervently anti-
communist, Rodinson’s sociological work was nevertheless still 
firmly grounded in Marxist sociology (Turner 2018:38–39).
There is no doubt that Foucault interpreted the Iran revolution 
as a spiritual event, yet many Western commentators almost 
76. Turner (2018:31). Note that Turner gives preference to the term ‘Shia revolution’ and not 
‘Iranian revolution’, following Nasr’s (2006) detailed explanation. In terms of the latter’s 
correspondence to the research register, it will be maintained here, whilst acknowledging 
that ‘Shia revolution’ is technically the better indicator.
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from the outset considered it to be fascist. Rodinson indeed used 
the term ‘Islamic fascism’ to describe the revolt, whilst other 
observers referred to ‘an authentic Muslim fascism’ (Onfray 
2007:24, per reference Turner 2018:39) and ‘Islamofascism’.77 
Rodinson objected vehemently that the ‘great gaps in his 
knowledge of Islamic history’ enabled Foucault to ‘transfer the 
events’ in Iran, to accept in most part ‘the semitheoretical 
suggestions of his Iranian friends’, and to extrapolate from this by 
imagining ‘an end of history that would make up for the 
disappointments in Europe and elsewhere’ (Rodinson 2005:267; 
Turner 2018:39).
Not surprisingly Rodinson contested Foucault’s notion of 
political spirituality (as the spark for the revolution) from a 
Marxist premise, stating that it ‘failed to uncover the material 
causes behind its discontent’ (Turner 2018:39). In terms of 
Rodinson’s Marxist interpretation of the event, it was clear that 
the bigoted nature of the religious elements in the revolt had 
from the outset refuted the humanist significance Foucault 
ascribed to it and by doing so, exhibited his political gullibility. 
A Marxist reading such as Rodinson’s will always stress on the 
fact that political opposition is realised materially and 
institutionally, conveyed through, for instance, working-class 
communities, trade unions and socialist political parties – and 
definitely not through religion-induced revolts. Of course, ‘[…] 
multiple cases of political spirituality have existed […] (yet) all 
came to an end very quickly’ (Rodinson 2005:271; Turner 2018:39).
Foucault, on the other hand, resisted this materialist inter 
pretation and accentuated that he considered the Iran revolution 
as an alternative to Eurocentric political categories and a 
charismatic break with history. Such a ‘charismatic break’ (Turner 
2018:42) is not inconceivable in late modernity: but the question is 
why, even if such a Derridean ‘event’ is possible, do revolutions 
77. The term was put forward by Ruthven (1990); extended by Berman (2003) and more 
intensively so by Podhoretz (2007).
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ultimately fail? As Ghamari-Tabrizi (2016:60–69) indicated, the air 
of political defeatism in France after May 1968 did play a role in 
Foucault’s perceptions of the events in Iran because in these 
events he saw the demonstration of the ‘possibility of resistance 
without participating in or perpetuating a preconceived schema of 
power’ (Ghamari-Tabrizi 2016:68; cf. Turner 2018:42).
Foucault refused to repudiate the contents of his Iran writings, 
precisely because he did not interpret the events as fascist and 
especially not as Islamofascist. He respected the authenticity of 
the Iranian revolt and the pure and simple fact that the revolting 
masses were able to force the Shah to abdicate, against all initial 
expectations. Again, as is the case in Leezenberg’s reading, once 
one understands that religion is a political force in its own right 
and ‘accepts the notion contra Marxism that religion has 
independent effects and a unique material force, Foucault’s 
interpretation of the events that produced the revolution is not 
“especially problematic”’ (Turner 2018:42). In so far Foucault was 
‘Orientalist’ in his interpretation of the events, he was so in a very 
particular and qualified sense. Indeed, that unique (Nietzschean) 
‘Orientalism’ enabled him to approach the Iranian revolution 
without the typical-French sociological baggage of secular 
Marxism.
Turner’s reading of Foucault’s involvement in the Iranian 
revolution is significant because he accentuates – from a 
sociological framework – that the criticisms of Foucault at the 
time had more to do with French academic idiosyncrasies than 
Foucault’s support ‘for a spiritual revolution in spiritless times’ 
(Foucault 1998a:221). These criticisms emerged from a culture – 
French, dominantly Marxist and explicitly modernist – that could 
not recognise the political significance of global religions.
However, these criticisms raise a far more penetrating problem 
in political philosophy, namely, on the unintended consequences 
of action (Turner 2018):
Modern Western thought does appear to embrace a metaphysical 
pathos of despair in promoting the view that the unintended 
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consequences of political action are always negative. In this pathos, 
revolutions have outcomes that are the opposite of the intentions 
of social actors. This promotes the obvious question: why are there 
no good unintended consequences? (It seems) Fortune looks 
unfavourably at protest […]. (p. 44)
So, was the French revolution itself another failed revolution in 
which the aspirations of 1789 descended into the violence of 
1793? And why had the student revolts of the late 1960s almost 
no lasting consequences, apart from the effects of violence and 
anarchy they have created? By pertinent contrast: the profoundly 
religious protests of 1978 to 1979 in Iran had removed a dictator 
through a mass movement. That is effectively why questioning 
Foucault’s endorsement of the events in Iran in 1978, is to question 
any mass movement against oppression and thus to ‘resign oneself 
to the futility of protest’ (Turner 2018:45).
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An ethics of self-discomfort
I have learned to keep silent sometimes, and also that one has to learn 
to talk, to be quiet in the proper way: that a person with backgrounds 
has to have foregrounds, be it for others, be it for oneself. For the 
foregrounds are necessary to recover from oneself, and to make it 
possible for others to live with us. (Nietzsche [1886] 1968:232)
The notions of self-interruption and self-critique, as we have seen, 
played a vital role in Foucault’s ‘radiation of uncertainty’ about the 
philosophical nature of his involvement in the Iranian revolution. It 
is precisely the notions of Foucault’s relation to the Self as ‘disturbed’, 
as ‘displaced’ and as one of ‘discomfort’ in terms of Iran, thus pointing 
towards a ‘self-conscious Greek in Persia’, which are considered here 
to be important for our ongoing discussion on ‘Foucault in Iran’ and 
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which is now presented in conclusion, by embedding it in Foucault’s 
history of sexuality and posing it against his presumed ‘mistake’, as 
the previous chapters have shown was often claimed regarding his 
involvement in Iran events in 1978 and 1979.
Perhaps, we could start this open end to our short treatise with 
a Foucaultian-like premise: what ‘we’ are to do with Enlightenment 
depends on what (we think) Enlightenment has done to ‘us’ 
(cf.  Deacon 2003:99). It also depends on how exactly do we 
understand ‘who we are’. Conventionally, ‘our’ role (that is, the role 
of people such as Foucault, the role of people making a living on 
the work of people such as Foucault as well as Foucault’s many 
readers) has been summed up in the attributes and activities 
assigned to the concept of the ‘intellectual’ (cf. Deacon 2003:99). 
As we have seen throughout this book, Foucault, his later 
development of parrhesia partially aside, was tremendously self-
critical in his use and application of the concept of ‘intellectual’.
At least, since the Enlightenment, but of course stretching as 
far back as Plato’s comments on the ‘philosopher king’ intellectuals 
and the theories they have authored, have been taken to provide 
both ‘governors’ and ‘governed’ with a range of questions such 
as ‘what is?’, ‘what do we know?’, and ‘what must we do?’ 
Foucault’s Iran expeditions did not fail in at least readdressing 
these questions and the possible answers that could be 
given  to  them. On the contrary, Foucault’s texts of this period 
indicate that he was working on ‘conceptualising modernity as a 
multivalent set of practices – some that reinforce power relations 
and some that resist them’ (McCall 2013:27). He was not turning 
towards ethics leaving the notion of power behind.
So, ‘what is?’ The distinctive hallmark of the legacy of the 
Enlightenment is its division of reality into two branches, two 
absolute and incommensurable universes, each with their own 
laws, conceived as totally discrete realities, forever divorced, 
alienated and estranged from one another: mind and matter, Self 
and world, the private and the public, the individual and the 
masses, the thinker and the thought, dream and reality, soul things 
Chapter 10
173
and worldly things, imagination and reason, West and East, subject 
and object, and Self and Other. This binary fiction of modern 
convenience has been broken down over the past decades, even if 
the de(con)structionists of modernity are themselves still very 
much ambivalent about the direction it is taking.
‘Postmodernity’, in all its awkwardness, has recognised over 
the past decades the damage caused to the Other by these 
modern polarisations. However, this postmodern recognition has 
gone no further than either merely emphasising the difference, or 
lingering in the difference, still keeping Self and Other apart, or 
otherwise completely demolishing otherness by forcing the Self 
to relinquish itself into integration with the Other. Now, in terms 
of the relation between Self and Other, there is in the wake of the 
critique of modernity, one of the three possible directions are to 
be taken: either the Other’s otherness could be acknowledged 
according to modernity’s strict polarising terms, whereby its 
otherness would be honoured whilst the Self’s sense of sameness 
would not be disturbed; or, the Other’s otherness could either be 
exalted or downplayed to such an extent that it is no longer 
possible to distinguish between Self and Other (which in the end, 
ironically, boils down to the extermination of the Other); or, and 
here, in what possibly could be described as the move after 
postmodernity, or ‘post-postmodernity’, where Foucault is to be 
found – there could be a conscious move to interrupt both the 
sense of Self and Other, by the Self hesitantly moving towards 
the Other, with all the uncertainty it entails, not knowing what it 
would bring about, keeping the tension alive, keeping both Self 
and Other in a ‘strained, painful negative-dialectical position, 
producing, even if only momentarily, flashes of insight about the 
Other as an Other Self’ (Beukes 2009b:8).
Foucault has been indeed read alongside Adorno as a ‘post-
postmodern’ thinker who (Beukes 1996:246–249; 2009b):
[W ]as willing to recognise Sameness in the Self-posed Other, who, 
when gazing ‘East’, saw not only difference but sameness, who was 
consciously willing to dwell over into the strained domain of the 
Other by severely compromising his acute sense of Self. (p. 10)
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Along the very same lines, it could be argued that Foucault’s 
critique of the (modern) events in Iran was by no means 
triumphant or sure of itself. His Iran writings form a robust 
awareness of loss, of a decadence which (now) must be fought, 
of a world in a state of collapse and of a still undefined future. 
Foucault trod the streets of Tehran as a self-conscious Greek in 
Persia, upholding a sense of necessity of the downfall of modern 
Western telos, which seemed to him almost like fate. Nietzsche’s 
scorn for modern ideas made a profound impression on him – 
what Nietzsche ([1886] 1968) said about his own critique of 
modernity in Beyond Good and Evil, still rang true for Foucault’s 
project in Iran:
[M]y book is a criticism of modernity, yet painfully it embraces the 
modern sciences, arts, even politics, together with possible indications 
that we are to reverse the fate of modern man [...]. (p. 225)
‘What do we know?’ It has been indicated that Foucault, during 
the last decade of his life, became progressively hesitant about a 
clear and specific philosophical inquiry into the strained dynamics 
of the relation between Self and Other. The main argument of 
Foucault’s last fully completed and independent works, the 
second and third volumes of his series of The History of Sexuality, 
was that the leading exponents of ‘sexual liberation’ in the West 
could be as grandiose, oppressive and self-deceiving as the 
repressive Medieval and Victorian puritans they took pride in 
defying. The ideas of these self-appointed liberators could, as 
Foucault noted, be traced to the Freudian Marxism of Wilhelm 
Reich and Herbert Marcuse, but he regarded them as part of a far 
more significant problem, namely the ‘problem of the West’ itself.
Speaking in the ‘high’ Orient of Tokyo in April 1978, just before 
he went to the ‘low’ Orient of Iran in September 1978, Foucault 
(cited in Rée 2005) went so far as to suggest that the pretentious, 
false incantations of sexual liberation could be heard throughout 
the entire history of the West:
‘We Europeans’, Foucault said, then hastily correcting himself, ‘We 
Others’ – have been engaged for millennia in a quixotic adventure 
unparalleled in the rest of the world, namely an earnest quest for the 
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truth about ourselves in the form of the truth about our sexuality. 
Throughout the 20th century, moreover, we European Others have 
been regaling ourselves with a tale about how Freud eventually 
exploded the age-old hypocrisies, allowing sexuality to be released 
from its fetters at last: First, there was Greek and Roman antiquity, 
where sexuality was free and capable of expressing itself without 
hindrance; next, there was Christianity, which – for the first time in the 
history of the West – imposed a great prohibition on sexuality, saying 
no to pleasure and sex. But then, beginning in the 16th century, the 
bourgeoisie found itself in a situation [...] of economic domination 
and cultural hegemony; it took over the Christian rejection of 
sexuality and made it its own, enforcing it with unprecedented rigour 
and severity, and perpetuating it into the 19th century, until at last the 
veil began to be lifted by Freud. (p. 46)
To avoid misunderstandings with his Japanese audience, Foucault 
meticulously articulated his opinion that the Freudian-Marxist 
epic of sexual liberation was ‘misleading and untenable [...] for 
hundreds of reasons’ (Rée 2005:46).
However, in The History of Sexuality itself, Foucault presented 
his readers with a compilation of somewhat awkward case 
studies, ranging from the ars erotic practices of ancient cultures 
to lengthy elaborations on his views on perversity, leaving his 
readers to draw their own conclusions. His aim, and on that he 
was unequivocal and explicit (Foucault 1999:110–114), was not to 
replace old certainties with new ones but merely to aid his readers 
to formulate some uncertainties of their own, and then as radiantly 
tentative as possible. When Foucault’s Japanese hosts thanked 
him for the clarity of his exposition, he returned the compliment 
gracefully: ‘[o]bscurity is unforgivable; indeed it is a form of 
despotism’ (Foucault, in Rée 2005:46).
However, he immediately stated, he had to admit that his own 
elucidations sometimes had the effect of cafouillage, of messing 
things up and leaving them more confused than ever. But at least 
he could never be accused of false or factitious clarity. Foucault 
never emulated the kind of modernist Freudianism that 
confidently discovers ‘vast unconscious realities’ behind the 
smokescreen of false consciousness in which the rest of 
Westerners live their lives – nor did he long for the Marxist self-
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assurance that ridicules a problematic political present in the 
light of a glorious future that has not yet dawned on anybody 
else outside the scope of a little circle in Europe. Foucault’s mind 
was too expansive for that: he was never going to commit to a 
priori separations between those who ‘know’ and those who ‘do 
not know’. The mature Foucault of Eric Paras’ Collège de France 
reception, for example, moved beyond those simplistic divisions 
and simply wanted to manifest uncertainty (Paras 2006:57–58).
Uncertainty is freedom, and the highest freedom is the 
freedom that allows ‘us moderns’ to be uncertain. Foucault, 
through his political–spiritual understanding of the modern world 
as a world without spirit, offered along this line a cross-cultural 
normative perspective in Iran during the events of 1978. So, what 
did Foucault know? He knew that ‘we Western Others’ have to 
change our concepts of Self and Other to make sense of the 
culturally pluralist world ‘we’ find ourselves in.
‘What must we do?’ Foucault’s hesitance about critical matters 
in Iran in 1978 and 1979 was, therefore, not a careless negation of 
intellectual responsibility, but rather a principled avoidance of 
the arrogance of those who claim to speak with authority on 
matters ‘we Western Others’ should rather be silent about. Like 
Nietzsche before him, Foucault, towards the end of his life, 
learned to be quiet sometimes so that he could learn to talk, to 
be silent in the right way, to recover from himself and to make it 
possible for others to live with him. That was Foucault’s ‘mistake’ 
in Iran: he dared to cross over, he dared to speak when others 
were silent, he dared to be silent when others were speaking, he 
dared to be hesitant and unclear when Western liberal 
commentators thought they could clearly and fluently articulate 
the problematic events in Iran. Foucault dared not speak – neither 
the trusted old binary language of modernity nor the pretentious, 
all-abiding, all-inclusive tongue of its postmodernist counterpart.78
78. Section ’An ethics of self-discomfort’ of Chapter 10 represents a substantial reworking of 
Beukes (2009b:10–11). This article was published under the Creative Commons Attribution 
4.0 International (CC BY 4.0) licence, according to which permission is granted for reworking.
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Perhaps then, the humbling lesson to be learned from 
Foucault’s problematic expedition to Iran in 1978 could be that 
‘intellectuals’ have to be silent sometimes, to learn to speak. And 
when they speak, they should do so cautiously, consistently 
interrupting themselves. More globally, the West has to learn 
anew to embrace understatement when faced with its Other. Our 
world would be a singularly different place if there was more 
hesitation in the Self’s relation to the Other, more uncertainty in 
the West’s dealing or rather reckoning with the ‘East’, if there was 
a greater sense of self-interruption of its Occident certainties, if 
self-discomfort could become a trait of its panoptic gaze on its 
Orient Other.
Foucault in Iran: Ten tentative 
answers
The modest hypothesis of this book, as mentioned in the 
Introduction, is that Foucault did not make a mistake by going 
to Iran in 1978, clearly supporting and willingly interpreting the 
unfolding revolution – yet only as long as this hypothesis is 
tested from Foucault’s own theoretical framework; and that he 
did not make any mistakes whilst being in Iran, as long as that 
framework (especially regarding his philosophical understanding 
of political spirituality and Otherness, the ‘Other as Self’) is kept 
in mind. In the last part of the Introduction, 10 direct questions 
were presented, by which the validity of this hypothesis could 
now be addressed in terms of offering 10 uncomplicated, 
tentative and open-ended answers to those straightforward 
questions posed.
Did Foucault explicitly support the cause 
of the revolting masses in Iran in 1978 on 
modern-critical grounds?
At the centre of all considerations, Foucault did explicitly 
support the cause of the revolting masses in Iran in 1978, on 
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relatable philosophical grounds. It has been shown convincingly 
that Foucault viewed the events, already in the early stages of 
the Iran revolution, as inherently modern-critical, and very 
perceptively so. He resolutely held the opinion that these 
events could broaden and support the ongoing critique of 
modernity in Europe itself. He, as a result of this, went entirely 
against the grain of the conventional European perspective on 
and reception of the revolution which considered it to be 
regressive and a free-fall back into pre-modernity. The majority 
of Foucault’s reports for Corriere Della Sera in 1978, of which 
many paragraphs have been cited and discussed in the 
preceding chapters, are quite obviously closely related to his 
general theoretical writings on the discourses of power, 
political spirituality, Otherness as well as the inherent risks of 
modernity. It is clear that these writings were stylistically 
unique – they indeed were not philosophical essays; however, 
by their decisive modern-critical claims, they were philosophical 
contributions to his oeuvre, in particular, and his critique of the 
project of modernity, in general. At no stage was Foucault 
‘seduced’ by Islamism or any other ‘Oriental’ ideology – contra 
interpretations which reduce Foucault’s involvement in Japan 
in the first half of 1978 and Iran in the second half of 1978 to 
precisely that. Furthermore, Foucault did espouse a unique 
kind of Orientalism in his Iran writings, but this Orientalism was 
deliberate – and could certainly not be regarded as a pedantic 
gaze from a prolific Occident on an inferior Orient. Lastly, it is 
true that Foucault was not consistent enough in cross-
referencing from his theoretical work in France at the time to 
the events in Iran, and vice versa. The theoretical tenets of his 
Iran writings did not sufficiently find their way back to 
his lectures and publications after February 1979. But why was 
Foucault under any obligation to do it, in any case? To satisfy 
the many modernist methodologists of philosophy, who 
understand philosophy but not how philosophy works? Indeed, 
for Foucault, philosophy functions as a present history and as 




Did Foucault foresee Khomeini’s 
understanding and implementation of 
what an ‘Islamic Republic’ would be, and 
did he at any point in his career endorse 
that understanding and application, even 
implicitly?
It has been argued extensively that Foucault did not and could 
not foresee the character of the eventualised 1979 Islamic republic 
nor did he endorse Khomeini’s understanding and application of 
what that ‘Islamic republic’ would be. What Foucault understood 
to be an Islamic government corresponded with what he got to 
know as the ‘Iranian dream’, which was tightly knit with his 
understanding of Shia Islam’s non-hierarchical nature and his 
perspective on Khomeini as a non-political figure in the modern 
sense. He was convinced that the new dispensation would be 
anti-hierarchical along the lines of horizontal clergy organisation 
in Shia Islam. In hindsight, this conviction was possibly naive, as 
many of his critics at the time held, but naïveté surely does not 
amount to ‘folly’ or a ‘gigantic mistake?’
Was Foucault justifiably being held 
accountable by his critics in France for a 
naive perspective on the vicious potential 
embedded in any religious fundamentalism?
It has been indicated over the course of nine chapters, as unbiased 
and balanced as possible, that Foucault was ferociously held 
accountable by his critics in France for what they considered a 
misdirected interpretation of the vicious potentiality embedded in 
any religious fundamentalism, on what they considered reasonable 
and justifiable grounds. This is an undeniable fact: Foucault indeed 
misread the developments from February 1979 onwards and did 
not foresee the bloodshed that would follow. Yet, how could he 
have predicted it? He was a philosopher after all, and not a prophet. 
There is no other responsible way than to acknowledge that 
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Foucault misjudged what was to follow after November 1978, but 
it is neither reasonable nor responsible to accuse Foucault of 
‘endorsing Khomeini’ and ‘championing Khomeini’s version’ of an 
Islamic republic. Whilst Foucault’s Iran writings clearly point 
towards his unreserved endorsement of the revolution (yet 
endorsing rather the ‘act of revolt’ rather than the actual revolution 
itself), these texts do not support the notion of Foucault advocating 
Khomeini as a ‘politician’– nor did he at any point of what was left 
of his career explicitly or implicitly ratify Khomeini’s bloodthirsty 
regime; quite the opposite.
Did Foucault have clear objectives for 
his journalistic expedition to Iran, and 
if he did not, then why should that be a 
problem philosophically?
Foucault quite evidently had no definite or particular objectives for 
his expedition to Iran. In fact, he was to an extent unsure of what to 
make of the opportunity and eventually opted to use the events as 
an opportunity to write a history of the present, as history-as-it-
unfolds. He was critically aware of the fact that he had no clear 
philosophical objective, in the conventional sense. Philosophically, 
he was out of place and uncomfortable. However, his uncertainty 
should be interpreted as essentially productive in a context where 
hesitation in the Self’s relation to the Other is the hermeneutic key – 
and not ‘certainty’ nor ‘confidence’. Foucault was conscious about 
the fact that ‘he did not understand’ and was self-conscious enough 
not to consider that ‘uncertainty’ a philosophical deficiency. To be 
uncertain is a philosophical virtue and not a vice.
Did Foucault appreciate the unfolding of 
revolution in Iran on strictly philosophical 
grounds?
Indeed – as has been shown consistently, Foucault appreciated, 
on an austerely philosophical level, the spontaneous eruption of 
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resistance to established power and the way the dissemination of 
information assisted momentum of the Iran revolution.
Was Foucault primarily fascinated by the 
violent confrontation with identity he had 
witnessed in Iran?
Undeniably so – Foucault was spellbound by the fierce opposition 
to identity he observed in the streets of Tehran, and the irrationality 
unleashed by people willing to risk death for something the 
outcome of which they themselves did not yet understand. 
Although that was not the only factor contributing to his captivation 
by the events, it could possibly be isolated as the primary factor.
Was Foucault intrigued by the possibility 
of a political alternative posed by the 
Iranian revolution?
It has been argued in the previous chapters that Foucault was 
profoundly enthralled by the prospect of a political alternative, the 
possibility of an event that was completely other to liberal 
democracy. He was titillated by the nature of the political spirituality 
that he was convinced was sustaining this alternative – that the 
revolution designated for him a radically new set of subject–object 
relations to be formed, precisely from within a modernised context.
Did Foucault compromise his 
philosophical position and reputation by 
not engaging in the legitimate critique of 
subjects who were systematically crushed 
as the revolution unfolded?
Yes, he unfortunately did compromise his reputation in this 
regard: Foucault, by initially furthering what he considered to be 
the fundamental cause and objective of the revolution –‘getting 
rid of what was modern in Iran’ – and in his belief that secularists 
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would not be marginalised in the new dispensation, compromised 
his philosophical position by not engaging the appropriate 
criticism of people who were methodically destroyed as the 
revolution unfolded: women, ‘homosexuals’ and political 
dissidents (meaning, steadfast secular Iranians), in particular. Yet 
again, does ‘compromise’ amount to a ‘gigantic mistake, similar 
to Heidegger’s flirtation with National Socialism’, ‘an error to be 
confessed’ or ‘a farcical self-absorption?’ Of course, not.
Did Foucault underestimate the hostility 
with which his reports would be received?
Yes, and he was taken aback by it: Foucault quite strikingly 
misjudged the antagonism with which his Iran writings were 
received, back in France, in particular – initially not reacting to his 
critics at all, then being entirely defensive, eventually withdrawing 
altogether from the circle of interpretation. In this sense, Foucault 
made any later answers to his decriers very vulnerable.
Did Foucault’s decision to go to Iran 
and report on the revolution in the end 
harm his reputation as being the leading 
intellectual in France and a world-
renowned philosopher at the time?
That is unfortunately the case: maintaining the grunt of this 
book’s hypothesis that Foucault going to Iran was not a mistake 
and nothing in his writings from the period point to a ‘mistake’, it 
must be conceded that his unwillingness to address legitimate 
points of concern did, in the end, undermine not only his 
reputation but his well-being. Foucault’s reporting expedition, 
unfortunately, did injure his standing as possibly the most eminent 
philosopher in Europe in the 1970s and sequestered him, to a 
considerable extent, from the European scholarly civic and the 
Western liberal tradition, where he was previously venerated. 
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It scarred him on a personal level, as confirmed by the miserable 
eulogies at his funeral (cf. Eribon 1992:289; Macey 2004:128).
The spirit of a world without spirit
These answers are, of course, preliminary and have only the 
intention to stimulate ongoing discussion on what has in the 
opening chapters been referred to as ‘an open nerve in Foucault 
scholarship’. They nevertheless reflect the author’s attempts to 
rework the most recent attempts in the scholarship to make 
sense of it all. However, it would be preposterous to ‘answer on 
behalf of Foucault’, as much as he considered himself ‘speaking 
on behalf of Others’ and being a ‘prophet of some kind’, to be 
extremely problematic in a philosophical sense. That is why it is, 
in this open-ended closure, sensible to create a dialogical space 
in which Foucault in his absence could answer similar straight 
questions on his presence in and writings from Iran – as he did in 
the only extensive interview he was willing to do on this matter 
after February 1979 (Foucault 1988a:211–224). This interview with 
Claire Brière and Pierre Blanchet, conducted after April 1979 
when the bloodshed by Khomeini’s komitehs in Iran became an 
overwhelmingly clear fact, originally appeared in the two 
philosophers’ own work on Iranian revolution (Brière & Pierre 
1979:227–241). In the discussion infra, the many biographical 
references, anecdotes and rhetoric elements in the two 
interviewers’ questions to Foucault are restricted to the bare 
minimum, and Foucault’s answers positioned to supply the 
essence of his arguments in each case and question.
In this interview, Foucault, again without hesitation, commended 
the Iranian revolution as an excellent example of the manifestation 
of a ‘collective will’ that could not be thought of as stemming 
from (Marxist) categories such as class struggle or economic 
oppression. For the revolution to be politically effective, Foucault 
in this exceptional interview stresses that the Shia opposition 
to the Shah had to involve political spirituality, that radical 
Foucaultian  reconfiguration of object–subject relations and a 
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resulting transformation in the subjectivity of a collective. The 
spiritual politics of Islam in 1978 enabled this change to take place 
– ironising the Marxist axiom that religion forms ‘the spirit of a 
world without spirit’.
The dialogue of the interview follows:
Question (Q): ‘Why were so many people, including yourself, 
fascinated by what has happened in Iran over the last year?’
Foucault (F): ‘I would like to go back to another, perhaps less 
important question, yet one that may provide a way for me to 
directly answer your question, namely what is it about what has 
happened in Iran that a whole lot of people, on the Left and on the 
Right, find so irritating?79 The Iran affair and the way in which it has 
taken place have not aroused the same kind of untroubled sympathy 
as for Portugal, for example, or for Nicaragua. I’m not saying that 
Nicaragua aroused a great deal of interest, but in the case of Iran, 
in Europe I soon felt a small, epidermic reaction what was definitely 
not one of immediate sympathy. For example: a well-known French 
journalist wrote an article in Tehran that was published in Paris and, in 
the last sentence in which she spoke of the “Islamic revolt,” she found 
that the adjective “fanatic,” which she had certainly not written, had 
been crudely added to her report. This strikes me as being fairly 
typical of the irritations that the Iranian movement has provoked. 
So, to answer your question: I don’t think that so many people were 
fascinated by what happened in Iran, but rather irritated by it.’
Q.: ‘People are undoubtedly irritated by what has happened in Iran, 
but why? Is it possible that the many different attitudes to Iran play 
a role in this “irritation?” For example, there’s the attitude of the 
classic, orthodox, extreme Left, above all the Communist league, 
which supports Iran and then the whole of the extreme Left, various 
Marxist–Leninist groups, which all say basically the same thing: Yes, 
the demonstrators in Iran are religious rebels, but that doesn’t really 
matter. Religion is after all only a shield. Therefore, we can support 
them unhesitatingly. We can thus support these religious rebels, but 
only from the perspective that the struggle in Iran is a classic anti-
imperialist struggle, like that in Vietnam, in this case incidentally 
79. It is significant that Foucault immediately relays the reference to a ‘fascination’ to a 
polemic notion, namely the ‘irritation’ of his critics back in France at the time.
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led by a religious man, Khomeini, yet one who might quite as well 
be a Marxist–Leninist. On the other hand, the attitude of the more 
moderate Left is one of irritation from the outset. These moderates 
say more or less two things: Firstly, religion is the veil for an archaism, 
a regression at least as far as women are concerned. Secondly, which 
cannot be denied, because one almost intuitively feels it: If ever and 
whenever religious forces come to power and apply their program, 
should we not spontaneously fear a new dictatorship?’
F.: ‘It is, of course, a legitimate question, but it might be said that 
behind these two irritations, that of the extreme Left and that of the 
moderate Left, there is another irritation, or perhaps an astonishment, 
a sort of unease when confronted by a phenomenon that is, for the 
European political mentality, very curious. It is a phenomenon that 
may be called “revolutionary” in the very broad sense of the term, 
since it concerns the uprising of a whole nation against a power that 
oppresses it. Now we normally recognise a “revolution” when we can 
observe two dynamics: the first is that of social confrontations and 
the second involves a political dynamics, that is to say, the presence 
of a vanguard, class, party or political ideology; in short, a spearhead 
that carries the whole nation with it. It seems to me that in what is 
happening in Iran, one can recognise neither of those two dynamics 
that are for us Europeans distinctive signs and explicit marks of a 
revolutionary phenomenon. What, for us, is a revolutionary movement 
in which one cannot situate the internal contradictions of a society and 
in which one cannot point out a vanguard either? The answer to this 
question is to be found in the revolutionary movement in Iran. What is 
spontaneously feared is not a new dictatorship, but a revolution that 
does not conform to European norms and expectations.’
Q.: ‘This could be seen at Tehran University, where there were Marxists 
who all were very conscious of living through what they considered 
to be a “fantastic revolution.” It was evidently much more than they 
had imagined, hoped for, dreamt for and dreamt about. Invariably, 
when asked what they thought, these young Marxists replied: “It is 
a revolutionary situation, but there’s no vanguard.” The reaction one 
hears most often about Iran from within Iran, is that people outside 
Iran “don’t understand.” When a movement is called “revolutionary,” 
people in the West always have this modernist notion of progress, 
of something that is about to be transformed in the direction of 
inevitable progress. This notion of progress is put into question 
by the religious phenomenon in Iran. Indeed, the wave of religious 
confrontation is based on notions that go back for thirteen centuries. 
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It is with these historical notions that the Shah has been challenged, 
whilst, at the same time, the Iranians claim social justice, which 
seems to be in line with progressive thought or action. The Iranians 
themselves are swimming or perhaps drowning in this ambiguity and 
one is able to isolate several levels of language, commitment and 
expression in this regard. There is, for example, the man who says. 
“Long live Khomeini,” who is sincerely convinced about his religion; 
the man who says “long live Khomeini,” but “I’m not particularly 
religious, Khomeini is just a symbol”; the man who says “Yes, I’m 
fairly religious, l like Khomeini, but I prefer Sharnat Madari,” who is a 
very different kind of figure than Khomeini. There is the woman who 
puts on the chador to show that she is against the Shah’s regime; 
and there is another woman, partly secularised, partly Muslim, who 
doesn’t put on the veil, but who will also say “I’m a Muslim and long 
live Khomeini.” Among all these people there are different levels of 
thought. And yet everybody shouts, at one and the same time, with 
great enthusiasm, “Long live Khomeini!” – and all these different 
levels of language and commitment seem to fall away. So, when you 
were in Iran, were you able to determine and to grasp the ambivalent 
nature of this enormous religious confrontation?’
F.: ‘Perhaps, I could refer to Francois Furet’s book on the French 
revolution. It is a very intelligent book and it might help us to sort 
out this ambivalence. Furet draws a distinction between the totality 
of the processes of economic and social transformation that began 
well before the revolution of 1789 and ended well after it, and the 
specificity of that revolutionary event: that is to say, the specificity 
of what people experienced deep inside, but also of what they 
experienced in that sort of theatre that they put together from day to 
day and which constituted the eventual revolution. I wonder whether 
this distinction might not be applied at least to some extent to Iran. 
It is true that Iranian society is shot through with contradictions and 
ambivalences that cannot in any way be denied, but it is certain that 
the revolutionary event that has been taking place for more than a 
year now, and which is at the same time an inner experience, a sort 
of constantly recommenced liturgy, a community experience, and 
so on: All that is certainly articulated onto the class struggle, but 
which doesn’t find expression in an immediate, transparent way. So, 
my answer to you, yet in the form of a question is: What role has 
religion then, with the clearly formidable grip that it has on people, 
the position that it has always held in relation to political power, its 
content, which makes it a religion of combat and sacrifice, and so on? 
It is definitely not the role of an ideology which would help to mask 
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ambivalences or form a sort of sacred union between a great many 
divergent interests. The revolt in Iran really has been the vocabulary, 
the ceremonial, the timeless drama into which one could fit the 
historical drama of a people that pitted its very existence against 
that of its sovereign.’
Q.: ‘What was striking was the uprising of literally a whole population. 
If one considers, for example, the demonstration of Ashura, and 
leave young children, the disabled, the old and the small proportion 
of women who stayed at home aside, it is clear that the whole of 
Tehran was in the streets shouting “Death to the king!”, except of 
course those parasites who literally lived off the regime. Even people 
who were associated with the regime for a very long time and who 
stood for a constitutional monarchy as little as a month before, were 
likewise shouting “Death to the king!” It was an astonishing, unique 
moment and one that must remain. Obviously, afterwards, things will 
settle down and different strata, different classes will become visible. 
How does one explain the collective will that supplied the impetus for 
the involvement of a whole population?’
F.: ‘Indeed, among the things that characterised this revolutionary 
event, is the fact that it has brought out – and very few peoples 
in history have experienced this – an absolutely collective will. Of 
course, on the one hand, this “collective will” is a political myth with 
which jurists and philosophers try to analyse or to justify institutions. 
It is in that sense simply a theoretical tool: Nobody has ever seen 
the “collective will” and, personally, I always thought that the 
collective will was like God or like the soul, something one thought 
one would never encounter. Yet in Tehran and throughout Iran, I have 
met the collective will of a people, not as a theoretical tool, but as a 
transformative dynamic. Well, and you have to salute it, that doesn’t 
happen every day. Furthermore (and here one can indeed speak 
of Khomeini’s “political sense”), this collective will was given one 
object and one target only, namely the departure of the Shah. This 
collective will, which in our theories is always general, has found for 
itself in Iran an absolutely clear, particular aim: and has in this way 
erupted into history. Of course, in the independence struggles and 
in the anti-colonial wars, one encounters similar phenomena. Yet, in 
Iran the national sentiment has been more vigorous than in those 
struggles: The rejection of submission to foreigners, disgust at the 
looting of national resources, the rejection of a dependent foreign 
policy, American interference, which was visible everywhere, have all 
been determinants in the Shah being perceived as a Western agent. 
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But national feeling has, in my opinion, been only one of the elements 
of a still more radical rejection: the rejection by a people, not only 
of foreigners, but of everything that had constituted, for years, for 
centuries, its political destiny.’
Q.: ‘Perhaps one could in this regard refer back to China in 1967, at 
the height of the Lin Piao period: one could at the time observe the 
same type of collective will. Something very powerful was taking 
place, a very deep desire on the part of the whole Chinese people; 
for example, concerning the relationship between town and country, 
intellectuals and manual workers, that is to say, about all those 
questions that have now been settled in China in the usual, traditional 
way. In Peking, the Chinese were forming a people “in fusion.” 
Yet  afterwards, the realisation that both Western commentators 
and the Chinese have been duped, was inescapable. Perhaps, it is 
true that we duped ourselves in believing in the existence of such 
a collective will. Perhaps that is why Western commentators now 
hesitate to allow themselves to be carried away by the revolutionary 
events in Iran. In any case, there is something similar in the charisma 
of Mao and Khomeini – and something similar in the way the young 
Islamic militants speak of Khomeini and the way the Red Guards 
spoke of Mao. Would you agree that the experience in China might 
have had a sobering effect on Western observers commenting on a 
revolution in the East?’
F.: ‘All the same, the Cultural Revolution in China was certainly 
presented as a struggle between certain elements of the population 
and certain others, certain elements in the party and certain others, 
or between the population and the party, to name a few possibilities. 
Iran was different than China because what struck me in Iran was that 
there was no struggle between these possible different elements. 
What gave Iran such beauty, and at the same time such gravity, is that 
there was only one confrontation: between the entire people and the 
state threatening it with its weapons and police. One didn’t have to 
go to extremes to observe it; one found them there at once, on the 
one side, the entire will of the people, on the other the machine guns. 
The people demonstrated, the tanks arrived. The demonstrations were 
repeated, and the machine guns fired yet again. And this occurred in 
an almost identical way, with, of course, an intensification each time, 
but without any change of form or nature. It was the repetition of the 
demonstration that was crucial. The readers of Western newspapers 
must have tired of it fairly soon. Oh, another demonstration in Iran! 
But I believe the demonstrations in Iran, in its very repetition, had 
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an intense political meaning. The very word “demonstration” must 
be taken literally: a people was tirelessly demonstrating its will. 
Of course, it was not only because of the demonstration that the 
Shah left. But one cannot deny that it was because of an endlessly 
demonstrated rejection of the Shah that he eventually left Iran. There 
was in these demonstrations a link between the collective action, the 
religious ritual and the expression of public right. It’s rather like in 
Greek tragedy, where the collective ceremony and the re-enactment 
of the principles of right go hand in hand. In the streets of Tehran, 
there was an act, a political and juridical act, carried out collectively 
within religious rituals – namely an act of deposing the sovereign.’
Q.: ‘Again on the question of the collective will, what was striking was 
when the students came forward and said: “We are all the same, we 
are all one, we are all for the Koran, we are all Muslims, there is no 
difference between us. Make sure you write that, that we’re all the 
same.” Yet everyone knew perfectly well that there were differences, 
for example, that the intellectuals, a section of the bazaaris and the 
middle classes were afraid to go too far. And yet they followed. Could 
you explain that?’
F.: ‘There is a very remarkable fact in what is happening in Iran. There 
was a government that was certainly one of the best in terms of 
weaponry; the best in terms of a large army that was astonishingly 
faithful, compared with what one might think otherwise; and a police 
force that was certainly not very efficient, but whose violence and 
cruelty often made up for its lack of subtlety. It was, moreover, a 
regime directly supported by the United States. It had the backing 
of the whole world, of the countries large and small that surrounded 
it. In a sense, the Shah’s regime had everything going for it, plus, of 
course, oil, which guaranteed the state of an income that it could 
use as it wished. Yet, despite all this, a people rose up in revolt: 
It rose up in a context of crisis and economic difficulties, but the 
economic difficulties in Iran at that time were not sufficiently great 
for people not to take to the streets, in their hundreds of thousands, 
in their millions, and to face machine guns bare-chested. That’s the 
phenomenon that we really have to talk about.’
Q.: ‘In comparative terms, may it be that our own economic difficulties 
are greater than those in Iran at the time?’
F.: ‘Perhaps. Yet, whatever the economic difficulties, we still have 
to explain why there were people who rose up and said: we’re not 
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having any more of this. In rising up, the Iranians said to themselves – 
and this perhaps is the soul of the uprising: Of course, we have to 
change this regime and get rid of this man, we have to change this 
corrupt administration, we have to change the whole country, the 
political organisation, the economic system, the foreign policy. 
But, above all, we have to change ourselves. Our way of being, our 
relationship with others, with things, with eternity, with God, must 
be completely changed and there will only be a true revolution if 
this radical change in our experience takes place. I believe that it is 
here that Islam played a crucial role. It may be that one or other of 
its obligations, one or other of its codes exerted a certain fascination. 
But, above all, in relation to the way of life that was theirs, religion for 
them was like the promise and guarantee of finding something that 
would radically change their subjectivity. Shi’ism is precisely a form 
of Islam that, with its teaching and esoteric content, distinguishes 
between what is mere external obedience to the code and what is 
the profound spiritual life. When I say that they were looking to Islam 
for “changing their subjectivity,” this is quite compatible with the fact 
that traditional Islamic practice was already there and already gave 
them their identity. In this way they had of living the Islamic religion 
as a revolutionary force, there was something other than the desire to 
obey the law more faithfully: there was precisely the desire to renew 
their entire existence by going back to a spiritual experience that 
they thought they could find within Shia Islam itself. People always 
quote Marx on “religion as the opium of the people.” The sentence 
that immediately preceded that statement and which is somehow 
never quoted says that religion is the spirit of a world without spirit. 
Let’s say, then, that Islam, in that year of 1978, was not the opium 
of the people, precisely because it was the spirit of a world without 
spirit.’
Q.: ‘By way of illustrating what you just said – “A demonstration in 
Iran really is a demonstration” – could we possibly use the word 
“witness”? – In the sense that, with the Shah out of the way, the 
movement will necessarily split apart?’
F.: ‘Of course, there will come a moment when the phenomenon 
that we are trying to apprehend and which has so fascinated us and 
yet irritated so many – the revolutionary experience itself – will die 
out. There was literally a light that lit up in all of the demonstrators 
and which bathed all of them at the same time. That will die out. 
At that point, different political forces, different tendencies will 
appear, there will be compromises, there will be this or that, I have 
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no idea who will come out on top and I don’t think there are many 
people who can say now. It will disappear though. There will be 
processes at another level, another reality in a way. What I mean is 
that what we witnessed in Iran was not the result of an alliance, for 
example, between various political groups. Nor was it the result of 
a compromise between social classes that, in the end, each giving 
into the other on this or that, came to an agreement to claim this 
or that thing. Not at all. Something quite different has happened. 
A phenomenon has traversed the entire people and will one day stop. 
At that moment, all that will remain are different political calculations 
that each individual had had in his or her head the whole time. Let’s 
take the activist in some political group as an example. When he was 
taking part in one of those demonstrations, he was double: he had his 
political calculation, which was this or that, and at the same time he 
was an individual caught up in that revolutionary movement, or rather 
an Iranian who had risen up against his king. And the two things did 
not come into contact, he did not rise up against his king because his 
party had made this or that calculation.’
Q.: ‘One of the significant examples of this movement is what has 
happened in the case of the Kurds. The Kurds, a majority of whom are 
Sunnis, and whose autonomist tendencies have long been known, have 
used the language of this uprising. Everybody thought they would 
be against it, whilst they have supported it, saying: “Of course we are 
Sunnis, but above all we are Muslims.” When people spoke to them 
of their Kurdish specificity, their reaction was almost one of anger, or 
rejection. “What! We are Kurds!” they replied to you in Kurdish and 
the interpreter had to translate from Kurdish, “No, not at all, we are 
Iranians above all, and we share all the problems of Iran, we want 
the king to go.” The slogans in Kurdistan were exactly the same as 
those in Tehran or Mashad: “Long live Khomeini” and “Death to the 
Shah.” What do we make of the radical inclusiveness of the revolt?’
F.: ‘I knew some Iranians in Paris, and what struck me about a lot of them 
was their fear: Fear that it would be known that they were consorting 
with Left-wing people, fear that the agents of some observing state 
department might learn that they were reading this or that book, and 
so on. It was exactly the opposite in Iran. When I arrived in Tehran, 
immediately after the September massacres, I said to myself that I 
was going to find a terrorised city, because there had been around 
four thousand dead. Now I can’t say that I found happy people, but 
there was an absence of fear and an intensity of courage, or rather, 
the intensity that people are capable of when danger, though still 
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not removed, had already been transcended. In their revolution they 
had already transcended the danger posed by the machine gun that 
constantly faced all of them. It was this fearlessness that brought them 
all together in Iran, whether Kurd or Shi’ite.’
Q.: ‘Yes, but were the Kurds still with the Shi’ites? Was the National 
Front still with the religious? Was the intelligentsia still following 
Khomeini? If there are twenty thousand dead and the army reacts, if 
there’s a civil war lurking below the surface or an authoritarian Islamic 
Republic on the horizon, there is a risk that we will see some curious 
swings to the back. It will be said, for example, that Khomeini forced 
the hand of the National Front. It will be said that Khomeini did not 
wish to respect the wishes of the middle classes and intelligentsia for 
compromise. All these things are either true or false, not so?’
F.: ‘Actually, it will be true and, at the same time, not true. The other 
day, someone said to me: Everything you think about Iran isn’t true, 
and you don’t realise that there are communists everywhere. But I do 
know this. I know that in fact there are a lot of people who belong 
to communist or Marxist–Leninist organisations – there is no denying 
that. But what I liked about writings as your own was that they 
didn’t try to break up this phenomenon into its constituent elements; 
they tried to leave it as a single beam of light, even though we know 
that it is made up of several beams. That’s both the risk and the 
interest in talking about Iran.’
Q.: ‘One evening, we went out after the curfew with a very Westernised, 
40-year-old woman, who had previously lived in London and was 
now living in a house in northern Tehran. She came to where we were 
living, in a working-class district. Shots were being fired on every side. 
We took her into the backstreets, to see the army, to see the ordinary 
people, the shouts from the rooftops. It was the first time she had 
been in that district on foot. It was the first time she had spoken with 
such ordinary people, people who cried out “Allah Akbar!” (“God is 
great!”). She was completely overcome, embarrassed that she was 
not wearing a chador, not because she was afraid that someone 
might throw vitriol in her face, but because she wanted to be like 
the other women. It wasn’t so much the episode of the chador that 
is important, but what those people said to us. They spoke in a very 
religious way and always said at the end: “May God keep you” and 
other such religious expressions. She replied in the same way, with 
the same language. She said to us: “This is the first time I have ever 
spoken like that.” She was very moved.’
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F.: ‘Yet, one day, all this will become, for historians, a rallying of the 
upper classes to a popular Left-wing movement. That will be an 
“analytical truth.” I believe it is one of the reasons why one feels a 
certain unease when one comes back from Iran and people, wanting 
to understand, ask one for an analytical schema of an already 
constituted reality.’
Q.: ‘Another interpretative grid that we Western journalists have often 
had comes to mind. This movement has followed such an odd logic that, 
on several occasions, Western observers have ignored it; for example, the 
day of the National Front strike in November, which had been a failure; or 
the fortieth day of mourning of Black Friday, which had been terrible. One 
could imagine how the fortieth day of mourning would be very moving, 
very painful. Now, on the fortieth day, many shops were reopened, and 
people didn’t seem particularly sad. Yet the movement began again with 
its own logic, its own rhythm, its own breathing. It seemed that in Iran, 
despite the hectic rhythm at Tehran, the movement followed a rhythm 
that might be compared with that of a man – they walked like a single 
man – who breathes, gets tired, gets his breath back, resumes the attack, 
but really with a collective rhythm. On that fortieth day of mourning, 
there was no great demonstration of mourning. After the massacre in 
Jaleh Square on Friday 08 September 1978, the Iranians were getting 
their breath back. The movement was relaunched by the astonishing 
contagion of the strikes that began about that time. Then there was 
the start of the new academic year, the angry reaction of the Tehran 
population, which set fire to Western symbols. What is your reaction to 
this, what for us Westerners may seem an oddity?’
F.: ‘Well, another thing that struck me as “odd” was the way the 
“weapon of oil” was used. If there was one immediately sensitive spot, 
it was oil, which was both the cause of the evil and the absolute 
weapon. One day we may know what happened. It certainly seems 
that the strike and its tactics had not been calculated in advance. 
On the spot, without their being any order coming from above, at 
a given moment, the workers went on strike, coordinating among 
themselves, from town to town, in an absolutely free way. Indeed, 
it wasn’t a strike in the strict sense of a cessation of work and an 
interruption of production. It was clearly the affirmation that the oil 
belonged to Iranian people and not to the Shah or to his clients or 
partners. It was at heart a strike in favour of national reappropriation.’
Q.: ‘Then, on the contrary, for it would not be honest to be silent 
about it, it must be said that when I, an individual, a foreign journalist, 
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a woman, was confronted by this “oneness,” this collective will, one 
could feel an extraordinary shock, mentally and physically. It was as if 
that oneness required that everyone conform to it. In a sense, it was 
woe betide anyone who did not conform. We all had problems of this 
kind in Iran. Hence, perhaps, the reticence that people often feel in 
Europe. An uprising is all very fine, yes, but the consequences?’
F.: ‘Yes, there were demonstrations, verbal at least, of violent anti-
Semitism. There were demonstrations of xenophobia and directed 
not only at Americans but also at foreign workers who had come to 
work in Iran. That was problematic.’
Q.: ‘This is indeed the other side of the unity that certain people may 
find offensive. For example, once a photographer got punched in 
the face several times because he was thought to be an American. 
“No,  I’m French,” he protested. The demonstrators then embraced 
him and said: “Above all, don’t say anything about this in the press.” 
Of course, the demonstrators’ imperious demands come to mind as 
well: “Make sure you say that there were so many thousand victims, 
so many million demonstrators in the streets.” That is another 
problem: The problem of a different culture, a different attitude to 
the truth. Besides it’s part of the struggle. When your hands are 
empty, if you pile up the dead, real and imaginary, you ward off fear, 
and you become all the more convincing, not so?’
F.: ‘They don’t have the same regime of truth as ours, which, it has to be 
said, is very special, even if it has become almost universal. The Greeks 
had their own. The Arabs of the Maghreb have another. And in Iran it is 
largely modelled on a religion that has an exoteric form and an esoteric 
content. That is to say, everything that is said under the explicit form 
of the law also refers to another meaning. So not only is saying one 
thing that means another not a condemnable ambiguity, it is, on the 
contrary, a necessary and highly prized added level of meaning. It is 
often the case that people say something that, at the factual level, isn’t 
true, but which refers to another, deeper meaning, which cannot be 
assimilated in terms of precision and observation.’
Q.: ‘It does become a real problem when one is told over and over 
again that all minorities will be respected and when, at the same 
time, they clearly aren’t being respected. When people speak to you 
about Jews – it is true that there was a lot of anti-Semitic talk – that 
they will tolerate them only if they don’t support Israel and when 
anonymous notes are sent out, the credibility of the movement is 
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somewhat affected. It is the strength of the movement to be a single 
unity. As soon as it perceives slight differences, it feels threatened. So 
the intolerance is there – perhaps necessary?’
F.: ‘What has given the Iranian movement its intensity has indeed 
been a double register. On the one hand, a collective will that has 
been very strongly expressed politically and, on the other hand, the 
desire for a radical change in ordinary life. But this double affirmation 
can only be based on traditions, institutions that carry a charge of 
chauvinism, nationalism, exclusiveness, which have a very powerful 
attraction for certain individuals. To confront so fearsome an armed 
power, one mustn’t feel alone, nor begin with nothing.’
Apart from the problem of the immediate succession to the Shah, 
there is another question that interests me at least as much: Will this 
unitary movement, which, for a year now has stirred up a people 
faced with machine guns, have the strength to cross its own frontiers 
and go beyond the things on which, or a time, it has based itself? 
Are those limits, are those supports going to disappear once the 
initial enthusiasm wanes, or are they, on the contrary, going to take 
root and become stronger? Many here and some in Iran are waiting 
for and hoping for the moment when secularisation will at last 
come back to the fore and reveal the good, old type of revolution we 
Europeans have always known. I wonder how far the Iranians will be 
taken along this strange, unique road, in which they look for, against 
the stubbornness of their destiny and against everything they have 
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Foucault in Iran, 1978–1979




Foucault in Iran, 1978-1979, by Johann Beukes, is a major contribution to the specialised 
field of Foucault research. It is an impressive, detailed in-depth study of the single brief event 
of Foucault’s two short visits of nine and seven days, respectively, to Iran in 1978, intended 
as a journalistic covering of the Iranian revolution, the result of which appeared in 1979. 
However, the book analyses and interprets the full context of its wider philosophical and 
political ramifications and implications. The breadth and depth of Beukes’ engagement with 
the primary and secondary literature concerning Foucault in general, and his Iran adventure 
in particular, are admirable. Equally convincing is his excellently informed situating of this 
in-itself small-scale event in the very wide context of the dynamic and multifarious post-
enlightenment Western tradition of social thinking and the various faces of critique thereof. 
The author’s style of academic engagement, his application of the morality of academic 
discourse, including historical evaluation, is exemplary. In his hands this type of interaction 
is not an exercise in aggressive destruction, but a constructive engagement, seeking 
fairness and balance. The book is deeply sympathetic Motifforschung as far as Foucault is 
concerned, taking a wide spectrum of relevant factors into consideration, and is a constructive 
alternative to the personal belittling of Foucault by the majority of his critics. This book moves 
beyond the limitations and implications of a conflictual style, opening the possibility of an 
open-ended never-final process instead of the final put-down and shut-down often sought 
in academic discourse. This does not mean that Beukes is blind to the shortcomings in 
Foucault’s evaluation of the Iranian situation at the time of the revolution, but these are seen 
as serious yet understandable and explicable shortcomings, not as fatal flaws in academic 
and personal integrity. Foucault in Iran, 1978-1979 appreciates the religious quality of the 
French philosopher’s notion of ‘political spirituality’, and invites further reflection.
Prof. J.S. Krüger, Faculty of Theology and Religion, 
University of Pretoria, Pretoria, South Africa 
The book guides the reader into the mysteries of Foucault’s involvement and understanding 
of the Iranian revolution and its aftermath in 1978 to 1979. It moves away from the often 
too simplified interpretation of Foucault’s involvement and writings during this period as 
a ‘breathtaking mistake’ and Beukes presents an alternative view based on an in depth 
understanding and correspondence of Foucault philosophy and positions on power, death, 
madness, uncertainty, spirituality, Orientalism and Otherness. Ten crucial questions about 
Foucault in Iran are asked very directly and answered in a well thought-through and 
researched way. These questions are: (1) Did Foucault explicitly support the cause of the 
revolting masses in Iran in 1978 on modern-critical grounds? (2) Did Foucault foresee 
Khomeini’s understanding and implementation of what an ‘Islamic Republic’ should be and 
did he at any point of what was left of his career, endorse that understanding and application, 
even implicitly? (3) Was Foucault justifiably being held accountable by his critics in France 
for a naive perspective on the vicious potential embedded in any religious fundamentalism? 
(4) Did Foucault have clear objectives for his journalistic expedition to Iran and if he did not, 
why should that be a problem philosophically? (5) Did Foucault appreciate the unfolding 
revolution in Iran on strictly philosophical grounds? (6) Was Foucault primarily fascinated by 
the violent confrontation with identity he witnessed in Iran?
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